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“Amerika, das Land der Träume,
Du Wunderwelt so lang und breit,
Wie schön sind Deine Kokosbäume,
und Deine rege Einsamkeit!”
[...]
Friederike Kempner, 19031
“America, the land of dreams,
you magical world so long and wide,
how beautiful are your coconut trees,
and your vivid solitude!”2
[...]
Friederike Kempner, 1903
1.1. Topic Introduction and Research Questions
As early as 1903 the German writer Friederike Kempner grasped an ambivalence 
which would become the nucleus of the literary America-reception for the following 
decades. In the first few lines of her poem Amerika3 (see above) Kempner depicts the 
United  States  of  America4 as  shimmering  land  of  boundless  possibilities,  but 
simultaneously raises awareness for its potential risks: the solitude of the individual 
in the midst of a mass-society. This dichotomy between admiring and admonishing 
the United States from a distance, became the centre of a lively America-debate that 
reached its preliminary highpoint during the 1920s. This debate was in no way a 
German peculiarity, but was rather part of a shared canon that extended beyond the 
German border  and was  similarly prominent  in  France.  The America-debate  was 
however  not  limited  to  the  simple  perception  of  the  USA as  a  model,  be  it  in 
1 Friederike Kempner, Gedichte (Berlin: Siegismund, 1903).
2 All English translation which follow in this thesis will have been made by myself.
3 Kempner, Gedichte.
4 Hereinafter also referred to as USA and United States.
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economic, political or social terms, it was just as much a reflection about American 
influences  in  France  and  Germany,  subsumed  under  the  term  Americanization. 
Debating America at the beginning of the twentieth century went hand in hand with a 
profound contemplation about its influences on other parts of the world.
Similar to the America-perception of the time, the Americanization-debate was 
just as much divided into admiration on the one hand and rejection on the other. Two 
opposing camps would be at the heart of this debate and were embedded into older 
historic  narratives:  pro-  or  philo-Americans  and  anti-Americans.  Pro-Americans 
would  welcome  American  developments  and  accomplishments  and  demand  the 
adoption  of  the  American  model  in  Europe.  Contrastingly  anti-Americans  would 
reject  American  influences  and  preach  caution  regarding  the  negative  effects  of 
Americanization  on  society.  Americanization  as  a  technical  term  could  thereby 
include economic, political, social and cultural influences, originally American and 
directed towards other countries such as Germany and France.5 It was essentially a 
discourse regarding a value transfer from the New World to the Old, negotiated in 
relation to the own nation state. This oscillating debate of American influences will 
serve as a framework for the research on hand, which, in essence, will investigate the 
Americanization discourse in Germany and France between 1918 and 1933. Thereby 
the study on hand will investigate the following main research questions: What is the  
relation between the Americanization-debate (i.e. pro- and anti-Americanism) and  
national  identity  in  Germany  and  France  in  the  1920s? What  are  the  main  
differences and similarities between the pro- and anti-American authors in France  
and Germany? How can we explain these differences and similarities? The research 
will  thus  primarily  explore the  construction  of  national  identity  in  Germany and 
France through investigating the perception of the USA in primary sources.  
1.2. Social relevance in past and present
The German and French America-reception during the interwar-period is no closed 
off debate, but rather part of a long historical tradition that is as old as the USA itself.  
5 In the US, the term “Americanization” was used earlier to point to the process of integrating migrants into American 
society. This Americanization movement in the USA consisted of private initiatives, including big companies like 
the Ford Motor Company. Chapter 2 will investigate the concept of “Americanization” in more detail, including its 
earlier meanings and usage.
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Since colonial times, different visions of America were debated in Europe, mainly 
rooted in the strong colonial transatlantic connection. One of the earliest narratives 
was comprised of the idea that America - as land of opportunity - was a pre-civilised 
social utopia. The USA served as a political model, which had the opportunity of 
starting  from scratch  and consequently  became a  platform for  visions  and hopes 
about the future. This idea of an “America experiment” would prevail up until the 
nineteenth century.6 
During the nineteenth century, the perception of America was largely influenced 
by the European waves of immigration. Emigration from Germany to America had 
been more voluminous than from France and a rather positive image of the USA as 
land of freedom and opportunities prevailed in the German reception. Some critical 
voices  towards  America,  mainly  stressing  the  lack  of  American  culture,  can 
nevertheless be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.7 The French 
America  cognition  of  this  period  can  in  return  be  characterised  as  largely 
lackadaisical spiked with occasional cultural condescension.8 
The ascent of the USA during the second half of the nineteenth century gave rise 
to  a  new form of  America  reception which  would  focus  on  America's  economic 
potential, its geographic expansion and its cultural exports. Suddenly the visions of 
America were no longer confined to a place across the Atlantic, they were brought to 
Europe through Americanization and were set  in relation to the national realities. 
Around 1900 the America-debate entered a new phase where hopes and fears were no 
longer  projected  on  America,  but  rather  related  to  American  influences,  thus 
Americanization.  Similar  to  the  simple  “America-debate”,  the  Americanization 
debate was equally double-barrelled and divided into pro-  and anti-Americanism. 
Even though both strands reach back until the American Revolution (1776-1783), it 
was  the  combination  of  this  ambivalence  and  the  current  national  reality  which 
plunged the discourse into a new phase around the turn of the century, where the 
“idiosyncratic  dependence”9 of  pro-  and  anti-Americanism  culminated  in  the 
6 Astrid Grewe, Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: C. 
Winter, 1985), p. 15f.
7 Thomas Raithel, ‘“Amerika” als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren’, in  
Deutschland - Frankreich - Nordamerika: Transfers, Imaginationen, Beziehungen, ed. by Chantal Metzger and 
Harmut Kaelble (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), 82–97 (p. 86f) 
8 Idem., p. 86f.
9 J. C. E. Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, The 
American Historical Review, 111 (2006), 1067–91 (p. 1073) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ahr.111.4.1067>.
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Americanization debate. 
Debating Americanization became a prominent part of the public discourse in the 
industrialised nations in Europe.  As early  as 1893 Frenchmen Émile Barbier  had 
stated that “America is invading old Europe; it is flooding it and will soon submerge 
it”10 clearly discussing the Americanization not  only of  France,  but  of  Europe in 
general, without actually referring to it as a concept or technical term. It would take 
another nine years and the British journalist W.T. Stead (1849-1912) and his famous 
work  The Americanization of the World11 to address the concept as such and make 
“Americanization” a popular term. Stead combined pro- and anti-Americanism by 
linking them to an inevitable expansion of American politics, economics, culture and 
military and hoped that Great-Britain and the USA could jointly rule on the dawn of 
the Anglo-Saxon century.12 
In Germany, it was Max Goldberger (1848-1913) who published Das Land der  
unbegrenzenten  Möglichkeiten13 (Land  of  boundless  possibilities)  in  1903  and 
depicted America, as the title already suggests, as a land of boundless possibilities 
whilst  debating  its  industrial  and  economic  influences.  During  the  same  year 
Wilhelm von Polenz's (1861-1903) Land der Zukunft14 (Land of Future) picked up an 
important narrative for the unfolding Americanization debate: the idea that America's 
past was Europe's future. By 1913 the German writer Bernhard Kellermann (1879-
1951) published a work entitled Der Tunnel15 (The Tunnel) which made an explicit 
reference  to  this  connection  between  the  USA and  Germany  through  its  title.  It 
symbolised and elucidated the dominant idea that American developments would in 
the near future also reach Europe.16 Shortly before the First World War the debate 
about  America and its influences  had thus  become the geographical  run-up for a 
discussion about the German and French future. 
The existing America-perception would however be fundamentally impacted by 
10 Émile Barbier, Voyage au pays des dollars. (Paris: E. Flammarion, 1893), p. 336f. Cited in Philippe Roger, The 
American enemy: The history of French anti-Americanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 137, 
footnote 19 (p. 470).
11 W[illiam] T[homas] Stead, The Americanisation of the World, of the Trend of the Twentieth Century ... (London: The 
‘Review of reviews’ office, 1902).
12 Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, p. 1073.
13 Ludwig Max Goldberger, Das Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten. Beobachtungen über das Wirtschaftsleben der  
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. (Berlin; New York: F. Fontane & Co.; Brentano’s, 1903).
14 Wilhelm von Polenz, Das Land der Zukunft (Berlin; Chicago: F. Fontane ; Brentano’s, 1904).
15 Bernhard Kellermann, Der Tunnel (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1913).
16 Dieter Heimböckel, “Zivilisation auf dem Treibriemen: Die USA im Urteil der deutschen Literatur um und nach 
1900,” in Mythos USA : “Amerikanisierung” in Deutschland seit 1900, ed. Frank Becker and Elke Reinhardt-Becker 
(Frankfurt/Main ; New York: Campus, 2006), p. 50f,  especially p.53.
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the First World War. Pro- and anti-American narratives that did indeed have their 
roots well before 1900 were bundled and intensified through the Great War which 
served as a magnifying glass, repositioning the Americanization debate into the broad 
public.  With  the  American  war-entry  in  1917,  the  USA  had  literally  and 
metaphorically  arrived  in  Europe.  The  First  World  War  would  exemplify  the 
American predominance economically and militarily. When the war reached peace 
negotiations by 18 January 1919, the American supremacy among the allied forces 
had  become  self-evident  and  was  personified  by  its  President  Woodrow  Wilson 
(1856-1924).  His  famous  ʻFourteen  Pointsʼ  were  the  benchmark  for  the  peace 
negotiations and would help to concretely shape the European future. The USA was 
thus no longer- as Kempner's  poem had suggested a few years earlier-  a magical 
world, far away across the Atlantic, it had become part of the political reality and 
decision-making in Europe. 
This  new political  time-period  would  consequently,  especially  in  France  and 
Germany,  trigger  a  wave  of  publications  discussing  the  “American-model”,  its 
advantages and influences, but simultaneously its disadvantages and risks. The fact 
that  America  as  phenomenon  had  become  concrete,  amplified,  popularised  and 
repositioned the America-perception and with it the America debate. America became  
a projection surface for a German and French debate about American influences and 
beyond that a debate about modernity and the future. Pro- and anti-American circles 
would discuss the USA and its influences and place them in relation to their own 
national reality. Indeed, American influences had become omnipresent in the post-
war period. Taylorist17 and Fordist18 methods were applied in the economy, whilst 
American movies and consumer products would influence the cultural everyday-life. 
At least until Hitler's ascension to power in 1933, the USA would be an important 
reference point for political, economic and cultural questions in Germany and France 
during the 1920s.19 
Diverse  interwar-publications  about  the  USA and  a  profound  interest  in  the 
“American-model” were not limited to Germany or France. They were rather part of 
a European canon that would show similar characteristic in countries such as the 
Netherlands. The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga for example in 1918 published a 
17 Taylorism refers to standardization of workflows, based on scientific management, initiated by Frederick Taylor.
18 Fordism refers to industrial mass-production, named after Henry Ford pioneering this economic development.
19 Viktor Otto, Deutsche Amerika-Bilder: zu den Intellektuellen-Diskursen um die Moderne 1900-1950  (Paderborn: W. 
Fink, 2006)., p. 15f.
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work  entitled  Mensch  en  menigte  in  Amerika20 which  intended  to  contribute  a 
historical  background to  the  ongoing America-debate.  When Huizinga visited the 
USA eight years later in 1926 he published his impressions in  Amerika levend en  
denkend.21 In  his  second work Huizinga offered an ambivalent  assessment  of  the 
American  society,  torn  between  admiration  of  the  economically  potent  USA and 
wariness of its influences on Europe such as materialism, mechanization and cultural 
mediocracy.22 
As one can see, the USA and its influences on other parts of the world have a 
long  historical  tradition.  The  USA as  a  social  model  has  always been discussed 
ambivalently,  people  were  always  either  for,  against  or  indecisive,  but  never 
indifferent towards it. With the American participation in the First World War and the 
following political and economic involvement on European soil,  the United States 
had  a  large  social  relevance  during  the  interwar  period.  The  vast  number  of 
publications about the USA are a tribute to the important position it held in the public 
discourse.23 The social relevance of the America debate and of this research therefore 
extends from the past into the present. Pro- and anti-Americanism are also today part 
of an ongoing social canon which correlates American influences and the national 
reality.24 Burning American  flags in  the  Middle  East  flicker  across  the  television 
screens  and parliamentary  committees  investigate  the  impact  and purview of  the 
National  Security  Agency  (NSA).  Clearly  the  connection  between  American 
influences and their impact on national realities is still socially relevant and discussed 
controversially.  The research on hand tries to  demonstrate  its historical  roots and 
idiosyncrasies for the 1920s.
20 Johan Huizinga, Mensch En Menigte in Amerika: Vier Essays over Moderne Beschavingsgeschiedenis  (Haarlem: 
H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1918).
21 Johan Huizinga, Amerika levend en denkend: losse opmerkingen (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1927).
22 Cornelis Van Minnen, ‘Dutch perceptions of American culture and promotion of dutch culture in the United States’,  
in Four centuries of Dutch-American relations : 1609-2009 (Boom, 2009), pp. 431–41, esp. 431-435.
23 Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland Und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, in Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse Zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld  
nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder, ed. by Wolfgang Essbach (Berlin, 2000), 173–91 (p. 4, particularly 
footnote 12), and Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: ‘Amerikanisierung’ in Deutschland und Frankreich  
(1900-1933) (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2003), p. 283f.
24 For a recent example on German anti-Americanism see: ‘Aggressive Stimmung in Erfurt Jetzt geht es gegen die 
„Amerikanisierung des Abendlandes“’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 January 2015 
<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/aggressive-stimmung-in-erfurt-jetzt-geht-es-gegen-die-amerikanisierung-des-
abendlandes-13388968.html> [accessed 28 September 2015].
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1.3. Scientific relevance and periodisation
The America perception and debate during the 1920s was particularly prevailing in 
Germany and France. Both countries shared a similar fate after the First World War 
in  terms  of  the  redevelopment  they  faced  as  consequence  of  the  wartime 
devastations. Infrastructure and economy had been heavily impaired, let alone the 
military and civil casualties. Although dissimilarly victor and loser of the war, both 
countries awaited similar difficulties regarding their political and economic national 
realities, but also in terms of their national identity. Whenever America as exemplary 
model was debated,  it  was placed in  relation to  the national  reality and potential 
future.  Whilst  pro-Americans  supported  the  adoption  of  the  American  economic 
model, anti-Americans dismissed the cultural consequences of the uniform American 
mass-society. German and French pro- and anti-Americanism in the interwar period 
became a reflection about the applicability of the American model on the national 
reality and its consequences for the future. 
The research on hand will take up this cornerstone and investigate at the heart 
the relation between Franco-German pro- and anti-Americanism and (the respective) 
national identity. The research is therewith part of a field of study that has been at 
best marginally researched: the relationship between the Americanization discourse 
and  national  identity.  Whereas  each  concept  by  itself  has  been  well  researched 
(which will be covered in Chapter 2), the causal relationship between them has only 
been  assessed  very  sparsely  and  only  for  a  different  timeframe.  The  main 
contribution  of  this  research  to  the  academic  debate  is  therefore  the  explicit 
exploration of how and why Americanization and national identity interrelate. 
The periodisation of the research on hand will be the timespan between 1918 and 
1933. The year 1918, with the end of the First World War, marks a historical turning 
point and logical starting point for this study. 1918 saw the “14 Point Speech” by the 
US-President  Woodrow Wilson as  well  as  the First  World War  armistice  and the 
following peace negotiations (for which the “14 Points Plan” became the basis). In 
November 1918, a republican revolution swept through the monarchic Germany and 
the subsequent proclamation of the republic radically changed its political system. 
The  developments  of  1918  thus  shifted  the  distribution  of  power  in  Europe  and 
changed the role and importance of the USA in European affairs. As a consequence, 
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the America- and Americanization-debate entered a new phase, which was influenced 
by the historical incidents, and would prevail until the 1930s.
  The year 1933 will figure as endpoint for this study as it shifted the political 
climate  in  Germany  once  again.  In  January  1933  Adolf  Hitler  was  appointed 
Chancellor of Germany and by March the Enabling Act had amended the constitution 
of the Weimar Republic to the effect that Hitler had the power to enact laws without 
the  involvement  of  the  Reichstag.  Even  though  the  constitution  of  the  Weimar 
Republic was not invalidated,  it  lost  its democratic function and consolidated the 
seizure of power of the Nazis. The rise of the Nazis in 1933 marked the beginning of 
a period which gradually changed the political landscape of Europe in its entirety. 
Therefore, even though not marking an explicit caesura for France, the year 1933 was 
in this sense at least of indirect political importance. This study will thus temporally 
conclude with the end of the Weimar Republic.
1.4. Theory and Methodology
Besides directing the research towards the concept of national identity and resting it 
on  a  transnational  framework25,  the  research  also  draws  upon  its  theoretical 
orientation  as  an  innovative  strategy.  This  study will  be  using  Constructivism as 
International Relations Theory (not to confound with Constructivism in Psychology, 
Education or Sociology where it  has a different  meaning)  and is  therefore at  the 
interface between the fields of History and International Relations. Whilst the explicit  
use of International Relations Theory is not very common in historical research it 
does  offer  several  benefits  when  applied  to  present-day  phenomena  as  well  as 
historical developments. Constructivism, stressing the social construction of meaning 
and the intersubjective definition of social realities, is very eligible when researching 
socially constructed concepts such as Americanization. The scientific relevance of 
25 Transnational history investigates the reach and movement of people, ideas and institutions across national borders. 
It generally refers to the period since the emergence of the nation-state and involves empirical research in more than  
one nation's archive. For additional information see: ‘What is Transnational History?’, Ian Tyrrell, 2008 
<https://iantyrrell.wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/> [accessed 24 December 2016]; ‘Promises and 
Perils of Transnational History’ <https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-
history/december-2012/the-future-of-the-discipline/promises-and-perils-of-transnational-history> [accessed 24  
December 2016].
In this study the transnational framework mainly refers to how Americanization, pro- and anti-Americanism as  
abstract concepts were part of larger narratives, rather than being German or French peculiarities.
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the research on hand consequently also rests upon its theoretical underpinning, the 
application  of  constructivist  theory  and  methodology  which  shall  be  briefly 
elucidated in the following section. A separate chapter (chapter three) will provide an 
in-depth description of the theory and methodology. 
Constructivist theory entered the field of International Relations Studies at the 
end of the 1980s. It developed out of an epistemological swing in the social sciences 
on the one hand and out of the fact that existing theories of international relations 
neglected the importance of identities and interests on the other, only focusing on the 
exertion of power rather than its causality.26 Epistemologically the humanities had 
entered a phase where the interpretational gap between subject and object had been 
overcome  with  developments  such  as  the  linguistic  turn,  acknowledging  that 
language  was  a  major  determinant  in  constituting  reality  and  the  meaning  that 
derived from it. This novel focus on meaning and the construction of reality, gave 
birth  to  Constructivism,  which  as  the  term  suggests  centres  around  the  social 
construction of meaning. Meaning derives from social relations and representations, 
ultimately leading to intersubjective interpretations as the main benchmark for the 
creation  of  social  reality.27 The  ontological  dimension  of  Constructivism 
complemented the ongoing debate in the field of international relations, which up 
until the 1980s had been dominated by (Neo) Realism stressing the importance of 
material forces in an international relations framework where states were the major 
actors.  Constructivism,  radically  challenging  Realism intellectually  and  opposing 
theories such as Liberalism rationally, largely neglected the importance of material 
forces as such and rather focused on the socially constructed concepts behind these 
forces  which  would  define  their  meaning  and  importance  for  social  realities. 
Constructivism would henceforth view power as a constant in international relations 
and  build  its  intellectual  framework  on  identities,  interests  and  the  interplay  of 
structure and agency. The causality of power rather than its exertion is of interest to 
the Constructivist.28 In conclusion, structures (in very basic terms all forms of social 
order and representation) and agency (the individual's possibility to autonomously 
26 Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 15.
27 Ian Hurd, ‘Constructivism’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and 
Duncan Snidal, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 298–316 
(p. 300f).
28 Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, p. 15. The constructivist 
conception of power will be developed in more detail in chapter 3.1.1.
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make choices and exert control) provide the philosophical background to the social 
theory of Constructivism, identities and interests define the behaviour of political 
actors.
As  already  discussed,  this  research  will  primarily  investigate  the  relation 
between  national  Americanization-debates  and  national  identities.  From  a 
constructivist standpoint, national identities generally consist of two basic elements. 
First, they provide a distinction from others, a sort of “us” versus “them”. Second, 
they are continuous over time. This continuity over time is not a given, as national 
identities need to be renegotiated in relation to the social reality: they need to be 
reinforced through social relations and representations.29 One of the key tasks for this 
research  will  be  to  determine  the  processes  which  lead  to  the  creation  of  these 
national identities, for example their reinforcement over time and space. Thereby the 
main criteria of analysis will encompass the mutual constitution of identities, as well 
as the rejection, incorporation and the reinforcement of national identities. 
Methodologically the study on hand will not only draw on constructivist theory, 
it  will  also  combine  it  with  the  case  study  method  and  comparative  historical 
research. The research design is therefore eclectic by combining multiple research 
methods. As for any other research, the methodology will be chosen in accordance 
with  the  research  topic.  By  investigating  German  and  French  pro-  and  anti-
Americanism  as  two  separate  cases,  the  case  study  method  hence  provides  an 
adequate  research  framework.  Case  studies  answer  how and  why  questions  in  a 
closed ontology and epistemologically  favour  deductive  approaches  based on the 
positivist  paradigm of knowledge accumulation.30 Case studies can be subdivided 
into single and multiple-case designs, with this research being a multiple-case design 
(four  cases).31 Both  cases  will  be  analysed  regarding  possible  similarities  and 
differences  in  their  respective  Americanization-discourse  through  a  cross-case 
comparison. 
This cross-case comparison will be carried out through comparative historical 
methodology.  The  comparative  historical  method  is  epistemologically  located  in 
qualitative  research.  Its  main  focus  is  to  investigate  whether  shared  phenomena 
29 M. Montserrat Guibernau i Berdún, The Identity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 9f.
30 Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, ‘Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, The Oxford 
Handbooks of Political Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 109–30 (p. 111f).
31 Jennifer Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, Management Research News, 25 (2002), 16–27 (p. 21f).
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between cases can be explained by the same causes. Comparative-historical research 
in  combination  with  a  cross-national  case  study  offers  two  different  research 
approaches: nomothetic and ideographic. The nomothetic approach aims at finding 
generalised  causalities  applicable  to  the  universe  of  cases,  hence  demanding  a 
multiple-case design. The ideographic approach aims at finding explanations for one 
particular case, leaving aside the larger universe of cases. This research will use an 
ideographic  approach,  investigating  each  case  for  itself  with  a  narrative-causal 
explanation framework. Thereafter the  results  can be compared to  allow possible 
generalizations.
The final methodological step relates to the chosen multiple-case design. Any 
multiple-case design distinguishes between holistic and embedded approaches. The 
former regards each case as one unit of analysis, taking a bird's eye perspective on 
the case, whilst the latter investigates multiple sub-units of the case on hand. Holistic 
approaches are favourable when no logical analytical subdivisions emerge. This will 
be  in  fact  the  case  for  the  research  on  hand.  The  units  of  analysis  the 
Americanization-discourse  could  offer  (for  example  how  economic,  cultural  or 
political forms of Americanization were perceived) are too large-scale as variables to 
make serious  assumptions  about  them in a  cross-national  context.  To bridge  this 
complication, it will be most beneficial for this research to use non-fictional literature 
as  medium to  investigate  the  Americanization-debate  and  its  relation  to  national 
identity. Literature does not only a priori consist of discourses, it actually depicts and 
processes the social reality and therefore incorporates all the possible variables one 
could investigate on a superordinate level. It is therefore the broadest and yet most 
precise  starting  point  to  investigate  constructed  concepts  such  as  pro-  and  anti-
Americanism,  i.e.  the  appropriate  approach  for  this  research.  In  conclusion,  the 
research  on  hand  will  use  a  constructivist  approach  to  investigate  the 
Americanization-discourse  in  non-fictional  literary  sources  through a  holistic  and 
ideographic cross-national case-comparison.
1.5. Source Selection
In  order  to  investigate  the  Americanization  discourse  and its  relation  to  national 
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identity  through  literature,  this  research  will  look  at  four  authors  which  are 
representative of respectively the German and French pro- and anti-Americanism. 
Past research has shown that one can consider the works of these authors on America 
as  prevailing  reasoning,  containing  a  majority  of  the  argumentations  of  their 
respective circles.  According to the literature this relevance mainly stems from the 
authors' role in the respective pro- and anti-American groups in their countries. They 
were thus part of like-minded organised circles, wrote books about the USA and gave 
speeches  on  the  subject.  This  research  is  consequently  following  the  secondary 
literature in assessing that the four authors are important and in fact representative in 
the debate. 
The source selection additionally arises out of practical reasons. For each of the 
four authors there exists primary archival material on their life and work as well as 
secondary  literature.  The  selection  of  the  four  authors  is  hence  based  on  a 
combination of  practicality  and their  importance in  the secondary  literature.  This 
selection  however  naturally  has  some  limitations.  By  following  the  secondary 
literature in its representability-assessment one has to accept that it is possible the 
importance of the authors might be overestimated. One equally has to accept that the 
authors are not representative of the entire debate but only of those authors whose 
work  has  been  researched.  Bearing  in  mind  these  limitations  this  research  will 
investigate the America-related work of Julius Hirsch, Lucien Romier, Adolf Halfeld 
and Georges Duhamel.
The selected literature consists of either travelogues or is based on journeys to 
the USA and therefore depicts a, at least for the authors, accurate description of the 
American model. The sources offer a combination of the prevalent argumentation in 
the public discourse, the perceived reality and inevitably the personal experiences of 
the authors.  The life of the authors will  therefore be of great  importance for this 
research, as the background of the authors helps to contextualise and understand their 
specific ideas, despite conveying the widespread argumentation. 
The  main  source  for  the  German  pro-Americanism  will  be  the  work  Das 
Amerikanische  Wirtschaftswunder32 (The  American  Economic  Miracle)  by  Julius 
Hirsch (1882-1961), published in 1926. Hirsch was a German-Jewish economist who 
taught at the University of Cologne. Between 1919 and 1922 he was Secretary of 
32 Julius Hirsch, Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1926).
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State in the German Ministry of Commerce where he was involved in the post-war 
reparations  negotiations  and the  economic  development  of  Germany.  In 1933,  he 
emigrated  to  Copenhagen and then  further  to  the  USA in  1941.  In  the  USA, he 
worked  for  the  U.S.  Office  of  Price  Administration,  before  becoming  a  private 
consultant and holding a lectureship in economics at the New School for Research in 
New  York.33 His  economic  background  becomes  particularly  evident  in  his 
publication  The American Economic  Miracle  where  he  provides  a  statistical  and 
structural analysis of the United States, highlighting the advantages of the American 
model. He depicts the USA as the incubator of a positive future which could also lead  
Europe and particularly Germany towards progress,  prosperity and modernity.  To 
Hirsch Germany should lastingly aspire the American (economic) model.34 
Lucien Romier (1885-1944), a French journalist, will represent the French pro-
Americanism. Despite doing a PhD in the field of history, Romier took part in the 
economic orientation of France during and after the First World War. In 1916, he 
became head of transport and customs at the ʻAssociation Nationale de l'expansion 
Économiqueʼ and in 1917 worked for the economic department of the Ministry of 
War. Maintaining his position as journalist, he became chief editor of the newspaper 
Le Figaro by 1925 and was president of the Societé d'économie Nationale in the late 
1920s. In October 1927, he became member of the Redressement Français, a circle 
promoting technocratic corporatism through modelling the French society after the 
American example. Romier's America-image is a connection of his works Qui sera le  
Maître, Europe ou Amérique?35 (Who shall  be Master:  Europe or America?) from 
1927 and  Idées très simples pour les français36 (Very simple ideas for the French) 
from  1928.  In  the  former  work  Romier  compares  the  USA  and  Europe  and 
determines which parts European countries should adapt from the American model. 
In the latter, he argues that mechanisation and rationalisation would lead towards a 
raised and superior living standard through adapting American methods in the French 
economy. 
Contrary to this position, the French anti-Americans argued in the completely 
opposite  direction  and  claimed  that  standardization  and  mass-production  would 
33 ‘Guide to the Julius and Edith Hirsch CollectionUndated, 1810-1982, Bulk 1942-1960AR 1254’ 
<http://findingaids.cjh.org/?pID=431109#serI> [accessed 29 September 2015].
34 Hirsch, Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder, p. 258.
35 Lucien Romier, Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique? (Paris: Hachette, 1927).
36 Lucien Romier, Idées très simples pour les français (Paris: Kra, 1928).
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destroy creative individuality. As for French pro-Americanism, the anti-Americanism 
was formulated in a specific intellectual circle. The so called ʻOrdre Nouveauʼ (New 
Order) took an anti-capitalist and anti-materialist stand and became the hub of French 
anti-Americanism during  the  1920s.  A representative  author  of  this  circle  is  the 
French journalist Georges Duhamel. Duhamel (1884-1966) was a medical doctor and 
journalist of broad public influence. After an editorship at the journal Mercure de 
France, Duhamel volunteered during the First World War as a military doctor. He 
processed  his  wartime  experiences  in  the  novels  Vie  des  martyrs37 (1917)  and 
Civilisation38 (1918),  for  which  he  received  the  Prix  Gancourt-  France's  most 
prestigious  literary  prize.  His  literary  fame  allowed  Duhamel  greater  financial 
independence  and funded extensive  travels.  They  would be  the  basis  for  various 
publications about other countries such as the Scènes de la vie future39 (Scenes of a 
future life) from 1930, reflecting on his voyage to the USA. The  Scènes de la vie  
future is  a  travelogue which criticises the USA and its socio-economic model  on 
various levels.  Duhamel dismisses the American mechanized machine-  and mass-
culture which would destroy the individual. He contradicts the American material 
values with, according to Duhamel, real moral values of France. These arguments 
were  simultaneously  the  predominant  statements  of  the  French  anti-Americanism 
during the 1920s. These anti-American narratives were however not only confined to 
France but rather part of larger transnational arguments. 
Similar  arguments  can  hence  be  found  when  surveying  German  anti-
Americanism  for  the  1920s.  German  anti-Americans  criticised  the  USA on  the 
background  of  their  post-war  political  revisionism  and  simultaneously  on  an 
economic  and  cultural  level.  As  in  France,  German  anti-Americans  argued  that 
standardisation,  rationalisation  and  mass-production  would  destroy  individuality. 
From a cultural  perspective,  German anti-Americans criticised the  lack of a  high 
standing American culture which entailed only basic values such as materialism. A 
German author who represents this  argumentation is  the journalist  Adolf Halfeld. 
Halfeld  (1898-1955)  worked  as  a  correspondent  for  the  newspaper  Hamburger 
37 Georges Duhamel, Vie des martyrs, 1914-1916. (Paris: Mercure de France, 1950).
38 Georges Duhamel, Civilisation, 1914-1917 (Paris: Mercure de France, 1918).
39 Georges Duhamel, Scènes de la vie future (Paris: Mercvre de France, 1930). All the references regarding this work 
in this thesis refer to the second edition: Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future. 2 éd. rev.  
et améliorée avec introd., analyse, notes, jugements et citations par Armand Bottequin. (Audenarde: Sanderus, 
1952). 
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Fremdenblatt  in  New York from 1924-1929 and London from 1929-1932.  It  was 
during  this  time  that  he  gathered  the  background  knowledge  for  his  eventual 
travelogue Amerika und der Amerikanismus40 (America and Americanism) in which 
he elaborated on his experiences made during his years in the United States. Amerika 
und  der  Amerikanismus,  published  in  1927,  is  a  clear  rejection  of  everything 
American,  radically rejecting all American influences.  Main argumentations circle 
around the USA being a planned society, opposed to the European cultural heritage. 
Halfeld  argued  that  the  USA would  promote  a  materialistic  mass-society  which 
would destroy individuality in the long run. 
These arguments by Halfeld represent the German anti-American argumentation 
of  the  1920s  as  much as  the  other  authors  represent  their  respective  intellectual 
circles. These four authors and their works will therefore be the core research focus 
to investigate the relation between the Americanization-discourse and the concept of 
national  identity.  Bearing  in  mind  constructivist  methodology,  the  creation  and 
influence  of  national  identities  for  the  individual  is  of  major  importance  for  the 
research on hand. A key idea will  therefore be to understand why individuals are 
drawn  to  and  attain  certain  identities,  create  identities  and  how  those  identities 
influence their self-understanding. In this sense, the social context of the authors is 
very important for the investigation of the constitution of the subject.  The sources 
will  thus  be  investigated  with  reference  to  the  biography  of  the  authors  and  in 
relation to the larger socio-economic developments of the 1920s. 
1.6. Structure
In order to develop and answer the research questions the thesis will be structured 
into  a  theoretical  and  empirical  part.  It  will  first  be  necessary  to  provide  a 
historiographical  overview  of  the  existing  literature  on  Americanization,  pro-
Americanism, anti-Americanism and national identity. Chapter two will thus position 
the  present  research  in  the  academic  debate  and  help  to  formulate  clear-cut 
definitions  for  the  concepts  analysed  in  this  research.  Investigating  the  existing 
literature will not only allow definitions for this research, it will also show how the 
40 Adolf Halfeld, Amerika und der Amerikanismus: Kritische Betrachtungen eines Deutschen und Europäers. (Jena: E. 
Diederichs, 1927).
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research questions will expand the academic debate. Chapter three will develop the 
theoretical  and  methodological  approach  this  research  will  use.  Having  already 
briefly  touched  upon  Constructivism,  the  Case  Study  Method  and  Comparative 
Research in this introduction,  chapter three (Theory and Method) will  provide an 
explanation and operationalization of these concepts. This will be important to place 
the  research  in  an  epistemological  framework  and  to  clearly  formulate  the 
methodological toolkit being used in the empirical part. Chapter four encompasses 
the historical background of the research. The relation between national identity and 
the Americanization-discourse is strongly influenced by the international-relations of 
the 1920s. It will therefore be important to formulate this background in a separate 
chapter, where the focus lies on the Franco-US relations and German-US relations 
between 1918 and 1933 while referring to pre-war developments as well. This should 
improve the understanding of some of the reasons behind pro- and anti-American 
perceptions for the given timeframe and shed light on whether the researched authors 
reacted  to  political  developments  through  their  literature.  Chapter  four  thereby 
provides  the  structural  cohesion  between  the  national  contexts  of  Germany  and 
France and the case studies to follow.  
The  core  part  of  the  research  will  be  undertaken  in  chapter  five  on  pro-
Americanism and chapter  six  on anti-Americanism.  Both  chapters  have  a  similar 
structure  as  they first  provide  a  general  perspective of  pro-  or  anti-Americanism 
during the 1920s and then address the research questions in two separate case studies, 
one on Germany and one on France. It will be here where Constructivism will be 
applied on the selected sources and the authors Hirsch, Romier, Halfeld and Duhamel 
will be investigated. Researching the biographies will allow a deeper understanding 
of their ideas and arguments. The works they have written on the United States will 
be  analysing  dominant  narratives  and  deconstructing  these  with  constructivist 
methodology,  placing structures and agents in  relation to  national  identities.  Both 
chapters will ultimately compare the results i.e. the relation between pro- and anti-
Americanism and national identity, comparing similarities and differences. The final 
chapter  of  this  research,  chapter  seven,  will  answer  the  research  questions  and 
conclude the thesis with an outlook on potential further research related to this study.
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2. Historiography
The  Americanization-debate  and  national  identity  as  separate  entities  have  been 
extensively  researched  in  the  academic  literature.  Publications  which  make  a 
connection between the two and relate them to one another however come down to a 
handful. Said publications only hint at an existing connection and treat it as a mere 
by-product  of  larger  debates  about  Americanization.  Studies  which  focus  on  the 
relation between pro- or anti-Americanism and national identity in its own right are 
currently non-existent at all. It is therefore necessary to review the historiography on 
the Americanization-debate and national identity separately before relating them to 
one another. The following section thus reviews the research on Americanization, 
pro-Americanism,  anti-Americanism  and  national  identity  separately  and  thereby 
thematically  rather  than chronologically.  The main objective  of  this  section is  to 
define the different concepts and investigate how the Americanization-discourse has 
already been connected to the concept of national identity, particularly for the 1918-
1933  period.  Despite  this  periodisation,  the  authors  and  works  examined  in  this 
historiography  cannot  be  confined  to  the  interwar  period  as  the  definition  and 
discussion  of  concepts  such  as  Americanization  are  part  of  an  ongoing  and 
independent debate. Many recent publications for example treat the perception of the 
USA from an up-to-date standpoint,  but reach far back in time to elaborate  their 
arguments. It is thus impossible to contemplate the Americanization debate in the 
interwar  period without  considering  its  historical  continuity,  surpassing the  given 
time period. Overall the focal point will however remain on the period from 1918 
until 1933 and the geographical areas France and Germany. 
2.1. Americanization
Finding an all-encompassing definition for Americanization proves very difficult due 
to  its  fluidity  across  time  and  space:  the  meaning  of  Americanization  varies 
depending on the time period and the area which is subject to American influences.41 
In  the  USA  itself  for  example  Americanization  historically  referred  to  the 
41 For a collective volume on modern-day Americanization see: Ulrich Beck, Natan Sznaider and Rainer Winter,  
Globales Amerika? Die kulturellen Folgen der Globalisierung (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2003).
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naturalization of foreigners that wanted to attain the US-citizenship. In 1916 Frances 
A.  Kellor  from the  National  Americanization  Committee  in  New York  wrote  an 
article entitled  Americanization: A conservation policy for industry42 arguing that it 
were a responsibility of the United States to naturalize immigrants in order to grow 
its  industry  and  economy.43 This  historical  meaning  and  use  of  the  term 
Americanization  differs  from  what  it  is  considered  today  and  from  what  it  is 
considered  during  the  1920s.  Researchers  nowadays  generally  agree  that 
Americanization refers to a certain value transfer from the USA to other parts of the 
world.  The  actual  characteristics  of  this  value  transfer  are  however  viewed  and 
assessed differently. Most publications stress either economic, cultural, political or a 
combination of these influences as constitutive of the concept. This perception of 
Americanization has prevailed over the past decades and even in the wider public 
there exist  reoccurring debates about  the diverse influences  of  the  USA on other 
countries.44 The  body  of  the  existing  Americanization-literature  can  therefore  be 
divided into authors stressing economic,  political  or cultural  aspects as its central 
characteristic. 
The most widely researched form of Americanization is  its economic aspect. 
Economic Americanization is most frequently associated with the post-World War II 
period, but there exist various publications that investigate it  during the interwar-
period and earlier. Harm Schröter for example dates the economic ties between the 
USA and  Europe  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  19th century  and  identifies  the 
economic  influence  of  the  USA as  a  combination  of  political,  technological  and 
cultural  factors.45 In  another  publication  he  distinguishes  three  major  waves  of 
Americanization:  the  1920s,  between  1949  and  1973,  and  from  1985  until  the 
present.46 Schröter argues that as the USA had become a leading economic power 
after  the  First  World  War,  European  countries  tried  to  adapt  similar  American 
economic processes to improve their national economic position. They for example 
constructed larger units of production to achieve economies of scale and combined 
42 Frances A. Kellor, “Americanization: a Conservation Policy for Industry,” Annals of the American Academy of  
Political and Social Science 65 (May 1, 1916): 240–244.
43  Idem., p. 241f.
44 See footnote 24.
45 Harm Schröter, Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact Survey of American Economic Influence in  
Europe since the 1880s (Dordrecht: Norwell, 2005).
46 Harm Schröter, “Economic culture and its transfer: an overview of the Americanisation of the European economy,  
1900-2005,” European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d’Histoire 15, no. 4 (August 2008): 331–344.
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Fordism and Taylorism with  Scientific  Management  systems to  produce  business 
models  after  the  American  example.47 Schröter  thus  perceives  Americanization 
during the 1920s as the adaptation of American economic processes. 
Besides Schröter other authors also perceive changing economic processes as a 
sign of Americanization. This research ranges from studies on changes in academic 
management education to papers that debate whether the use of consumer-credit was 
a  sign of Americanization before the Second World War.48 Others scholars assess 
innovations associated with Fordism and Taylorism as constitutive of the concept 
during the interwar-period. These are namely at the heart of Mary Nolan's work on 
Americanization in Germany during the 1920s where she argues that the key concept 
which  characterised  German  society  in  the  Weimar  Republic  (1919-1933) was 
rationalization.49 Rationalization  was  strongly  connected  to  Americanism  and 
Fordism and became the major component of the German road to modernity. Nolan 
investigates the effects of rationalization across gender and class with the conclusion 
that generally all parts of society agreed on its importance. To Nolan rationalization 
was therefore central in explaining the success and collapse of the Weimar Republic 
and the main component of Americanization.50 Hubert Bonin and Ferry de Goey take 
a  differentiated stand in  their  book  American firms in  Europe:  Strategy,  identity,  
perception and performance (1880-1980)51 where they argue that on the one hand 
European  businesses  certainly  adapted  American  practices  and  the  American 
business-model, but American businesses in Europe also had to adapt to the existing 
conditions, namely the local market. There hence existed a certain hybridization of 
the  transatlantic  business-model.52 In  this  sense  economic  Americanization  was 
certainly influential but needed to be renegotiated with regard to the national reality. 
47 For a study on the Americanisation of Scientific Management see: Alfred Kieser, “The Americanization of  
Academic Management Education in Germany,” Journal of Management Inquiry 13, no. 2 (January 6, 2004): 90–
97.
48 Alfred Kieser, “The Americanization of Academic Management Education in Germany,” Journal of Management  
Inquiry 13, no. 2 (January 6, 2004): 90–97; Jan Logemann, “Americanization through Credit? Consumer Credit in 
Germany, 1860s–1960s,” Business History Review 85, no. 03 (2011): 529–550.
49 Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994).
50 Belinda Davis, ‘Review of Nolan, Mary, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of 
Germany’ (H-German, H-Review, 1996) <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=334> [accessed 2 July 
2012].
51 American Firms in Europe: Strategy, Identity, Perception and Performance (1880-1980), ed. by Hubert Bonin and 
Ferry de Goey (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2009).
52 Berti Kolbow, ‘Review of Hubert Bonin and Ferry de Goey, Eds., American Firms in Europe: Strategy, Identity, 
Perception and Performance (1880-1980)’, 2011 <http://www.sehepunkte.de/2011/01/18546.html> [accessed 13 
January 2013].
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Similar to De Goey and Bonin, Michel Gueldry and Michael Gott have also observed 
a hybridization of Americanization through the assimilation of offered cultural and 
economic products in different social settings.53 Gueldry and Gott focus mainly on 
the Americanization of France post World War II and define it as a combination of 
US-cultural exports and their assimilation in France. According to Gueldry and Gott 
the increasing Americanization of French popular culture is one of the main reasons 
for cultural pessimism and anti-Americanism.54 
An  older  work  by  Emily  Rosenberg  combines  the  economic  and  political 
dimensions  of  Americanization  and  is  entitled  Spreading  the  American  dream55. 
Rosenberg investigates the relation between the German public and the private sector 
from the  1890s until  the  end of  World  War  II  and defines  Americanization as  a 
special ratio between how much the public sector promotes, cooperates and regulates 
the private one. Authors who combine economic and cultural characteristics to define 
Americanization are Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek and Adelheid von Saldern.56 In their 
analysis of Americanization in Germany in the 20th century they combine economic 
elements  such  as  Fordism with  cultural  phenomena  such  as  the  American  mass 
culture to explain the German America-image and define Americanization. Mel van 
Elteren has defined it as a combination of political and economic notions in his book 
Americanism  and  Americanization57.  Van  Elteren  conducts  a  survey  of  Euro-
American exchanges and particularly investigates the use of the terms Americanism 
and Americanization against the background of European and American history. In 
order to understand the dynamics and perceptions of, as well as the preoccupations 
with, Americanization, many factors have to be considered according to Van Elteren. 
These include military, political, economic, cultural and social dimensions. Overall 
Van Elteren thus aims at getting a more balanced view of the terms “Americanism” 
and “Americanization” in relation to the socio-historical context whilst highlighting 
the difficulty to clearly define it.
Next  to  economic  and  political  dimensions  many  publications  (also)  define 
53 Michel Gueldry and Michael Gott, “The Americanization of France,” Yale French Studies no. 116/117 (January 1,  
2009): 37–51; particularly p. 37f.
54 Idem., p. 47.
55 Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945, 1st ed. 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).
56 Alf Lüdtke, Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996).
57 Mel van Elteren, Americanism and Americanization: A Critical History of Domestic and Global Influence (Jefferson 
N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2006).
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Americanization as a cultural process. Rob Kroes and Robert Rydell have pointed out 
how  the  typical  characteristics  of  cultural  Americanization,  such  as  mass 
entertainment, mass culture and consumerism, had to first develop in the USA itself 
at the end of the nineteenth century. In their book,  Buffalo Bill  in Bologna58 they 
investigate in particular the rise of consumerism and mass culture which transformed 
American society after  the Civil  War.  Indeed,  consumerism and mass culture are 
today most frequently associated with cultural Americanization.59 The importance of 
popular  culture  and  mass  culture  in  spreading  American  influences  have  been 
highlighted by Heike Paul  and Katja  Kanzler  in  Amerikanische  Populärkultur  in  
Deutschland60.  Paul  and  Kanzler  investigate  the  function  of  popular  culture  in 
Germany at specific historical moments, which they present chronologically from the 
mid-nineteenth century. The central argument is that the influence of popular culture 
leads to a culture transfer through an adaptation-process. This adaptation-process is 
always individual and makes the influence of popular culture distinct for different 
historical contexts.61
An  author  who  combines  economic,  political  and  cultural  forms  of 
Americanization and has published multiple works on the topic is Egbert Klautke. In 
Unbegrenzte  Möglichkeiten:  “Amerikanisierung”  in  Deutschland  und  Frankreich  
(1900-1933)62,  Klautke  carries  out  a  survey  of  a  gradual  build-up  of  American 
influence in France and Germany on a multitude of levels and how this American 
influence was perceived by society. His work surveys early receptions of the USA, 
starting at the end of the nineteenth century, including the perception of American 
imperialism,  Taylorism  and  early  anti-Americanism  before  the  First  World  War. 
Klautke contemplates the political dimension of Americanization through surveying 
the  American  dollar-diplomacy  after  the  First  World  War  and  the  economic 
dimension of Americanization is elucidated through the rationalization of the German 
and French economy during the 1920s. Klautke attributes its cultural dimension to 
58 Robert Rydell and Bob Kroes, Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869-1922 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005).
59 See: Philip Melling, Americanisation and the Transformation of World Cultures: Melting Pot or Cultural  
Chernobyl? (Lewiston  N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996). Angelika Linke, Attraktion Und Abwehr: Die  
Amerikanisierung der Alltagskultur in Europa (Köln: Böhlau, 2006).
60 Heike Paul and Katja Kanzler, Amerikanische Populärkultur in Deutschland (Leipzig: Univ.-Verl., 2002).
61 Waltraud Sennebogen, ‘Review of Heike Paul and Katja Kanzler, Amerikanische Populärkultur in Deutschland’,  
2002.
62 Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: ‘Amerikanisierung’ in Deutschland Und Frankreich (1900-1933) 
(Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 2003).
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the importance of American mass-culture in France and Germany, mainly in the form 
of the film industry63, Jazz music and Tiller-Girls. 
In conclusion, the majority of the literature defines Americanization as a multi-
layered value transfer from the USA towards other parts of the world.  Thereby a 
dynamic  exchange  exists  between  this  value  transfer  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
assimilation  of  American  influences  in  national  contexts  on  the  other.  Most 
publications  specify  diverse  characteristics  as  constitutive  of  the  concept,  mainly 
depending  on  the  time  period.  For  the  period  1918-1933  Americanization  was 
essentially a combination of American economic and cultural  influences and their 
political implementation. This characterization will consequently figure as definition 
of Americanization for the research on hand. 
Economically,  most  publications  perceive  the  application  of  Fordism  and 
Taylorism  with  their  key  concept,  rationalization,  as  a  sign  of  Americanization. 
Culturally, changes in pop-culture towards mass-entertainment (including American 
movies,  Jazz  music,  radio  and  dance)  and  consumerism are  associated  with  the 
concept. Its political dimension relates to the level of public state involvement in the 
private sector (less involvement here being a sign of Americanization). In addition, 
the debate on Americanization shows, that it is a very hybrid concept. The perception 
and assimilation of American influences are considered as important as the influences  
themselves. Particularly different national contexts apparently change the perception 
of American influences and the way these are adapted and assimilated. The following 
sections will therefore investigate the historiography of pro- and anti-Americanism 
for different national contexts, i.e. France and Germany respectively. 
2.2. Pro-Americanism
The literature on the perception and evaluation of Americanization is imbalanced. 
Whereas  opposition  to  Americanization,  thus  anti-Americanism  with  its  long 
historical  roots,  has  been  well  researched,  this  is  not  quite  the  case  for  pro-
Americanism. Google-Scholar for  example shows about  30,600 search  results  for 
63 For a study on cinema and film industry in the Weimar Republic see: ‘Cinema and Film Industry in Weimar 
Republic, 1918-1933 - Cinema-and-Film-Industry-in-Weimar-Republic1.pdf’ <http://peopleonsunday2010.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/Cinema-and-Film-Industry-in-Weimar-Republic1.pdf> [accessed 22 December 2016].
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articles treating anti-Americanism, whereas only 1,570 results appear for its positive 
counterpart.64 Most of the articles on pro-Americanism thereby focus on the period 
since  2000  and  formulate  a  special  kind  of  anti-anti-Americanism  rather  than 
conceptualising pro-Americanism in its own right. One article in The Economist from 
2003 for  example investigates  pro-Americanism in former communist  countries.65 
Here the main argument evolves around most central European countries still being 
pro-American out of gratitude  towards the USA for its spread of democratic and 
capitalist values.66 
Similar  arguments  can  be  found in  another  relatively  recent  article  by  Anne 
Applebaum.67 Applebaum investigates  some of  the  current  characteristics  of  pro-
Americanism which include the appreciation of: political freedom, economic liberty 
and the declaration of independence as a benchmark for liberal constitutions. 68 People 
or countries who are pro-American today either identify their ideology as in core 
American or are grateful to the USA for past deeds and hence experience a nostalgic 
attachment.69 The research on the historical  forms of pro-Americanism is  equally 
limited in quantity but attributes the concept other characteristics qualitatively. The 
literature on the concept in the interwar period mostly approaches it as admiration of 
the USA's economic force and innovations and a call for their application in the own 
national economy.
Egbert Klautke provides a detailed investigation of the Taylorism- and Fordism-
debate  during  the  interwar  period  in  Germany  in  his  book  Unbegrenzte  
Möglichkeiten.70 He  points  out  how  the  German  pro-Americanism  started  as  a 
fascination with Taylorism and then became in essence an admiration of Fordism. 
Klautke furthermore points out various German publications during this period which 
debate Fordism and call for its adaptation in Germany. He demonstrates that there 
indeed existed a positive perception of the USA and Americanization in Germany, 
but he does not refer to it as pro-Americanism. Klautke rather focuses on depicting 
the evolution of the debate about Fordism and rationalization through discussing their  
64  As of 25.01.2017
65 ‘Central Europe and the United States: We Still Rather like the Americans’, The Economist, 30 January 2003 
<http://www.economist.com/node/1560869> [accessed 12 January 2013].
66 ‘Central Europe and the United States’.
67 Anne Applebaum, “In Search of PRO Americanism,” Foreign Policy no. 149 (July 1, 2005): 32–41.
68 Idem., p. 34.
69 Idem., p. 35.
70 Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, pp. 183–238.
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proponents.
Philipp Gassert investigates the German admiration of the USA between 1923 
and 1939 based on the Fordism- and modernism-debate (and the relationship between 
the Nazi ideology and the modernism narrative of the Weimar Republic). He neither 
explicitly  uses  the  term  pro-Americanism,  but  rather  researches  the  positive 
perception of Americanism (which is basically a synonym of pro-Americanism for 
Gassert) and modernism. Gassert defines Americanism as a coming to terms with the 
social and cultural breakthrough of modernism during and after the First World War 
and states that Americanism was used as an “umbrella-term” during the 1920s for 
anything that could be linked to being modern.71
Mary  Nolan  has  researched  the  modernization  of  Germany  and  the  steady 
application of Fordism and Taylorism in the industry during the 1920s.72 She focuses 
on the German fascination with American innovations such as mass production and 
standardisation. As seen above Nolan argues that the key concept which characterised 
German  society  in  the  interwar-period  was  rationalization,  a  concept  all  parts  of 
society perceived as crucial for progress.73 According to Nolan, debating modernism 
and  rationalization  under  the  American  aspect  gave  the  debate  more  immediacy. 
Whilst once again not explicitly referring to the concept of pro-Americanism, one 
can  conclude  that  according  to  Nolan  pro-Americanism could  be  described  as  a 
positive perception of mainly economic American innovations, functionally used to 
promote modernity. 
The  publications  on  French  pro-Americanism during  the  interwar  period  are 
equally rare as for its German counterpart. Again, an exception is Egbert Klautke's 
Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten74 where he dedicates one section to Americanization and 
rationalization in France. He summarises and connects a vast number of publications 
by French pro-Americans of the 1920s, including the pro-American intellectual circle 
“Redressement  Français”.  Moreover,  he  provides  an  insight  into  the  dominant 
narratives  and  characteristics  of  French  pro-Americanism  which  include  an 
admiration  of  rationalization  and  Taylorism.  Despite  this  recital,  Klautke  lacks  a 
71 Philipp Gassert, ‘“Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought”: Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939’, in 
Transatlantic Images and Perceptions, ed. by David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmid, Publications of the 
German Historical Institute (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 22.
72 Nolan, Visions of Modernity.
73 Davis, ‘Review of Nolan, Mary, Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany’.
74 Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten.
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distinct definition or conceptualisation of pro-Americanism in France. He however 
does recognize the general lack of existing publications on French pro-Americanism 
of the 1920s.75 
Klautke's  article  Amerikanismus  und  Antiamerikanismus  im  Frankreich  der  
Zwischenkriegszeit76 raises similar arguments as the section in his book. He discusses 
the  main  debate  about  “Americanism”,  again  through  focusing  on  prominent 
intellectuals who shaped the debate. Klautke's main argument is that the discussion of 
Fordism and Taylorism overlapped with the rationalization debate on the one hand 
and  the  Americanization  debate  on  the  other  hand.77 He  additionally  argues  that 
“Americanism” became a synonym for modernization during the interwar period, in 
France and Germany respectively.78 In conclusion Klautke demonstrates how pro-
Americanism  during  the  given  time  period  can  be  seen  as  an  endorsement  of 
modernization and rationalization which were attributed to being American at heart.
Walter Sommer investigates the America-perception of French intellectuals and 
politicians during 1924 and 1939.79 He dedicates one chapter to the pros and cons 
French  publicists  saw  in  the  American  mass-civilisation.80 He  discusses  the 
arguments of prominent pro-American authors such as Siegfried, Tardieu, Maurois, 
Braunschvig  and  Romier.  According  to  Sommer  these  authors  praise  the 
progressiveness as well as the synthesis of mass-civilisation and elite culture of the 
USA.  Similarly  to  Sommer,  Astrid  Grewe also  investigates  the  French America-
image during the interwar-period through salient writers and publications.81 Grewe 
analyses various features of the America-image of two main streams of publications: 
the  liberal-conservative  “Ordre  Établi”  and  the  anti-traditionalistic  “Parti  du 
Mouvement”. Pro-American perceptions were predominantly voiced in the “Parti du 
Mouvement”, whose authors were more open to technological progress and saw the 
USA as economic role model.82 
75 Idem., p. 10.
76 Egbert Klautke, ‘Amerikanismus und Antiamerikanismus im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit’, in 
Amerikanismus, Americanism, Weill: die Suche nach kultureller Identität in der Moderne, ed. by H. Danuser and H. 
Gottschewski (Schliengen, Germany: Edition Argus, 2003), 67–90 <http://www.editionargus.de/pd-535780167.htm?
defaultVariants=%7BEOL%7D&categoryId=10> [accessed 29 September 2015].
77 Idem., p. 22f.
78 Idem., p. 23.
79 Walter Sommer, Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik, 1924-1939 (Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 
1967).
80 Idem, pp. 55–144.
81 Astrid Grewe, Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Heidelberg: C. 
Winter, 1985).
82 Idem p. 110f.
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A recent  publication  is  Robert  L.  Frost's  article  Fordism and  the  American 
Dream in France, 1919-1939.83 Frost elaborates that the French Fordism discourse 
mainly  consisted  of  two  branches:  rationalization  and  consumerism.  The 
implementation of this American-style rationalisation was however mostly limited to 
large  firms.  Generally  American  rationalisation-methods  were  modified  by  and 
adapted for the French industrial preconditions. Positive perceptions of the USA here 
related to an adaptation of American rationalization methods which reconstructed an 
industrial production process which Taylorism had tended to break apart. Together 
with Bernadette Galloux-Fournier's unpublished dissertation Voyageurs français aux  
Etats-Unis,  1919-1939.  Contribution  à  l'étude  d'une  image  de  l'Amérique.84 this 
represents the current state of research.
Overall the existing research on pro-Americanism during the interwar period is 
very limited. This is as much  the case for Germany as for France. The literature 
predominantly does  not  refer  to  the  term “pro-Americanism”,  let  alone define or 
conceptualise it. One of the few exceptions is Jessica Gienow-Hecht who argues that 
philo-Americanism and anti-Americanism are structurally linked to one another and 
exist in juxtaposition. In her eyes philo-Americanism was a liberal European utopian 
vision of the USA which faded with the rise of industrial capitalism and modernity. 
This European disappointment eventually led to anti-Americanism.85 Gienow-Hecht 
does not provide a clear definition of pro-Americanism, but addresses the concept as 
such  and  recognizes  it  as  elementary  counterpart  of  anti-Americanism.  This  is 
unfortunately as far as the research in terms of conceptualisation currently goes. 
In terms of a positive perception of the USA there do exist some publications for 
Germany  and  France  respectively.  Most  researchers  here  focus  on  authors  who 
conveyed a positive image of the USA, mostly with regard to its economic model 
character.  The body of  literature thereafter  allows it  to  conceive  and define  pro-
Americanism during  the  interwar-period  as  a  combination  of  the  following three 
factors: first, an admiration of the American economic-power all-inclusively, second, 
an admiration of Taylorism and Fordism and a subsequent call for their adaptation in 
the own country and thirdly, a progress-optimism that was connected to American 
83 ‘Fordism and the American Dream in France, 1919-1939’ 
<http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism_materials/frost.htm> [accessed 29 September 2015].
84 Bernadette Galloux-Fournier, “Voyageurs français aux Etats-Unis, 1919-1939. Contribution à l’étude d’une image 
de l’Amérique” (ANRT, 1988).
85  Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, p. 1070.
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influences. This conception is equally valid for Germany as it is for France, despite 
both debates showing some minor differences with regard to terminology. 
2.3. Anti-Americanism
A negative perception of the USA and its influences on other parts of the world has a 
long  history,  nevertheless  anti-Americanism  has  been  rejuvenated  in  the  public-
discourse over the past decade.86 Led by foreign policy specific criticism also cultural 
and economic exports of the USA have triggered waves of global criticism. It is not 
surprising  that  these  recent  rather  anti-American  years  have  been monitored  and 
heavily  debated  in  the  academic  literature.  A vast  number  of  publications  thus 
investigate present-day anti-Americanism whilst attributing the concept a historical 
legacy.87 The scholar Michael Curtis argues that unlike in the past there today exist 
real  differences  between  the  USA  and  Europe,  which  include  foreign  policy, 
environmental  issues  and  the  cooperation  in  international  institutions.88 In  Anti-
Americanism in Europe89 Curtis  retraces the history of German and French anti-
Americanism  and  historically  defines  anti-Americanism  as  a  metaphor  for  the 
misperception of US society and culture.90 It  is the psychological consequence of 
alienation on a  political  and philosophical  layer  and consists  of  an attribution of 
general problems to the USA.91 Present-day anti-Americanism on the other hand is 
generally a resistance to modernity and an opposition to globalization, supposedly 
eroding national identity.92
The dimension of anti-Americanism's historical continuity is equally addressed 
by Herbert  J.  Spiro in  Anti-Americanism in Western Europe93.  Spiro differentiates 
four main reasons for anti-Americanism: first,  the popular kind, second, anti anti-
86 For a recent essay on the historiography of anti-Americanism in the twentieth century see: Egbert Klautke, ‘Anti-
Americanism in Twentieth Century Europe’, The Historical Journal, 54.3 (2011), 909–23.
87 See: Bernard-Hénri Levy, “Anti-Americanism in the Old Europe,” New Perspectives Quarterly 20, no. 2 (2003): 4–
10.
88 Michael Curtis, “Anti-Americanism in Europe,” American Foreign Policy Interests 26, no. 5 (2004): 367–384 (p. 
368, 370).
89 Michael Curtis, “Anti-Americanism in Europe,” American Foreign Policy Interests 26, no. 5 (2004): 367–384.
90 Idem., p. 371.
91 Ibid.
92 Idem., p. 382.
93 Herbert J. Spiro, “Anti-Americanism in Western Europe,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and  
Social Science 497, no. 1 (January 5, 1988): 120–132.
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Communism,  third,  policy-specific  anti-Americanism,  and  fourth,  elitist  anti-
Americanism.94 Spiro  sees  the  core  of  anti-Americanism as  an  opposition  to  US 
constitutional values.95 According to Spiro any form of American success has always 
appeared as a European failure to the Western European elites.96 To European elites 
the USA couldn't possibly succeed because it was lacking tradition, a multi-cultural 
and  -racial  society  as  well  as  aristocracy.  This  led  to  a  condescension  on  the 
“American experiment”.97 Spiro thus understands anti-Americanism as a social class 
specific approach, arguing that the Western European ruling class has always been 
anti-American,  ordinary  people  have  always  been  pro-American  and  the  British 
governing class has always shown a certain level of condescension on the USA.98 
According to Spiro the higher the social class, the stronger the anti-Americanism, out 
of envy of US-predominance.99 
Ideas of condescension on and disappointment of the “American experiment” are  
equally advocated by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht. In Always Blame the Americans:  
Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century100 Gienow-Hecht argues that 
anti-Americanism is mainly based on cultural condescension of established elites.101 
From  a  historical  point  of  view  anti-Americanism  begins  with  the  American 
Revolution and the fear of European traders that their business could be disrupted.102 
Before the First  World War mainly the conservative  elites,  such as  the  Frankfurt 
School in Germany, proclaimed anti-American tendencies, which helped to “cement 
national  positions in  the discourse on modernity”103.  During the interwar-period a 
general  ambivalence  between  the  welcoming  and  rejection  of  American 
developments  was  visible.  After  the  Second  World  War  anti-Americanism 
encompassed  political  criticism  embedded  in  cultural  criticism.104 Gienow-Hecht 
generally distinguishes three main periods of anti-Americanism in Europe: Pre-1945, 
94 Idem., p. 121.
95 Idem., p. 122.
96 Idem., p. 123.
97 Idem., p. 123f.
98 Ibid.
99 Idem., p. 126.
100 J. C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century,” The 
American Historical Review 111, no. 4 (October 1, 2006): 1067–1091.
101 Idem., p. 1071.
102 Idem., p. 1073.
103 Idem., p. 1075, in reference to Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und  
Volksmeinung, 1933-1945 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1997), p. 12f.
104 Idem., p. 1089.
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the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period.105 Thereby Gienow-Hecht  not 
only  provides  a  history  and  variety  of  definitions  for  anti-Americanism but  also 
relates  it  to  pro-Americanism,  arguing  that  both  concepts  can  only  exist  in 
juxtaposition. According to the author the term anti-Americanism is misleading and 
badly chosen as any term with “ism” as a suffix normally signifies an ideological 
movement,  which  anti-Americanism  is  not.  The  author  nevertheless  makes  no 
proposition to rename the concept.106 Gienow-Hecht explains that there exist some 
grand-narratives of anti-Americanism around which it evolved, which are cultural, 
political or economic and demonstrate the different varieties of the phenomenon. 107 In 
addition, the meaning of the concept exclusively derives from the subject, not the 
object, in other words, the concept has no autonomous meaning, it is the constructed 
meaning the anti-Americans attribute it that constitutes its meaning.108 Gienow-Hecht 
stresses that, overall, anti-Americanism is something constructed and independent of 
the actual reality.109 Moreover,in most countries there exists an ambivalence between 
the consumption of American popular-culture on the one hand and the rejection of 
US-policies on the other. An ambivalence that partly roots in an admiration of the 
United States, or as the author puts it: “There is an Americano-phile lurking inside 
every anti-American”.110 An ambivalence that supersedes the cultural criticism and 
shows the mutual dependence of anti- and philo-Americanism.111 
Despite  many authors stressing the historical  continuity of anti-Americanism, 
various  publications  discuss  the  peculiarities  of  anti-Americanism  during  the 
interwar-period in its own right. For Germany and France, the existing research on 
anti-Americanism between 1918 and 1933 is extensive. One reason therefore is that 
in contrast  to pro-Americanism, anti-Americanism has always been recognized as 
such, not only by Europeans but also by Americans. As early as 1900 the New York 
Times published an article entitled Europe's Anti-Americanism.112 Not only is there an 
active reference to the term anti-Americanism, it is also explained as a “widespread 
hostility manifested on [the] continent”.113 Evidently anti-Americanism has always 
105 Idem., p. 1068.
106  Idem., p. 1069.
107  Ibid.
108  Ibid.
109  Idem., p. 1090.
110  Idem., p. 1084.
111  Idem., p. 1089.
112  ‘Europe’s Anti-Americanism’, New York Times (1857-1922) (London, 24 April 1900), 1 edition.
113  Ibid.
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been part of the public vocabulary. The ongoing awareness and active support of anti-
Americanism across time has facilitated research about it, be it for different countries 
or time periods. 
German  anti-Americanism during  the  interwar-period  has  consequently  been 
very well researched. Authors have particularly focused on the cultural dimension of 
anti-American images and prominent authors who wanted to defend German cultural 
values against American cultural imports. Dan Diner has in this respect contributed 
two important publications which trace the German hostilities towards the USA from 
the nineteenth century until the present. His first work Verkehrte Welten114 from 1993 
(which  was  published  three  years  later  in  English115)  investigates  German  anti-
Americanism from 1800 until the end of the Cold War, more precisely the aftermath 
of  the  Gulf  War.116 Diner  contrasts  German  anti-Americanism,  which  reflects  a 
special and particularly German political mentality, with a milder America-hostility 
in other Western European countries.117 He argues that first anti-American images 
relate  to  the  German  Romanticism during  the  nineteenth  century.  With  the  First 
World  War  these  biases  changed  and  during  the  interwar-period  German  anti-
Americanism was primarily formulated by intellectuals who dismissed the American 
popular-culture  aimed  at  mass-entertainment.  The  USA became  a  gimmick  for 
cultural fears and biases fuelled by Weimar Republic's path to modernity. 
Besides  Diner,  Egbert  Klautke  contributed  to  the  research  on  German  anti-
Americanism with multiple publications.118 His already mentioned book Unbegrenzte  
Möglichkeiten dedicates one chapter to the German anti-Americanism between 1900 
and 1933. Here Klautke demonstrates how its main characteristics included criticisms 
of the American mass-culture, criticism of American materialism and how the legacy 
of the First World War affected anti-American positions.  In addition,  he connects 
multiple  authors  who  published  anti-American  works  during  the  interwar-period. 
114  Dan Diner, Verkehrte Welten: Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland : ein historischer Essay (Frankfurt am Main: 
Eichborn, 1993).
115  Dan Diner, America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism, English language ed. (Princeton 
NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996).
116  Diner's Feindbild Amerika is a revised version of his earlier work and, being published in 2002, includes more 
recent developments such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Here Diner argues that there existed strong German sympathy  
with the USA after the attacks which eventually diminished and anti-America voices re-emerged. Dan Diner,  
Feindbild Amerika: über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002).
117  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 13 & Diner, Verkehrte Welten pp. 34, 36.
118  For a case study on German anti-Americanism see: E. Klautke, ‘Die halbierte Moderne: Amerikanismusdebatten  
und Amerikanisierungsängste im Augsburg der Weimarer Republik’, in Amerika in Augsburg: Aneignungen und  
globale Verflechtungen in einer Stadt, ed. by P. Gassert and others (Augsburg, Germany: Wißner, 2014), 167–84.
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Two of  these  often-quoted  authors,  the  German  journalist  Adolf  Halfeld  and  the 
French writer  Georges Duhamel,  are subject of another publication by Klautke.119 
Both  authors  represent  the  predominant  argumentation  of  the  anti-American 
intellectuals in Germany and France and inherit a central role in the opinion making 
about the USA. Klautke sees many parallels in the criticisms of Halfeld and Duhamel 
with both authors strongly dismissing the mass-culture of the USA.
Viktor  Otto  equally  investigates  German  intellectuals  and  their  negative 
America-images  in  his  publication  Deutsche  Amerika-Bilder.120 Otto  particularly 
focuses on the processing of these images in literature and theatre. Other researchers 
focus  less  on  the  America  images  conveyed  in  the  literature  and  approach  anti-
Americanism more conceptually. Klaus Schwabe for example reflects the different 
anti-American tendencies of the 1920s from a more political perspective.121 Schwabe 
differentiates three main reasons and forms of the German anti-Americanism during 
the Weimar Republic. Firstly, political and cultural anti-Americanism dismissing the 
importance  of  material  values  in  the  USA and  its  lack  of  an  intellectual  elite. 
Secondly, anti-Americanism was a form of anti-modernisation tendencies, viewing 
the USA as forerunner of a modernity that was incompatible with Germany. Thirdly, 
Schwabe perceives the trauma of the German defeat in the First World War, mainly 
blamed on the USA, as most important reason for German anti-Americanism during 
the 1920s.
Mary Nolan  argues  that  the  USA was  in  Germany  since  the  early  twentieth 
century  mostly  resented  for  what  it  is,  not  what  it  does.122 She  defines  anti-
Americanism  as  “anxieties  about  and  criticisms  of  Americanization  and 
Americanism”123.  According  to  Nolan  the  dimensions  of  mass-production, 
-consumption and -culture were added to the anti-American argumentation after the 
First World War, with the USA as an emerging hegemon.124 After the Second World 
119  Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld Und Georges  
Duhamel’, in Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld  
nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder, ed. by Wolfgang Essbach (Berlin, 2000), 173–91.
120  Viktor Otto, Deutsche Amerika-Bilder: zu den Intellektuellen-Diskursen um die Moderne 1900-1950  (Paderborn: W. 
Fink, 2006).
121  ‘Klaus Schwabe: Archäologie Des Anti-Amerikanismus’ <http://www.db-
thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-1560/schwabe.html> [accessed 12 January 2012].
122  Mary Nolan, “Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany,” Politics & Society 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 
88 –122 (p. 88). Nolan here explicitly refers to Dan Diner's Feinbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines  
Ressentiments, p. 8. 
123  Idem., p. 91.
124  Nolan, ‘Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany’, p. 93.
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War  anti-Americanism  added  the  lack  of  high  culture  and  resentment  of  mass-
production as destruction of German craft tradition to its rhetoric.125 In the first half 
of the twentieth century, Nolan argues, German anti-Americanism mainly rejected 
modernity  and  capitalism  and  was  furthermore  fuelled  by  anti-Semitism.126 The 
connection between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism has  also been drawn by 
Michael  Curtis  who  argues  that  particularly  economic  anti-Americanism  was 
amplified by anti-Semitism.127 
Many  publications  today  connect  German  anti-Americanism  to  French  anti-
Americanism.128 Thomas Raithel argues that both debates show many parallels even 
though the topicality and actual Americanization of Germany was more advanced 
than it was in France.129 Raithel perceives the “American challenge” as a combination 
of increasing American-style economic rationalization and a spread of mass-culture. 
In  an  important  rather  recent  publication  on  the  development  of  French  anti-
Americanism Philippe Roger traces French anti-Americanism over the past 250 years 
and  describes  how  anti-Americanism  has  always  been  a  cultural  peculiarity  of 
France.130 He perceives the fear of an erosion of national identity combined with an 
Anglo-phobia as main reasons for French anti-Americanism over time. Particularly 
interesting is Roger's assertion that intellectual anti-Americanism was partly also a 
humanism,  thus  a  defence  of  man  against  inadvertent  influences.131 This 
argumentation is something we will  notably see through the literature of Georges 
Duhamel. Besides humanism also the idea of French superiority will be addressed 
through Duhamel's works. In the academic literature, the connection between French 
superiority  (and  inferiority)  and  anti-Americanism  have  most  notably  been 
investigated by Anthony Daniels who perceives them as constitutive of the French 
125  Idem., pp. 94, 99.
126  Idem., p. 89.
127  Curtis, ‘Anti-Americanism in Europe’, p. 373; also see Andrei S Markovits, Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes  
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), especially chapter 5 "Twin Brothers": European Anti-
Semitism and Anti-Americanism, pp. 150-200.
128  A recent historiography on French anti-Americanism between 1919 and 1932 can be found in: Robert Boyce, 
‘When “Uncle Sam” Became “Uncle Shylock”: Sources and Strength of French Anti-Americanism, 1919-1932’,  
Histoire@Politique, 2013, 29–51. 
For a study on French anti-Americanism since 1970 see: Jean-François Revel, L’obsession anti-américaine: son  
fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences (Paris: Plon, 2002).
129  Raithel,”Amerika als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren” .
130  Roger, The American enemy.
131  Idem., p. 373-409. For a study on the relation between Humanitarianism and the First World War see: Bruno 
Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924, 2014.
42
anti-Americanism.132 
Egbert Klautke contributed to the research on French anti-Americanism through 
two publications. In chapter eight of  Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten133 he investigates 
major anti-American intellectuals and their publications after the First World War in 
France.  Moreover,  Klautke  highlights  various  parallels  between  the  French  and 
German anti-Americans, especially in their economic and cultural criticism of the 
USA.  His  article  Amerikanismus  und  Antiamerikanismus  im  Frankreich  der  
Zwischenkriegszeit134 raises similar arguments as his book and focuses particularly on 
the dismissal of American cultural-imports such as movies and jazz music.   
David  Strauss'  Menace  in  the  West135 provides  an  overview  of  French  anti-
Americanism since  the  eighteenth  century  up  until  the  book's  publication  in  the 
1970s.  Strauss  dates  the  roots  of  French  anti-Americanism  back  to  the  USA's 
constitutional beginnings in 1776. Strauss demonstrates how the Franco-American 
relations on a political level added to negative images of the USA over the centuries. 
For  the  interwar-period  Strauss  traces  the  anti-American  position  back  to  three 
publications of 1927 by André Seigfried, André Tardieu and Lucien Romier.136 
As we have seen, there exists considerably more literature on anti-Americanism 
than on pro-Americanism in general and for the interwar-period. One reason for this 
phenomenon is that anti-Americans were much more vocal about their convictions 
than pro-Americans. In the scientific literature anti-Americanism is seen as part of a 
historical  continuum.  While  some  authors  trace  it  back  to  the  constitutional 
foundation of the USA, most publications divide anti-Americanism into three main 
phases:  pre-First  World  War,  the  interwar  period  and  post-World  War  Two. 
Conceptually  it  is  possible  to  approach anti-Americanism across  all  epochs  as  a 
strong dismissal of the USA and its influences, mostly based on irrational prejudices. 
Thereby many negative developments can be connected to the USA as the concept of 
132  Anthony Daniels, ‘Sense of Superiority and Inferiority in French Anti-Americanism’, in Understanding Anti-
Americanism: Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad, ed. by Paul Hollander (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 
65–83.
133  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten.
134  Egbert Klautke, ‘Amerikanismus und Antiamerikanismus im Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit’, in 
Amerikanismus, Americanism, Weill: die Suche nach kultureller Identität in der Moderne, ed. by H. Danuser and H. 
Gottschewski (Schliengen, Germany: Edition Argus, 2003), 67–90 <http://www.editionargus.de/pd-535780167.htm?
defaultVariants=%7BEOL%7D&categoryId=10> [accessed 29 September 2015].
135  David Strauss, Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1978).
136  Idem., p. 67.
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anti-Americanism  itself  lacks  clear  focus.137 Most  publications  define  anti-
Americanism as a combination of cultural  criticism, anti-modernisation tendencies 
and  a  condescension  on  the  perceived  socio-cultural  inferiority  of  the  American 
society. Whilst there do exist some minor epochal differences these characteristics 
seem to exist time-independent and will figure as definition of anti-Americanism for 
the study on hand. 
For  the  interwar-period  there  existed  an  interesting  historical  particularity 
between an increasing Americanization of the society on the one hand and growing 
anti-Americanism on the other. While the Americanization of Germany seemed to be 
more  advanced  than  in  France,  also  its  anti-Americans  were  more  vocal.  This 
German  anti-Americanism  combined  a  negative  legacy  of  the  First  World  War, 
revisionism  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  anti-modernisation  efforts  regarding 
economic rationalisation and strong cultural criticism against American mass-cultural 
imports. In France, the political aspects of anti-Americanism differed. As opposed to 
the  legacy  of  the  First  World  War,  criticism  of  perceived  American  (financial) 
imperialism  was  a  French  peculiarity.  Nevertheless,  similarities  between  both 
countries prevail, particularly regarding cultural anti-Americanism: main arguments 
include a criticism of mass culture and materialism which would lead towards a loss 
of human individuality.
2.4. National Identity
National identity has been thoroughly covered in the existing research. It has been 
approached  and  analysed  from  various  angles  and  research  areas,  including 
psychology, history and sociology. Particularly the construction of national identities 
and their influence on individuals and groups have been at the centre of this research. 
Different criteria have been considered as constitutive of national identity in order to 
find an all-encompassing definition.  A connection between a positive or negative 
perception of the USA and national identity is however rare. This section will thus 
consider  the  publications  that  have  already  made  a  connection  between  national 
identity and the Americanization-discourse while first surveying the historiography 
137  I here agree with the assessment by Gienow-Hecht in: ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe  
in the Twentieth Century’, p. 1072.
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on national identity itself, including its definitions and key attributes. 
2.4.1. National Identity in Historical Research
First  considerations  about  national  identity  in  the  field  of  history  were  mainly 
influenced by research on the concept of nationalism. This nationalism research in a 
historical  perspective  was  propelled  by  the  following  three  historians:  Benedict 
Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm. In 1983 Benedict Anderson initiated 
these contemplations through analysing nationalism and the nation-state in his work 
Imagined  Communities138.  His  publication  developed  the  idea  that  nations  were 
socially  constructed  communities,  i.e.  imagined  communities,  and  provided  a 
modernist interpretation of nationalism. This modernist interpretation of nationalism 
places the origins of nations in modern times.139 It  is  thereby in strict  contrast  to 
perennial theories which stress the permanence of nations.140 According to Anderson 
the  nation was a  recent  social  construction,  created by the  people who imagined 
themselves as part of it. National identity was in this sense a feeling of belonging to a 
community  which  was  fundamentally  associated  with  and  subordinated  to  this 
conception of a nation. 
The idea of the nation being a  social  construction was equally developed by 
Ernest Gellner in Nations and Nationalism141. According to Gellner the nation was a 
modern and constructed phenomenon rather than being a time-independent and fixed 
entity.  It  was mainly the product  of the social  and cultural  changes that occurred 
through the industrial revolution, more concretely the migration from rural to urban 
areas which occurred through the shift from an agricultural to an industrial society. 
Gellner argued that in order for people with different backgrounds to work for the 
good  of  the  community  there  existed  the  necessity  of  a  common  identity.  This 
demand was met by creating a common identity with a common past, language and 
138  Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983).
139  Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/> [accessed 22 March 2017]. 
140  Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment’, Nations and 
Nationalism, 10.1–2 (2004), 125–41 (p. 126) <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00159.x>. 
141  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Also see: Ernest Gellner, 
Nationalism (Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1997).
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heritage, which effectively was national identity.
Similar  to  Anderson  and  Gellner,  Eric  Hobsbawm's  work  on  nationalism 
perceives the nation-state as a construction.142 According to Hobsbawm, nations are 
brought into being by nationalism and are hence a modern formation.  They have 
changing national identification patterns which influence the individual. Hobsbawm 
and  the  other  early  scholars  on  nations  and  nationalism  consequently  perceived 
national identity as a component of nationalism but did not conceptualise it in its own  
right. To them, the relationship between the nation-state and nationalism was at the 
heart of the research. Despite a contemplation of national identity, they focused more 
on the “national” part than the “identity” part.143 This changed in the 1990s when 
scholars such as Liah Greenfeld and Maria Montserrat-Guibernau investigated the 
concept and different criteria of national identity as such. 
In  1992  Liah  Greenfeld  provided  a  slightly  different  approach  when  she 
differentiated it from other collective identities and introduced the idea of ethnicity.144 
To Greenfeld national identity was not simply a territorial or political identity, nor 
was it a unique identity such as Germanity or Frenchness. These unique identities 
would sometimes exist  centuries before national identities were created.  Ethnicity 
was thereafter not constitutive of a national identity even though it often incorporated 
ethnic characteristics. National identity by itself, was tied to the concept of a nation-
state and “provided an organizing principle applicable to different materials to which 
it  then  grants  meaning,  transforming  them  thereby  into  elements  of  a  specific 
identity”.145 
In  The  identity  of  nations146 Montserrat  Guibernau  provided a  historical  and 
conceptual  investigation  of  national  identity.  Guibernau  argued  that  up  until  the 
nineteenth century, a concept such as national identity was unknown, as ideas such as 
individuality  and  uniqueness  were  of  relative  unimportance  in  international 
relations.147 Only since the nineteenth century did reflections about the uniqueness of 
people and groups emerge and lead to a reflection on identities. Identity became an 
interpretation of the self that established who the person in social and psychological 
142  E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge [England]; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
143  David McCrone, Frank Beckhofer: Understanding National Identity, p. 12f.
144  Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism : Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 12.
145  Idem., p. 13f.
146  Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).
147 Idem., p. 9.
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terms was.148 All  identities hence emerged within a system of social relations and 
representations.  According  to  Guibernau  two  basic  distinctions  regarding  identity 
were its continuity over time and its difference from others.149 These have become the 
main characteristics of national identity: an identity that would move from the past 
into the future and an identity that would represent a community with shared values 
and roots, different from other communities. Continuity and differentiation therefore 
led to key concepts regarding identities, the differentiation and comparison between 
us and them.150
Montserrat  Guibernau defined national identity as “[...] a collective sentiment 
based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the 
attributes that make it distinct from other nations. National identity was therefore a 
modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature. While consciousness of forming 
a nation may have remained constant for long periods of time, the elements upon 
which such a feeling was based may have varied over time.”151 Guibernau argued that 
the elements which constituted national identity were the following five attributes: 
psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political.152 To Guibernau national 
identity was a construction, it  had no meaning a priori and wasn't autonomous- it 
only  had  the  respective  meaning  people  attributed  it.  National  identities  were 
constructed  through  different  images,  rituals  and  institutions  whilst  they  were 
reinforced through the creation of common enemies and the concept of citizenship as 
distinction between us and them.153 
Today,  the  conceptualisation  of  national  identity  remains  part  of  an  ongoing 
debate.154 The majority  of  the  literature  approaches  its  constitutive  characteristics 
from different angles but there exists consensus on the fluidity of national identities 
across  time  and  space.  Hereafter  national  identities  are  comprised  of  different 
characteristics, depending on the nation-state and the time period. Amanda Scorrana 
argues that because of this fluidity, nations need symbolic representations to reinforce 
148  Idem., p. 10.
149 Idem., p. 10.
150 Ibid.
151  Idem., 11.
152  Ibid.
153  Idem., 25.
154  For a rather recent debate on the characteristics of national identity see: Stefan Manz, ‘Constructing a Normative  
National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in Germany, 2000/2001’, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural  
Development, 25 (2004), 481–96 (p. 481). 
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their identity.155 Scorrana picks up the idea of ʻimagined national communityʼ from 
Anderson and outlines that people use these symbolic representations and combine 
them with their personal experiences to create national identity.156 To Scorrana the 
central  feature  of  national  identity  is  shared  history  and  it  can  be  influenced  by 
selective historical narratives (specific versions of the past).157 Other scholars focus 
less on the reinforcement of national identity and explore its different characteristics, 
whether psychological, territorial, cultural or others.158 Nevertheless the legitimacy of 
some of these national identity characteristics has been questioned. Denis Sidinic for 
example  argues  that  a  specific  territory  (e.g.  city  or  state)  is  an  attribute  for 
citizenship but not for national identity. National identity is based on a shared feeling 
of  belonging  while  citizenship  itself  existed  long  before  the  nation-state  as  a 
guarantee of rights.159 
What has most frequently been considered as the main characteristic of national 
identity is its ethnic dimension. Indeed, contemplations about ethnicity and the ethno-
nation as predecessor of the nation-state are in many ways a prerequisite for research 
about  the  nation  and  national  identity.  These  contemplations  synergise  questions 
about the nature of the nation with questions about the properties of belonging to a 
nation, i.e. national identity and identification.160 Debates about the ethno-nation can 
generally be divided into two opposing camps: civic and ethnic positions. The former 
chair a voluntaristic definition of the nation, created through collective political will. 
Ernest Renan can be considered one of the founding fathers of this position, as he 
argued as early as 1882 that the nation was a construction established through the 
will of the population.161 Ethnic positions by contrast perceive the nation as a “non-
155  Armanda Scorrano, “Constructing national identity: national representations at the Museum of Sydney,” Journal of 
Australian Studies 36, no. 3 (2012): 345–362.
156  Idem., p. 346f.
157  Idem., p. 349.
158  Benoit Bertrand, “Germans must shift their image of national identity,” Financial Times Online (London, April 9, 
2004), 1 edition.
159  Denis Sindic, ‘Psychological Citizenship and National Identity’, Journal of Community & Applied Social  
Psychology, 21 (2011), 202–14, especially p. 206.
160  For a recent (December 2014) and comprehensive article about nationalism, the nation and national identity 
see:Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 
2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/> [accessed 22 March 2017]. 
Misevic also provides an extensive bibliography on the subject. (For questions of accuracy note that Misevic 
provides a wrong date for Benedict Anderson's Immagined Communities. It should be 1983 instead of 1965.)
161  Ernest Renan, ‘“What Is a Nation?”, Text of a Conference Delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11, 1882’, in  
Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation? (Translated by Ethan Rundell), by Ernest Renan (Paris: Presses-Pocket, 1992).
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voluntary community of common origin”162, based on an ethnical bond. A conception 
of  national  identity  would  in  this  sense  precede  any  form of  the  nation-state  as 
political entity. One of the fathers of this position was Johann Gottfried Herder who 
during the mid-18th century, thus before the German nation as political entity existed, 
described a form of German national spirit, based on common history, culture and 
language.163 
Debates about the origins of the ethno-nation however exceed civic and ethnic 
dimensions and also relate to its authenticity, i.e. how long conceptions of the ethno-
nation  reach  back  in  time.164 Here  it  is  once  again  possible  to  distinguish  two 
differing strands: primordial (or perennial) views and modernist views. Primordialists 
argue that the ethno-nation has existed since pre-modern times, hence emphasizing 
the permanence of nations, while modernists perceive the nation as a modern creation 
(such as Hobsbawm, Gellner and Anderson above).165 A milder yet very prominent 
primordial  vision  which  is  somewhat  located  between  radical  modernist  and 
perennial views is advocated by Anthony Smith. Smith has developed the theory of 
Ethnosymbolism in which he perceives the origin of nations and national identity in a 
pre-modern  and  collective  ethnic  identity.166 Ethnosymbolism further  stresses  the 
importance  of  symbols  and  culture  in  the  creation  of  nations,  nationalism  and 
national identity.167  
162  Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/> [accessed 22 March 2017].
163  Wulf Koepke, ‘Herder’s View on the Germans and Their Future Literature’, in A Companion to the Works of  
Johann Gottfried Herder, ed. by Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke, NED-New edition (Boydell and Brewer, 2009), pp. 
215–32 (p. 221) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt14brrn7> [accessed 23 March 2017].
164  Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/> [accessed 22 March 2017].
165  Idem. Modernists can be further distinguished between realists und anti-realists. Realists perceive the nation as 
modern and real formation (such as Hobsbawm and Gellner) while anti-realists perceive the nation as modern yet  
completely imagined formation (such as Anderson). 
166  Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment’, Nations and 
Nationalism, 10.1–2 (2004), 125–41 (p. 126). This mainly relates to: Anthony David Smith, National Identity 
(London: Penguin Books, 1991).
In the above article Guibernau argues (pp. 127ff) that Smith has later moved away from his definition of the nation 
and national identity, more specifically in Anthony David Smith, ‘When Is a Nation’, Geopolitics, 7.2 (2002), 5–32.
167  For further literature on ethnosymbolism and the study of ethnies see: Anthony David Smith, National Identity 
(London: Penguin Books, 1991); Anthony David Smith, ‘When Is a Nation’, Geopolitics, 7.2 (2002), 5–32; Anthony 
David Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Polity, 2010); Anthony David Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and 
Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (Routledge, 2009); 
John Hutchinson has also significantly contributed to the theory of Ethnosymbolism, particularly in relation to 
cultural nationalism., see: John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the  
Creation of the Irish Nation State (London, 1987); John Hutchinson, Nations as Zones of Conflict (London; 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2005).
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Debates about the ethno-nation and its origins consequently seem essential for 
considerations about the ethnic dimension of national identity. This is particularly the 
case for countries such as Germany and France where ideas of exceptionality and 
ethnicity  have  historically  been part  of  the  national  identity  narratives.168 This  is 
especially related to the distinction between ʻcivicʼ and ʻethnicʼ nationalism, “the 
former being allegedly  Western  European and the  latter  more  Central  or  Eastern 
European,  originating  in  Germany  [..]”169.  In  this  sense,  the  civic  dimension  of 
national identity tends to be associated with France, the ethnic with Germany. Such 
distinctions are equally reflected in differing forms of citizenship,  more precisely 
between  birth  right  citizenship  and  ancestral  citizenship,  i.e.  jus  solis  and  jus 
sanguinis.170 Nevertheless scholars have argued that irrespective of such differences 
the French and German conception of national identity are not that different after all. 
Raphaël  Cahen and Thomas Landwehrlen for  example  argue that  particularly the 
modernist  interpretation  of  national  identity  allows  the  assessment  that  both 
conceptions are similar ideological products, intended to legitimise political action 
through establishing a ʻnational-natureʼ (“nature de la nation”).171
Even Colette Beaune, who presents the traditional juxtaposition of the civic and 
ethnic dimensions of national identity, perceives the “patrie” (fatherland) as a core 
feature of French national identity.172 The fatherland-narrative in this sense does show 
some similarities  to  the  German “Volk”-narrative.  First  contemplations  about  this 
narrative can be related back to Herder (see above) and his ideas about the national 
spirit of the German people (“Nationalgeist”). Even though the idea of “Volksgeist” 
168  For  the ethnic dimension of German national identity see: Harold James, A German identity : 1770-1990 (New 
York: Routledge, 1989); Brian E Vick, Defining Germany : the 1848 Frankfurt parliamentarians and national  
identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Thomas Banchoff, “German Identity and European 
Integration,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (January 9, 1999): 259–289. 
For an overview of works on the French national identity see: David Bell, “Recent Works on Early Modern French 
National Identity,” The Journal of Modern History 68, no. 1 (March 1, 1996): 84–113.
For a study on French nationhood see: Suzanne Citron, Le mythe national: l’histoire de France revisitée (Paris: Les 
Éd. de l’Atelier, 2008).
169  Nenad Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism/> [accessed 22 March 2017].
170 For a detailed study on the difference between the French and German citizenship, nationhood and nationalism see:  
William R Brubaker, Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, 1990.
171  Raphaël Cahen and Thomas Landwehrlen, ‘De Johann Gottfried Herder à Benedict Anderson : retour sur quelques  
conceptions savantes de la nation’, Sens Public, 2010, p. 13 <http://www.sens-public.org/article794.html> [accessed 
22 March 2017]. 
172  David Bell, “Recent Works on Early Modern French National Identity,” The Journal of Modern History 68, no. 1 
(March 1, 1996): 84–113, here in particular p. 89; in referral to Colette Beaune, The birth of an ideology : myths and 
symbols of nation in late-medieval France (Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1991), p. 90.
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is  predominantly  associated with Herder,  the  term was actually  coined by Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.173 Anne-Marie Le Gloannec describes the mythical element 
of “Volk” (populace) as historical constant for the creation of one German entity.174 
According  to  Le  Gloannec  the  German  national  identity  has  two  theoretical 
dimension,  the  “primordial”  dimension  (time-independent  ethnic  bond  between 
people) and the “situational” one (reaction to other identities).175 To Le Gloannec 
particularly  the  idea  of  “Sonderweg”,  of  a  special  German  path  in  international 
affairs, is a cornerstone characteristic of the German national identity.176 This notion 
of exceptionality is also elucidated by Daniel Unowsky who argues that the German 
identity  implies  an  assumption  of  superiority  and  imperialism.177 To  Unowsky 
“Germanness” as ethnical bond is a classical narrative of the German culture and 
identity.178 Harry Pross adds an emphasis on German individualism and Lutheran-
tradition to this exceptionality-narrative.179
2.4.2. National identity and the Americanization-debate
In  the  body  of  the  literature  on  Amercanization,  anti-Americanism  and  pro-
Americanism  there  exist  some  authors  who  have  touched  upon  a  relationship 
between national identity and Americanization. The most explicit reference to this 
relation  can  be  found  in  Richard  Kuisel's  work  Seducing  the  French.180 Kuisel's 
account  of  the  French  confrontation  with  Americanization  post-1945  includes  a 
connection  between  the  French  America  perception  as  well  as  the  French  self-
perception. According to Kuisel, French pro and anti-Americanism was at one level 
“[...] a reflection about personal identity and the future [...]”181, the phenomena of 
pro- and anti-Americanism thus a relationship between French encounters with the 
173  Woodruff D. Smith, ‘Volksgeist - Bibliography’ <http://science.jrank.org/pages/8147/Volksgeist.html> [accessed 24 
March 2017].
174  Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, “On German Identity,” Daedalus 123, no. 1 (January 1, 1994): 129–148; here p. 129.
175  Idem., p. 131.
176  Idem., p. 144.
177  Daniel  Unowsky,  “Comments:  Contesting and constructing  national  identity in  Central  Europe,”  Nationalities 
Papers 29, no. 3 (2001): 493–497 (p. 494).
178  Ibid.
179  Harry Pross, “On German identity,” Media, Culture & Society 13, no. 3 (July 1, 1991): 341–356 (pp. 344, 350).
180  Richard F Kuisel, Seducing the French the Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993) <http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft4w10060w&query=&brand=ucpress> [accessed 18 May 2015].
181  Idem., p. xi.
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American reality and a sense of self-identity i.e. national identity.182 The connection 
Kuisel draws for the French debate, Gesine Schwan similarly makes for the German 
post-WWII Americanization-discourse. She investigates anti-Americanism and anti-
Communism  post-1945  whilst  also  referring  to  pre-war  intellectual  traditions. 
Schwan argues that the conservative anti-Americanism of the interwar-period was 
functionally  used  (by  the  middle  class  to  counter  a  loss  of  status  through 
democratization) to  preserve  the  German  cultural  and  political  peculiarities  and 
identity.183 In a lengthy treatise on the history of French anti-Americanism Philippe 
Roger makes a comparable deduction by arguing that French anti-Americanism was 
historically at least partly a defence of what it meant to be French, hence national 
identity.184 
Whilst  not  explicitly  connecting  pro-  or  anti-Americanism to  the  concept  of 
national  identity,  other  authors  have  indeed  touched  upon  the  link  between  the 
America-perception and the national self-perception. Peter Berg for example argues 
that  the  German  America-image  of  the  interwar-period  was  complementing  the 
German perception of its own national position and historical role. The America-
perception incorporated certain hopes, images and fears- which were not necessarily 
objectively true as such- but were functionally used to argue in political and social 
discussions.185 Gienow-Hecht, who surveys the development of anti-Americanism in 
Europe in the twentieth century, remarks for the 1920s that “[...] images of America 
served to cement national positions in the discourse on modernity”186. Once again a 
(positive  or  negative)  perception  of  the  USA seems  to  allow  a  reference  to  the 
national  realities  and  (re-)positioning  of  the  national  self-perception  i.e.  through 
discussing American developments authors could formulate how the national future 
should look like or what it was supposed to look like in a trade off with conserving 
the  national  identity.  On that  note,  Thomas  Raithel  argues  that  the  German  and 
French America-images of the interwar-period were connected to new developments 
in Europe, attributed to Americanization. These developments would challenge the 
182  Idem., p. xii.
183  Gesine Schwan, Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuität und Wandel nach 1945 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), p. 55.
184  Roger, The American Enemy, pp. 219–253.
185  Peter Berg, Deutschland und Amerika, 1918-1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre. (Lübeck: 
Matthiesen, 1963), p. 8.
186  Gienow-Hecht, ‘Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century’, p. 1075.  
referring to Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung, 1933-1945 
(Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1997), p. 12f.
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European  identity  and  provoke  admiration  and  rejection.  Most  importantly  they 
would be seen as relevant and influential for the European future.187
A last  publication  which  conceptually  relates  anti-Americanism to  collective 
identities is Anti-Americanism in world politics188 by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert 
O.  Keohane.  In  an  effort  to  conceptualise  anti-Americanism  Katzenstein  and 
Keohane  differentiate  its  cognitive  structure,  its  emotional  component  and  its 
normative standpoint. In regard to the latter the authors argue that “assessments of 
the United States can serve as identity markers or as ways to regulate behaviour”189. 
This mainly relates to situations where collective identities can be fostered through 
the existence of a powerful “other”. In these circumstances “anti-Americanism can 
be  a  potent  and  useful  stand-in  for  otherwise  missing  symbols  of  collective 
identity.”190 
2.5. Conclusion
Surveying the existing literature on Americanization and national identity has shown 
that only few publications relate both concepts to one another. Whereas authors such 
as Schwan and Kuisel connect pro- and anti-Americanism to national identity on a 
super ordinated level, the actual mechanisms of identity formation and their possible 
correlation with the Americanization-debate have been at  most  suggested.  Studies 
which address this relation in its own right are currently non-existent. Investigating 
this relationship and its mechanisms will be the starting point for the study on hand.
The  historiography  on  the  concept  of  Americanization  has  shown  that  it  is 
perceived as a combination of economic and cultural influences and their political 
implementation.  In  addition,  authors  stress,  that  next  to  the  American  influences 
themselves, their assimilation was important as well. What was actually perceived as 
Americanization thereby depended on the national context and lacked clear focus. 
Diverse criteria have been identified as being signs of Americanization (which could 
be  related  to  anything  modern)  making  it  a  very  hybrid  and  subjective  concept. 
187  Raithel,  ‘Amerika” als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren’, p. 84.
188  Peter J Katzenstein and Robert O Keohane, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2007).
189  Idem., p. 13.
190  Ibid.
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Particularly  the  subjective  dimension  of  Americanization  has  thus  far  been 
overlooked in the literature. As we have seen whether a development is conceptually 
attributed to Americanization ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder. This research 
can  expand  the  academic  debate  by  explicitly  acknowledging  this  subjective 
dimension and investigating authors and contexts  through which  Americanization 
was debated during the 1920s. 
The  subjective  dimension  is  equally  important  when  authors  assess 
Americanization positive  or  negative.  The existing literature on pro-Americanism 
during the interwar-period conceives it as an admiration of the American economy 
potency as well as an admiration of Fordism and Taylorism combined with a demand 
for  their  implementation.  The  literature  thereby  lacks  a  clear  definition  of  pro-
Americanism  and  only  vaguely  conceptualises  it,  insufficiently  appreciating  the 
subjective component. One has to bear in mind that pro-Americans as well as anti-
Americans  generally  assessed the exact  same developments,  just  from a different 
perspective. Valuing American influences positive or negative was a personal choice 
therefore the circumstances which affected these opposing perspectives need to be 
studied  further.  This  is  equally  the  case  for  pro-Americanism  as  it  is  for  anti-
Americanism. 
In contrast to the limited number of publications on pro-Americanism the body 
of  literature  on  anti-Americanism  is  much  larger.  As  a  consequence,  anti-
Americanism  has  been  better  researched,  defined  and  conceptualised  for  the 
interwar-period than its counterpart. Publications generally define anti-Americanism 
as a combination of historical legacies, such as German revisionism after the First 
World  War,  and  cultural  factors  which  include  anti-modernism  and  cultural 
condescension towards the USA. Despite these conceptualisations all-encompassing 
definitions for the interwar-period remain difficult and vague as anti-Americanism is 
often used as umbrella for various negative developments associated with the USA. 
Moreover, anti-Americanism can either be directed at the USA for what it is or for 
what it does, namely its international influences i.e. Americanization.191 This adds to 
the difficulties in clearly defining anti-Americanism, particularly for different time 
periods  and  on  a  transnational  level.  The  literature  has  consequently  identified 
191  This relates to: Mary Nolan, “Anti-Americanism and Americanization in Germany,” Politics & Society 33, no. 1 
(March 1, 2005): 88 –122 (p. 88). Nolan here explicitly refers to Dan Diner's Feinbild Amerika: Über die  
Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments, p. 8. 
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different reasons for anti-American voices in France and in Germany, despite many 
transnational similarities. While vocal anti-American authors of the 1920s and their 
surrounding have been well researched the connection to pro-Americanism is less 
common, especially on a conceptual level. The research on hand can hence try and 
add some insights to the juxtaposition of anti- and pro-Americanism.
In order to investigate the relationship between the Americanization-debate and 
national identity it has been important to survey its historiography. Despite different 
approaches to define national identity one can overall conclude that national identity 
is a construction that underlines the shared belief of belonging to one community, 
distinct  from  other  communities  in  its  fundamental  characteristics.  These 
fundamental characteristics can be very diverse and range from ethical and cultural 
factors  to  geographical  ones.  Core  features  of  any  national  identity  include  the 
differentiation between “us” and “them” and its fluid nature. The key is furthermore 
that national identity is always constructed and not given. Generating an identity is a 
psychological necessity, generating national identity however is not. National identity  
is  not  generic,  it  is  specific.  What  is  thus  more  important  than  the  conceptual 
dimension of national identity is its construction. With national identity not being a 
necessity, there always exists different means and reason for its constitution. This is 
the main contribution this research can add to the debate. With an interconnection of 
national identity and the Americanization-discourse there exist new possibilities to 
conceptualise  the  discourse  and  explain  its  construction.  As  we  have  seen  some 
researchers  have  already hinted  at  this  connection,  for  the  interwar-period  it  has 
however  only  been  marginally  explored.  Researchers  have  argued,  that  anti-
Americanism has been used to re-enforce national images and peculiarities in times 
of an identity-crisis. The main contributions of this research will thus be to further 
deepen  this  construction  and  explore  the  general  relation  between  the 
Americanization-discourse and national identity. 
The Americanization-debate strongly relates to how and if American influences 
can be  assimilated in  particular  national  contexts  and realities.  In  this  sense,  the 
national self-conception and self-perception is a determinant in assessing American 
influences positively or negatively- which inevitably ties national identity to pro- and 
anti-Americanism.  The  underlying  reasons  for  the  Americanization-debate  hence 
seem to be a combination of national self-perception and subjective convictions. In 
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order to fully investigate both dimension this research will use Constructivist theory 
and  apply  it  to  selected  prominent  authors  of  the  1920s.  The  historiography has 
shown that the Americanization-debate has thus far not been researched through the 
spectacles of a specific theory. Constructivism can be very suitable for the research 
on hand as it incorporates a conception of national identity and aims to explain the 
social construction of man-made concepts such as Americanization. The theory can 
aide  in  conceptualising  the  juxtaposition  of  pro-  and  anti-Americanism,  thereby 
bridging a  gap in  the academic literature,  and repositioning the  Americanization-
debate. The scientific relevance of this research therefore lies in the expansion of the 
academic debate it provides: mainly by intending a new multi-layered analysis of the 
correlation between pro- and anti-Americanism and national identity for France and 
Germany respectively. The research is thereby not only innovative in regard to its 
orientation  in  the  field,  but  will  also  expand  the  debate  by  making  use  of 
methodological and theoretical concepts that have as such not yet been applied on 
this specific  topic.  The comparison between Germany and France as comparative 
inquiry develops the already existing research on transnational comparative studies 
and tries to expand the debate by fundamentally linking it to national identities on the 
basis of a Franco-German cross-case synthesis.192 
192  In Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten (p.12), Egbert Klautke has called attention to the lack of transnational studies which 
compare the Americanzation debates in different European countries. This research hence draws upon the existing  
research and tries to expand the debate by fundamentally linking it to national identities on the basis of a Franco-
German cross-case synthesis.
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3. Theory and Method
The  research  in  the  empirical  section  of  this  thesis  (chapter  5  and  6)  will  be 
conducted from a constructivist perspective. Constructivism is a very diverse theory 
that has different meanings in different scientific disciplines, whether Psychology, 
Education, Sociology or International Relations. Constructivism as such is a meta-
Theory, not specific to one discipline, but a theory about theory, based on an innovate 
triangle of ontology, epistemology and methodology.193 In this regard it is important 
to stress that this research will use Constructivism as International Relations Theory. 
Any reference to Constructivism in the following sections refers to how the theory is 
understood in the field of International Relations.
3.1. Constructivism
3.1.1. Constructivist Theory
The theory of Constructivism emerged in the 1980s out of two separate developments 
which went hand in hand. Firstly, an inability of existing theories of International 
Relations to account for the rising importance of identities and interests in politics. 
Secondly, the development of new post-positivist approaches in epistemology and 
ontology  which  influenced  the  humanities  across  all  disciplines.  The  theory  of 
Constructivism  is  thus  embedded  in  a  larger  philosophical  and  epistemological 
debate  which  has  fundamentally  influenced  how  the  theory  is  constituted  in 
International  Relations.194 In  order  to  fully  conceive  the  theory  it  is  therefore 
necessary to first consider how Constructivism is connected to post-positivism. 
Post-positivism refers to a pivotal  shift  in the sciences away from positivism 
193  Cornelia Ulbert, ‘Konstruktivistische Analysen der internationalen Politik: Von den Höhen der Theorie in die 
methodischen Niederungen der Empirie’ (presented at the Tagung der Sektion Internationale Politik der DVPW, 
Mannheim, 2005), p. 1f. For other considerations about Constructivism as Meta-Theory also see: Stefano Guzzini, 
‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 6.2 
(2000), 147–82.
194  For a recent study on the history of Constructivism see: Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: 
Sources, Contributions, and Debates’, in Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 
2013), 112–44. 
For a general study on the history and historiography of International Relations see: Brian Schmidt, ‘On the History 
and Historiography of International Relations’, in Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, 2002), 3–22.
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which had stressed empiricism (the idea that observation and measurement were the 
basis for gathering knowledge) and deductive approaches (theories and hypothesis 
could be tested in a closed environment to be confirmed or rejected). Post-positivists 
are critical about the human ability to perceive and interpret reality with certainty and 
rather  stress  that  every  observation  is  inherently  biased  by  the  experiences  and 
worldview of the observer. Rather than believing that objectivity resides in every 
scientist,  only  the  mutual  supervision  and  criticism of  the  scientific  work  could 
approach something close to objectivity. The debate between positivists and post-
positivists in International Relations is referred to as “the third great debate” (also 
sometimes referred to as “the fourth great debate”). Constructivism, which claims 
that we construct and interpret the world based on personal or social construction, 
thus developed through post-positivist approaches to epistemology (driving question: 
how can we gather knowledge?) and ontology (driving question: what “is”?).195
Another important philosophical root of Constructivism dates further back than 
the “third debate” and begins with the linguistic turn. The linguistic turn reassessed 
the importance of language as a form of action that was being constitutive of the 
world. Particularly Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus196 bridged the 
interpretational gap between subject and object through stressing the social nature of 
language and the inherent meaning it entails. His work was thus a point of departure 
for  language  philosophers,  speech  act  theories  and  eventually  also  influenced 
Constructivism. When Nicholas Onuf introduced the term Constructivism in 1989 he 
indeed  began  his  elaboration  with  Wittgenstein.197 In  this  first  formulation  of  a 
constructivist approach, Onuf perceives language as a central aspect for the creation 
of reality. Furthermore, Onuf bases his theory on “the idea that ʻpeople  and  (sic!) 
society construct, and constitute, each otherʼ ”198. This idea of a mutual constitution 
of  structures  and  agents  is  based  on  Anthony  Giddens'  structuration  theory  and 
Alexander  Wendt's  The  Agent-Structure  Problem  in  International  Relations  
195  ‘Positivism & Post-Positivism’ <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php> [accessed 28 September 
2015].
196  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).
197  K. M Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, Constructing International Relations: The next Generation (Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 4f, in relation to: Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and  
International Relations (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
198  Maja Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’, in Constructing International 
Relations: The next Generation (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 54–75 (p. 58f), in reference to Nicholas 
Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 36.
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Theory.199 This  interplay  of  structures  and  agents  is  connected  by  what  Onuf 
considers  as  “rule”.  Rule  is  the  institutionalization  of  deeds  through  which 
individuals create their reality. Social rules “make the process by which people and 
society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal”200. One should note here that 
deeds  consist  of  speaking  words  rather  than  physical  activity,  something  that  is 
developed in Onuf's speech act theory.201 Similar to Onuf, other Constructivists have 
stressed the  importance of  language in  the creation of an intersubjective context. 
Friedrich Kratochwil for example focuses on the dimensions of everyday language 
and on the norms and rules that guide human behaviour. To Kratochwil particularly 
the intersubjective nature of human action (based on rules and interpretation) takes 
place in a normative framework.202  
Despite  the  importance  of  language and post-positivism,  Constructivism also 
developed out an increasing insufficiency of existing International Relations Theory 
to account for identities and interests. In 1987, two years before Onuf had coined the 
term Constructivism, Alexander Wendt introduced the Agent-Structure problem to IR 
scholarship.203 His  article  The Agent-Structure Problem in International  Relations  
Theory demonstrated two main ideas. Firstly, Wendt took up the structuration theory 
of  Giddens,  implying  the  mutual  constitution  of  agents  and structures.  Secondly, 
Wendt argued that despite the structures being non-material and non-observable they 
were “real” and occupied a crucial role, they existed through agents practice. This 
demanded a departure from empiricism and therewith also from positivism. Wendt 
therefore significantly contributed to the “third debate”. The key concept of Wendt's 
conception of Constructivism, connecting structures and agents, focused on identity. 
This approach is based on the belief that the ideas of the individual about his/herself 
and his/her surrounding are shaped by human interaction and simultaneously shape 
this interaction.204 In addition to Wendt's Structure-Agency investigation, his article 
Anarchy Is What States Make of It205 from 1992 developed how people's actions were 
199  Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984). & Alexander Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’,  
International Organization, 41 (1987), 335–70.
200  Nicholas Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, in International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 58–78 (p. 59).
201  Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’ p. 59.
202  Idem., p. 65.
203  Fierke and Jørgensen, Constructing International Relations: The next Generation, p. 5. in relation to: Wendt, ‘The 
Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’.
204  Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’, p. 55.
205  Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International  
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based on meaning and how meaning developed out of interaction. This led to his 
important argument that anarchy (a system without a hegemon), is contrary to the 
belief  of  Realists  or  Neo-Realists,  no given in  international  relations,  it  is  rather 
constructed through the states in the system. And this construction is strongly based 
on (collective) identities which provide the basis for the interests of the actors (e.g. 
the states).206
Because of diverse approaches and the different origins of Constructivism it has 
been difficult to locate or define the theory clearly. The common denominator relates 
to  the  construction  of  meaning  and  mainly  consists  of  the  idea  that  identities, 
interests  and meaning as  such are  made by people and not  objectively  given by 
nature.  These  shared  ideas  and  identities,  rather  than  material  forces,  define  the 
mutually constitutive construction of agents and structure. In an attempt to locate and 
define  Constructivism  scholars  have  accredited  the  theory  a  Middle  Ground. 
Emanuel Adler for example placed Constructivism between individual and structural 
approaches on the one hand and materialism and idealism on the other.207 Others have 
proposed to move beyond the concept of identity. They seek an analytical approach 
to identity with the goal of re-conceptualising it: how can one categorise the concept 
or how can one define self-understanding.208 Again others have stressed the necessity 
of new methodological approaches to the concept of identity.209 Alongside ideas to 
rethink the concept of identity there have been efforts to reboot Constructivism as a 
whole. These consist of more radical approaches to Constructivism, which most of 
the time are comprised of new approaches to epistemology. They move beyond the 
construction  of  meaning  and  challenge  what  can  even  be  considered  as  real  or 
reliable acquisition of knowledge. To them “reality” is but an experience and “there 
exists no world at  all apart  from the conceivable mind of the subject”.210 Radical 
Constructivism does not want to depict any absolute reality, it is rather a model of 
knowing or acquiring knowledge through constructions of a more or less reliable 
Organization, 46 (1992), 391–425.
206  Zehfuss, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, Kratochwil’, p. 57f; Alexander Wendt, 
‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State.’, American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 384–96. 
207  Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of International  
Relations, 3 (1997), 319–63 (p. 331). 
208  Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, Theory and Society, 29 (2000), 1–47.
209  Lars-Erik Cederman and Christopher Daase, ‘Endogenizing Corporate Identities: The Next Step in Constructivist 
IR Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, 9 (2003), 5–35.
210  Ernst von Glaserfeld, ‘An Introduction to Radical Constructivism’, in The Invented Reality, ed. by Paul Watzlawick 
(New York: Norton, 1984).
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world - on the basis of subjective experience.211 The simple approach that meaning is 
created  and  constructed  through  human  interaction  clearly  opens  up  various 
conceptions  of  Constructivism.  Despite  the  theory's  diversity,  we will  hereinafter 
consider what scholars today generally seem to agree that Constructivism “is” and 
which features will be most important for this research. 
Constructivism, as the word already suggests, relates to the social construction of 
meaning.212 Ideas,  perceptions  and  relations  are  bound  by  their  intersubjective 
understanding. The social relations that people uphold, construct them into the actual 
way they are. The world is made what it is by doing what we do and by saying what 
we  say.213 Every  epistemological  contemplation  in  this  sense  is  premised  on 
constructed  ideas,  beliefs  and  identities.214 Meaning  is  therefore  always  socially 
constructed, whether of things or thoughts.215 
Constructivists start from the benchmark that the way one interprets a certain 
process  actually  produces  one's  social  reality.216 Material  things  or  non-material 
developments have no meaning a priori,  but attain a certain meaning through the 
importance and values we attribute to it. This specific interpretation does however 
not only relate to the individual as such, but also influences the subject through its 
intersubjective understanding.217 Society in this sense shapes the ideas after which the 
institutions  (a  framework for  individuals,  not  to  confuse with  “institutions” as  in 
international institutions) are modelled. These institutions then reflect back upon the 
individual by shaping societal coexistence. People make society and society makes 
people.218 In a constructivist world, the individual is thus not only influenced by the 
world, but can actively change it.219 The Constructivist sees power as a constant, a 
dominant idea that reinforces or undermines meaning and constitutes identities and 
interests.220 The constructivist  conception of power in this regard draws upon the 
power-conception by Michel Foucault who views power as discursive and rested in 
211  Ibid.
212  Hurd, Ian, ‘Constructivism’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. by Christian Reus-Smit and 
Duncan Snidal, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 298–
316 (p. 300).
213  Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 59.
214  Hurd, ‘Constructivism’, p. 301.
215  Idem., p. 300.
216  Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, p. 3.
217  Idem., p. 7.
218  Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 59.
219  Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, p. 3.
220  Idem., p. 10f.
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social  relations.221 The  discursive  power  conception  particularly  relates  to  the 
interconnection of power and knowledge. To Foucault the discourse is ʻpowerfulʼ in 
the sense that it creates knowledge and thereby shapes social reality.222 His power-
conception is however not confined to language and the discourse.  Power is  also 
manifested in non-discursive practices which Foucault refers to as dispositif. Thereby 
the subject itself lies at the heart of Foucault's contemplations and how it is created 
through social  practices.223 The main focus of  the Constructivist  is  hence not  the 
exertion  of  power  as  it  would  be  for  a  Realist  or  Neo-Realist,  but  its  causality: 
explaining  individual  and  societal  behaviour  by  understanding the  conditions  for 
action.224 These  conditions  for  action  can  however  not  be  stated  apodictically. 
Meaning varies over time; therefore, the conditions for action are subject to change 
as well. Thereby intersubjective understanding can only be presupposed in a specific 
historical context.  In this sense, Constructivism is predestined for context specific 
analysis.225 This does not mean that generalizations are impossible. On the contrary, 
they  are  necessary  to  understand  the  bigger  picture.  In  general,  however,  the 
Constructivist favours contemplations within a social ontology.226 
To the Constructivist the world is thus a construction of our making.227 It exists 
through  a  constant  interplay  of  individuals  and  society  where  meaning  is 
221 Jonathan Gaventa, ‘Power after Lukes: An Overview of Theories of Power since Lukes and Their Application to  
Development’, Brighton: Participation Group, Institute of Development Studies, 2003 
<http://www.powercube.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/power_after_lukes.pdf> [accessed 21 March 2017], p. 3f;
For the constructivist conception of power see: Power in Global Governance, ed. by Michael N Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Concept of Power: A 
Constructivist Analysis’, Millennium, 33.3 (2005), 495–521. Guzzini here perceives the constructivist idea of power 
as a combination of Foucault's and Luke's power-conception. 
For literature on the power-conception of Luke see: ‘Power after Lukes: An Overview of Theories of Power since  
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continuously  mutually  challenged  and  replicated.228 What  links  individuals  and 
society are social rules, not restricted to legal rules. These rules tell people what they 
should do and they match their conduct to this standard. If they do not comply with 
the social rules they can expect consequences. The ways in which people deal with 
rules – be it follow or reject them- is called practices. Rules determine who the active 
participants  in  a  given  society  are  and  these  active  participants  are  what  the 
Constructivist calls agents.229 Whenever agents reproduce practices and rules, stable 
patterns emerge and these stable patterns form institutions. A stable pattern of rules 
and institutions (and unintended consequences) give a society what the Constructivist 
calls structure.230 Structures and agents are therefore the main units of analysis in a 
constructivist world.231 The main objective for the Constructivist is to understand the 
underlying causality of structures and agents. The causality between the two is not 
independent but it is rather part of a larger framework, with identities and interests 
connecting  structures  and agents.  Particularly the  role  of  identities  for  the agent-
structure causality and its role in the constructivist methodology will be contemplated  
at a later point in this chapter. First, it will be important to explore the relationship 
between  the  four  key  constructivist  concepts:  structure,  agency,  identity,  and 
interests.232 
When  considering  agency one  would  normally  consider  agents  as  people  or 
individuals. People can however act as agents for other people through rules. One 
could for example consider a politician representing interests for many people as an 
agent  of  their  voices.  People  and  agents  are  in  this  sense  not  completely 
interchangeable, whereas the first  is a premise for the second. Agents are always 
people,  but people not always agents.  Rules give agents choices and only human 
beings  can make choices.  These  choices  are  always made on the  basis  of  social 
constructions.  In a  given society agents always act  rationally  in  order  to  achieve 
goals. Rules and interests tell agents which goals to pursue. Pursuing these goals is 
what the Constructivist considers rational conduct, even though the conduct might 
seem  irrational  from  an  outside  perspective  at  times.  Based  on  the  information 
available to the agent and with regard to the interests and goals the agent pursues, the 
228  Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, p. 7.
229  Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 59.
230  Idem., p. 61.
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agent  always makes  choices  rationally.  The  combination  of  agent's  practices  and 
existing  rules,  form a  stable  pattern  through  reproduction.  This  stable  pattern  of 
practices and rules are called institutions. Institutions thereafter transform people into 
agents, but simultaneously constitute the environment within which agents perform 
rational conduct.233 
When agents act  within institutional frameworks they change its features and 
themselves in the process. Moreover, they might trigger consequences which were 
unintended and independent of their interests. One example might be how in a given 
(perfect) market buyers and sellers have no individual influence on the price of a 
good,  they  must  accept  it  as  fixed.  A stable  pattern  of  institutions,  rules  and 
unintended  consequences  create  the  constructivist  concept  of  structure.  In  basic 
terms, structure could be broken down to “almost all types of social order”234: what 
people do collectively and how this limits (or aids) individual or agential choice. The 
reproduction and duplication of behavioural patterns creates social assumptions, thus 
meaning and stable meaning creates structure.235 Agents will act  based upon these 
assumptions or patterns, structure therefore gains a causal  and normative force.236 
Whether structure can be called “real” in an absolute sense is subject to debate. It is 
unclear  whether  they  exist  in  reality  or  only  in  the  mind.  The  most  important 
ontological distinction one can make is that “structure is what observes see, whereas 
institutions  are  what  agents  act  within”237.  Whenever  agents  are  affected  by 
phenomena they cannot see, they might change their behaviour in the institutional 
context. The structure as socially constructed ontology therefore certainly becomes 
“real” in a specific institutional context. It is only in these contexts, that structure has 
its normative force and it is here where structure is institutionalised. Structure can in 
this sense be anything that provides a stable pattern of meaning and is in a causal 
connection with agency, from a government to an abstract concept.
In the constructivist world, the interaction of agents is at heart influenced by two 
distinct prepositions: “who we are” and “what we want”.238 The first relates to the 
agents' identities, the second to its interests. Whenever agents act in a given society 
233  Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 60f.
234  Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, p. 25.
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the  recognizable  patterns  constitute  their  interests.  In  order  to  act  upon  these 
interests,  agents are not  required to  be aware of them. If  they always were,  they 
might act differently. To the outside observer, the interests are however recognizable. 
Whilst actors needn't always be conscious about their interests, they don't even have 
to  be  self-aware  at  all,  to  act  as  an  agent.  This  level  of  self-consciousness  is 
commonly associated with  identity. Most of the time agents are “aware enough of 
their identities […] to have an interest in fostering them”239. To the Constructivist, 
identities are a social relationship that represent agential self-perception in relation to 
others.240 Mostly, identities are created through comparison, a “self” is constructed 
though the existence of an “other”. Furthermore, identities vary over time and space, 
despite providing a fairly stable representation structure on the basis of which agents 
formulate  their  interests.241 Interests  and  identities  both  inherit  an  intersubjective 
dimension as  they are  created  and formulated through the mutual  constitution of 
agents and structures. Interests are here the product of an agency-structure dichotomy 
that leads agents to pursue their goals rationally in an institutional environment to 
foster their identities, whilst being constituted by them at the same time. 
Similar to the role of identities as an abstract concept, the properties of national 
identity are also constituted through structure and agency. After all they are just one 
form of collective identity. The constructivist approach to national identities premises 
on the assumption that identity is constructed intrinsically as an actor property, as 
much as it is determined by the social structure. The social structure in this sense 
shapes both the behaviour and the identity of the agents. Agents in return play an 
active role in the fabrication of their own national identities.242 Similar to what has 
been developed above, the core distinction for group identities exists between “self” 
and  “other”.   This  in-/out-group  phenomenon  shows  some  distinct  features  with 
regard  to  (national)  identities.  Psychologists  have  shown  that  two  groups  given 
competing goals will form negative attitudes about each other and positive attitudes 
about themselves, even in the total absence of information about the other. Objective 
conflict would intensify these feelings whereas super ordinated goals would reduce 
them.  Later  research  showed  that  objective  conflict  was  not  even  necessary  to 
239  Onuf, ‘Constructivism: A User’s Manual’, p. 64.
240  Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, p. 76ff.
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produce distinct identities which led to the “minimal group paradigm” (MGP).243 It is 
not  necessary  to  do  more  than  divide  people  into  different  groups  for  distinct 
identities to form. The MGP shows that group identities will inevitably emerge in 
social interaction. People continuously face the problem of locating themselves and 
others in the institutionalised society. The result  is that people tend to exaggerate 
their  perception  of  others  to  make  categorization  easier.  Thereafter  differences 
between  members  of  different  groups  are  exaggerated  as  well.  This  tendency  of 
intergroup distinction goes hand in hand with intragroup homogeneity. Members of 
one  group  perceive  themselves  as  more  alike  than  they  actually  are.  This 
differentiation  extends  to  an  attributional  bias:  the  behaviour  of  other  groups  is 
explained  by  attitudes  of  the  group  members  rather  than  external  factors.  This 
cognitive bias does not extend to the in-group, as there is more information available 
and the behaviour can be explained through situational constraints and negotiations. 
The considerations about the MGP and collective identities leads to three final 
lessons. First, “whenever distinctive categories for political groups are salient, group 
members will  perceive strengthened group identities (ordinarily evaluated positive 
for in-groups and negative for out-groups.) Conflict will strengthen these identities 
and encourage exaggeration of group attributes.”244 Secondly, people will always tend 
to exaggerate differences with other groups and underestimate differences within the 
own group. Thirdly, people will tend to attribute the behaviour of the out-groups to 
their intent whilst in-group behaviour will be attributed to environmental constraints. 
Perceived increase in the power of the out-group will strengthen this tendency.245  
When one places Constructivism in a larger philosophical context, it is helpful to 
elaborate how the theory is positioned ontologically. All theories can be understood 
as having empirical aspects on the one hand and normative aspects on the other.246 
Empirical  aspects  depict  the  way  the  theory  describes  and  explains  reality.247 
Normative aspects represent to which ideal the theory aspires, how things ought to 
be, how one should act.248 Empirical aspects include whether a theory emphasizes 
243  Idem., p. 106.
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structure  or  agency,  is  based  on a  material  or  ideational  approach and  what  the 
theory's conception of power is.249 As already discussed Constructivism stresses the 
mutual constitution of structure and agency and is thereafter a structurationist theory 
(as introduced by Giddens, see above). Furthermore, Constructivism is an ideational 
theory.250 Material  forces  are  not  completely  neglected,  but  their  importance  and 
meaning are socially constructed and the causal conditions for this meaning are more 
important  to  the  Constructivist  than  the  material  force  itself.  The  constructivist 
conception  of  power  is  structural,  which  derives  from  the  features  of  agency.251 
Agency is in the constructivist world always limited. All agents act within institutions 
and on the basis of rules and rules limit the range of acts agents can take. Agents are 
hence never fully autonomous because they are limited by the very rules that allow 
them to act in the first place. Power must therefore be a structural entity as it restrains 
agential independence.252
The normative aspects of theory differentiate between its value commitment and 
its orientation towards change.253 The value commitment of Constructivism on the 
one hand rests on individual positive freedom and international cooperation on the 
other.254 This shows that the foundation of Constructivism is individual and collective 
and  simultaneously  highlights  the  structurationist  base  of  the  theory.  The 
constructivist orientation towards change is optimistic.255 Any kind of change reflects 
a natural process within a society where values and meaning shift across time. These 
processes are perceived optimistically as they reinforce the constructivist paradigm 
that meaning as social construction is inherently subject to change.
3.1.2. Constructivist Methodology
Constructivism offers a unique and diverse methodology regarding its key elements. 
Whether one focuses on structure, agency, interests, or identity, the Constructivist has 
different  tools  to  investigate  their  construction  and  significance.  The  following 
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section will elucidate the constructivist methodology to analyse the constitution of 
identities. Foci hereby lie on how identities are constitutive for the agency-structure 
debate, how they can be researched methodologically and how national identities are 
constructed  through  agency  and  structure.256 In  addition,  this  section  will 
operationalise the theory by formulating how the specific methodology will be used 
to analyse the source material. This methodological toolkit will provide the basis for 
the empirical analysis of the sources in chapters five and six. 
The methodological starting point for the concept of identities is that they vary 
over time and space and are hence in constant possibility of change.257 The individual 
has the natural urge to secure his/her identity. The perceived threat of identity-change 
per se creates insecurity.258 This is the key idea to understand the role and importance 
of identities for the individual. The nature of identities, their inherent possibility for 
change  or  fluidity,  creates  insecurities  for  the  individual  that  he/she  tries  to 
compensate.259 Due to the fact that identities act as link between structure and agency, 
identities can work both ways. Structure on the one hand can constitute the identity 
of agents, agents in turn can however also constitute the identity of structures. The 
constitutive dualism of those options will be elucidated in the following. 
When one considers the case that structure constitutes the identity of agency, it is 
important to link this back to their definition in the theoretical part. Structure is more 
than  the  institutional  grid  for  the  agents,  but  all  forms  of  social  order.  This  can 
encompass social movements, concepts or generally accepted assumptions. Agency 
relates to individual acting in society on the basis of rules to pursue his/her intentions 
rationally.  In  summary,  it  can  be  assessed  as  a  discussion  about  structure,  as 
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representation of socialization constraining the individual, and agency, portraying the 
subject's  (limited)  scope  for  autonomy.  Identity  figures  as  link  between the  two. 
Dominant representation structures impose identities on the individual which opens 
up two possibilities: either the individual incorporates the offered identity and makes 
it part of his/her own, thus constitutes himself/herself in and through the structure, or 
the  individual  opposes  the  new  identity  and  sees  his/her  position  as  subject 
potentially endangered.260 A logical conclusion would therefore be the defence of the 
personal identity against the new identification structure. What makes this even more 
difficult is the notion that identities as such can overlap.261 In this sense the individual 
might incorporate certain traits of the new identity but oppose the concept as such. 
The on-going ontological question in social sciences is whether the individual has a 
choice  regarding  this  identity-imposition  or  not,  if  he/she  can  really  choose  to 
incorporate certain aspects of the offered identity or if this is forced upon him/her. 
Arguing from a structural perspective, the individual does not have this autonomy no 
matter how it might seem from the outside.262 The identification structure is always 
imposed. There is the possibility of identities being hierarchical or influencing each 
other, but as such they are always inflicted by the dominant representation. Identities 
can thus overlap, influence each other and maybe even mutually constitute each other 
(for example when one identity evolves from demarcation of another one).263 Agency 
as such is however according to structuralists only perceived as being autonomous 
and in reality dictated by the structure. The core methodological challenge for the 
researcher  is  to  deconstruct  those  identities  and  trace  the  processes  that  lead  to 
identity-formation.  From this  starting  point,  it  is  then  possible  to  investigate  the 
special relationship between structure and agency. A key methodological tool is the 
analysis of dominant narratives to discover the identities and how people perceive 
and think about them.264 This will in the long-term lead to the understanding of how 
structures as identification grids constitute agency.
When one now considers the other case, agency constituting structure, it might 
be  useful  to  once  again  reflect  upon  the  nature  of  agency.  Agency  as  mediator 
between  the  individual  and  the  collective  structure  elucidates  the  possibility  of 
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individuals  to  construct  and influence  the world they are living in,  including the 
dominant structures themselves. Individualists stress that no structure exists a priori. 
Every structure receives its constituting identity from the individuals that attribute it 
this certain meaning. So how does the individual construct identities which in the 
long term become structures? The starting point is that the human being is a group-
animal. It perceives itself as belonging to a certain group or not.265 Inherently there is 
thus a comparison-process between the group it belongs to, the in-group, and the 
others, the out-group.266 The individual wants to belong to a certain group that he/she 
values  positively  and  that  others  value  positively.267 Furthermore,  valuing  certain 
characteristics  more  than  others  and  comparing  them  with  one  another  creates 
hierarchies.268 When many individuals identify themselves with the same hierarchical 
structure,  i.e. perceive some characteristics more important than others,  structures 
emerge.269 Automatically the collective identification with certain hierarchical values 
creates  a  form  of  social  order.  In  this  sense  agency,  even  though  only  partly 
autonomous as such, constitutes structure through its special relation with identities. 
What one has to bear in mind is that identities, just like all other forms of meaning, 
are to the Constructivist a social construction.270 It is therefore crucial to understand 
why individuals are drawn to and attain certain identities, create identities and how 
those identities influence their self-understanding. In this sense the social context of 
the  individual  is  very  important  for  the  investigation  of  the  constitution  of  the 
subject.271
The contemplations on constructivist methodology, especially with regard to the 
concept  of  identities,  will  be  empirically  applied  in  chapters  5  and  6.  On  an 
operational level it will first be necessary to assess if the authors can be considered as 
agents in a constructivist sense. Secondly one must determine what can be considered 
as structure in the literature and if structures are constructed by the authors. As we 
have  seen  agents  will  act  based  upon  their  assumptions  about  the  structures. 
Therefore,  structures  in  the  sources  are  causal  powers  which  influence  and  alter 
actors' behaviour. These structures could be anything from physical institutions to 
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concepts such as Americanization towards which agents attribute meaning. It will 
hence be imperative to investigate the meaning (whether positive or negative) the 
agents attach to the structures and how this changes their actions. In the selected 
sources, we will particularly be looking at passages where the authors differentiate 
between groups they consider themselves as part of, the in-group, and others, the out-
group.  Moreover,  we will  look at  passages  where the authors value these groups 
positively or negatively. As we have seen with the minimal group paradigm, being 
part of different groups automatically leads to distinct identities. We will therefore 
especially  look  at  passages  where  perceptions  of  differences  and  of  others  are 
exaggerated in order to strengthen group identities. In the case of this study these 
group identities will generally be national identities. The research will therefore try to  
highlight  how  and  why  the  authors  construct  and  perceive  certain  identities,  if 
identities  overlap,  are  endangered  or  have  to  be  defended.  Here  particularly  the 
nature of collective identities and the minimal group paradigm will  be important. 
This relates to the importance of national identities for the constitution and autonomy 
of the actors. We will consequently aim to find narratives about national identity in 
the  sources  and  investigate  passages  where  authors  try  and  strengthen  group 
identities i.e. national identities. This could for example be the case when authors 
highlight the superiority of their group identity. Finally, also the idea of structures 
imposing  identities  on  individuals  and  their  reaction  to  this  influence  will  be 
investigated.  The  main  focus  will  be  therefore  on  retracing  the  processes  that 
constitute  the  conditions  for  action,  identifying  and  investigating  individual  and 
group identities and relating this back to the dualism of structure and agency. 
3.2. Research Methodology
In  order  to  decide  upon  an  adequate  research  method  for  this  thesis,  the  main 
precondition  is  the  subject  itself.  Different  subjects  require  and  favour  different 
methods, be it  quantitative or qualitative.  This research,  investigating the Franco-
German  Americanization-discourse  in  the  interwar-period,  favours  a  qualitative 
approach. The investigation of concepts, which are per definition abstract, require an 
interpretative or hermeneutical framework. Concepts as such do not exist in “the real 
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world”, they are social constructions which only become real through contextuality 
and  intersubjectivity.  Without  these,  abstract  concepts  would  be  stripped of  their 
paramount  significance.  The  research  topic  combined  with  the  constructivist 
approach  will  be  using  qualitative  methodology.  This  does  not  per  se  exclude 
quantitative methods, but I would consider them of at best marginal importance for 
this research and theoretical concepts in general. The choice of qualitative method for  
this  research  is  based  on  the  topic  of  this  study.  The  investigation  of  the 
Americanization-discourse will  geographically be limited to Germany and France. 
Pro and anti-Americanism will hence be elucidated in the German context on the one 
hand,  and the French context  on the other.  This research will  thus in  essence be 
comprised of two case studies with subsequent comparison in order to understand the 
supranational  meaning  of  anti-  and  pro-Americanism.  Consequently,  the 
methodology guiding this research will consist of the case study method on the one 
hand and comparative historical research on the other.
3.2.1. Case Study 
Case  Study  Research  has  traditionally  been  seen  as  method  only  applied  in  a 
preliminary phase of research. Today, these limitations have however been lifted and 
case studies have become one of the most widespread approaches: they constitute a 
methodology  in  itself.272 Case  study  research  allows  the  inquiry  of  entities, 
hypothesis or concepts which are closed in themselves and are of different or no 
significance in other social or historical  settings. Case studies thus ask  how? and 
why? questions about a contemporary or historical set of events where the researcher 
has little control over the variables.273 The research design of case studies is of a 
positivist, deductive nature.274 As already discussed, positivists stress the empirical 
dimension  of  knowledge  accumulation.275 No  knowledge  exists  a  priori,  all 
knowledge arises from observations of the human surrounding. In this  sense,  the 
272  Jennifer Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, Management Research News, 25 (2002), 16–27 (p. 16). 
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human beings' capacity for observation is the main medium but also main constraint 
for all knowledge-gathering. As the empiricist, John Locke has put it: “Nihil est in 
intellectu quod non (prius) fuerit in sensibus”276- we can only know what we observe. 
The deductive dimension of case studies relates to the question whether concepts or 
theories are used to make observations or whether concepts and theories derive from 
empirical  observations.  Deductive  methods  define  hypothesis,  questions  and 
concepts prior to the actual data collection and use this method as a metaphorical pair 
of glasses to make observations.277 This approach contrasts with inductive methods 
where propositions, questions, ideas or even theories emerge from the data-analysis 
itself.278 Case studies are hence used to make observations in a closed social  and 
historical setting with questions, hypothesis and variables which have been defined 
beforehand. 
Case  studies  can  be  differentiated  on  two  layers.  First,  there  exists  a 
differentiation  between a  single  case  study and multiple  case  studies.279 Multiple 
cases represent multiple experiments and test propositions in different settings. This 
makes it easier to make larger comparisons and generalizations due to the replication 
logic. Single case research places one specific case at the heart of the research and is 
hence  comparable  to  one  single  experiment.280 Multiple  case  studies  have  gained 
popularity over the past years as they provide a bigger overview and are hence more 
robust to criticism.281 The multiple case design allows a comparative approach where 
similarities  and  reoccurring  developments  in  the  cases  might  be  found  or  where 
differences  can be  documented.  In  this  sense  multiple-case  designs  have  a  more 
universal  eligibility.  Single  as  well  as  multiple  case  designs  can  be  further 
distinguished in holistic and embedded approaches.282 Holistic studies regard the case 
as  one  unit  of  analysis  and take a  bird-eye perspective  on the  case.  The holistic 
approach  is  preferable  when  no  logical  subunits  exist  or  when  the  theory  that 
underlies the research is itself of holistic nature. Embedded studies on the other hand 
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Thomas Aquinas in his De veritate, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19. The principle has a long intellectual tradition and was prior to 
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the Epistemology by John Locke in his work An Essay concerning Human Understanding has merged the phrase 
with explaining the origins of human understanding and observation principles. 
277  ‘Deduction & Induction’ <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/dedind.php> [accessed 28 September 2015].
278  ‘Deduction & Induction’.
279  Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, p. 21.
280  Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, p. 46.
281  Idem., p. 53.
282  Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, p. 22.
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incorporate  multiple  units  (or  sub-units)  in  the  case  study  design.  They  explore 
different dimensions and then later combine them to one overall picture. Whereas 
holistic  approaches  risk  being  too  shallow,  embedded  approaches  may  find  it 
challenging  to  connect  the  different  units  to  a  bigger  picture,  an  overarching 
generalization.283 
This research, being split into the German and French Americanization-discourse 
will naturally use a multiple case design. Not only does the existence of four cases 
imply a multiple case design, the approach will also allow a cross-case synthesis. In 
this  sense  using  two  cases  per  concept  adds  stability  to  the  research.  It  will  be 
possible  to  cross-analyse  the  cases  and  compare  how  the  pro-  or  anti-American 
argumentation overlaps or differs in both countries. Furthermore, this research will 
use  a  holistic  approach  due  to  multiple  reasons:  the  cases  under  investigation, 
Germany and France are as super ordinated structures not logically dividable into 
subunits. This means that the different forms of pro-/anti-Americanism might have 
different  origins,  be  it  financial  or  cultural,  there is  however  no clear  distinction 
between  them.  Naturally  it  is  impossible  to  investigate  the  entire  pro-  or  anti-
Americanism in Germany or France. The abundance of starting points makes it hence 
too difficult to decide upon specific units of analysis. Therefore, this research will 
choose a unit of analysis that provides multiple perspectives: literature. We will use 
one  author and his  written oeuvre  as  source  for  each case.  Methodologically  the 
research design therefore falls into the small-n category.284 Small-n studies run the 
risk of a selection bias, i.e. a selection of cases which fit the researcher’s hypothesis.  
In addition, the limited sample size challenges the possibility for generalizations. By 
contrast, small sample sizes allow a more intensive examination of the actual cases 
than large-n research designs. For the study on hand it appears legitimate to use a 
small-n design, not only because this allows the in-depth analysis of the four authors 
and  their  works,  but  also  because  the  different  works  are  representative  of  the 
prevailing  argumentation  of  the  respective  pro-  and  anti-American  circles  (see 
chapter 1.5. on source selection). Therefore, despite the limited sample size the works 
of Hirsch, Romier, Halfeld and Duhamel should represent the general argumentation 
of the respective timeframe.285 In this sense the research will touch upon different 
283  Ibid.
284  The “n” here refers to number of subjects, the study's sample size.
285  For further literature on the advantages and disadvantages of small-n research designs see: Jack S. Levy, ‘Case  
Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25.1 (2008), 1–18 
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units  of  analysis,  on a  lower level,  subordinated under  one holistic  multiple-case 
study research design. 
Furthermore, the underlying theory of the research, Constructivism, is itself not 
easily dividable into subcategories. The methodology as chosen and discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter is advantageous in micro-studies. This entails that the use of 
constructivist  methodology on one specific  source,  in  this  case the single  unit  of 
analysis, is favourable over applying Constructivism on large societal developments 
or multiple  units  of analysis.  The structure-agency-identity  approach is  useful for 
narrative analysis and specific conclusions which can then be applied for a cross-case 
synthesis. It would not be feasible to use the same methodological toolkit on various 
units of analysis (for example economic, cultural, political, or gender specific, pro- or 
anti-Americanism) as they require individual approaches. 
The research design of this study will follow the guidelines of Robert Yin's Case 
Study Research286 who identifies five main components: first, defining of a research 
question and second, determining a proposition.287 This proposition is a speculation 
about  the  outcome  of  the  research  and  figures  as  expected  finding.  The  third 
component is the determination of the study's unit of analysis, the case selection.288 
This selection is to be linked to the research question, the expected findings, and the 
theoretical framework of the analysis. The fourth component consists of linking the 
research data to the proposition, thus the actual inquiry itself.289 There exist multiple 
forms  of  data  collection  or  gathering  of  evidence,  each  likely  to  yield  different 
results. Generally, case studies should however draw on multiple sources.290 
Once the analysis has been carried out the fifth and last component of case study 
research design is reviewing the findings and interpreting them. Consequently, the 
study should be assessed according to three principles: generalization, validity and 
reliability.291 Overall  generalizations  should  only  be  performed  through  similar 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318>, especially p 8f, and footnote 22 for further references. 
286  Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods.
287  Rowley, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, p. 19.
288  Ibid.
289  Ibid.
290  Idem., pp. 17, 21, 24. : In order to analyse the case study evidence the most important question is whether the 
findings can be linked to the propositions. The following principles should help evaluating the coherence and quality 
of the research: First the study should make use of all the relevant evidence. Second, it should consider rival 
interpretations and possible critiques to the own approach. Third, it should tackle the most significant part of the 
case study and its research focus. Lastly, any analysis should always draw and relate to the prior research in the  
respective field. When these principles are contemplated and followed, the case study research should be of solid  
argumentation and accurate findings.
291  Idem., p. 20.
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findings in multiple cases. Case study findings replication is therefore the basis for 
analytic  generalizations.  Case  study  validity  and  reliability  relates  to  the 
epistemological quality of empirical social research. The evaluation of the research 
rests  on  four  pillars:  construct  validity,  internal  validity,  external  validity  and 
reliability. Construct validity refers to establishing the correct objective measures for 
the concepts and topics under investigation, its coherent structure. Here one's focus is 
on minimising subjective biases by a well-executed connection of data and research 
parameters (including research question and propositions). Internal validity refers to 
the internal coherence of the research project, hence its stringent causality. External 
validity  can be  understood  as  a  comprised  logic  that  allows generalizations.  The 
inquiry should exhibit particular consistent areas that allow the generalization of the 
findings. Reliability is established when the structure, execution and implementations 
of the analysis can be reproduced. This not only refers to its repeatability but also to 
the documentation of the research. 
Despite general consensus on the key definitions and structures of case studies, 
different  approaches  and  definitions  can  be  found  in  the  literature.292 Some 
researchers for example propose six steps, rather than five, to conduct case study 
research.293 Others, such as R.E. Stake, differentiate between different types of case 
studies depending on the purpose of the research.294 The research purpose is also at 
heart of Donna M. Zucker's conception of case study research. For Zucker method 
and analysis are intertwined with each other, any methodological approach therefore 
depends on the research purpose.295 In this context Zucker argues that even though 
case studies are most frequently used prospectively (on contemporary events) there is 
utility in applying the method retrospectively in historical research.296 Zucker further 
reappraises  the  constructivist  paradigm  for  case  study  research  designs.  There 
consequently exists precedent for using case studies in historical contexts and for 
applying Constructivism. 
292  The case study method as positivistic epistemology has sparked some debate and criticism. According to Jennifer 
Rowley, three main debates about case studies can be identified: their ability for generalization, the role of theory 
and the authenticity and authority of case studies. See: Rowley, Jennifer, ‘Using Case Studies in Research’, 
Management Research News, 25 (2002), 16–27, especially 25f.
293  Susan K. Soy, ‘The Case Study as a Research Method’, 1997 
<https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm> [accessed 10 December 2013].
294  Donna M. Zucker, ‘How to Do Case Study Research’, School of Nursing Faculty Publication Series, 2 (2009), p. 
2f.
295  Idem., p. 5.
296  Idem., p. 1.
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3.2.2. Comparative Research
The case study method itself is open to be combined with other research methods.297 
As discussed, this research will delineate a holistic multiple-case design with the aim 
of cross-comparing the individual cases. In order to adequately execute this cross-
case comparison it will use the comparative methodological research approach.298 In 
this sense the study on hand will be built on a mixed method design, interconnecting 
case study research with comparative research (and constructivist methodology) for 
the cross-case analysis. The key features of comparative research methods analyse 
and explain similarities and differences across societies and are mainly used in cross-
cultural  studies.  In  this  respect,  the  cross-national  research  increasingly  takes 
different socio-cultural settings into account.299
Undertaking  comparisons  has  always  been  driven  by  the  question  whether 
specific shared social phenomena can be explained by the same causes. In addition, 
they  have  assisted  in  developing  criteria  for  the  classification  of  these  shared 
phenomena.300 Comparisons are the analytical framework to  examine and explain 
social developments and parameters irrespective of national borders. Lately there has 
been an increasing shift to the contextualization of these developments and with it  
cross-national  comparisons  have  gained  importance,  particularly  in  order  to 
understand national structures, institutions and societies.301 The research on hand also 
undertakes a cross-national comparison by comparing Germany and France as case 
studies and is therefore very suitable for combining comparative research with the 
case study method. 
One can speak of cross-national and comparative research “when individuals or 
teams set out to examine particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries 
with  the  express  intention  of  comparing  their  manifestations  in  different  socio-
297  Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, pp. 62–64.
298  For a recent study on the Comparative-Historical Method see: Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Epilogue: Comparative-
Historical Analysis: Past, Present, Future’, in Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis, ed. by James Mahoney 
and Kathleen Ann Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 264–88.
299  Linda Hantrais, ‘Comparative Research Methods’, Social Research Update, 1995, p. 1 
<http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU13.html> [accessed 10 December 2013].
300  Idem., p. 2.
301  Ibid.
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cultural  settings  [...]”302.  The  method  thereby implies  the  use  of  similar  research 
instruments and parameters to conduct empirical research with the goal of explaining 
and  understanding  similarities  and  differences.  Research  findings  can  thereafter 
either be the basis for potential generalizations or to gain a deeper understanding of 
social realities in different national contexts. For cross-national comparative research, 
it is consequently paramount to take into account the wider social context in order to 
explain the phenomena under investigation. 303 
Naturally  the  cross-national  comparative  approach  bears  some  difficulties 
regarding the research parameters. It is for example difficult to find a clear-cut and 
time-independent  definition  which  parameters  contribute  sociologically  to  the 
geographical  area  “nation-state”.304 It  is  therefore  also  for  the  research  on  hand 
crucial to understand national contexts and intellectual traditions. Consequently, this 
research  will  dedicate  chapter  4  –  Historical  Background  –  to  establishing  this 
structural  cohesion  through  the  investigation  of  the  national  developments  and 
international  relations  of  Germany  and  France  with  the  USA.  This  historical 
background should place the case studies in a larger and more intelligible context. 
With  this  contextualisation,  the  findings  of  the  case  studies  can  and  should  be 
interpreted  “in  relation  to  their  wider  societal  context  and  with  regard  to  the 
limitations of the original research parameters.”305 A deeper understanding of the case 
and an improved identification of cross-national similarities and differences, hence 
national “likeness” and “unlikeness” will be the case.306 
The comparative methodology has been applied to different research areas. In 
the field of history, the comparative historical method is a product of methodological 
pluralism.307 It  combines  the  within-case  method,  the  comparative method,  social 
scientific  methodology  and  the  aggregate  units  of  analysis.  In  this  sense,  it 
presupposes  a  multiple-case  design  for  the  investigation  of  its  similarities  and 
differences. The within-case method explores causal processes within one delineated 
ontology, mainly by testing pre-formulated hypothesis and theories. It is therefore 
part of a causal positivist epistemology and distinct from postmodern thinking. The 
302  Ibid.
303 Idem., p. 2f.
304  Idem., p. 4.
305  Idem., p. 5.
306  Idem., p. 5f.
307  Matthew Lange, Comparative-Historical Methods (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2013), p. 2.
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comparative  historical  method  aims  to  take  a  structural  view  and  investigate 
processes with multiple individuals that produce patterns of social relations.308 Here 
there is  a strong connection to  constructivist  thinking. The comparative  historical 
method retains a structural focus without neglecting the importance of the individual 
and  considers  the  interrelation  between  structures  and  individuals,  which  is 
simultaneously a fundamental pillar of the constructivist structure/agency approach 
for the research on hand.309
When one contemplates the different research methods which are combinable 
with the comparative historical method, there exists a close relation to case study 
research.  Firstly,  nomothetic  approaches  aim  at  finding  causal  explanations  for 
societal  developments  and  then  generalising  them  to  the  universe  of  cases. 
Nomothetic  methods  in  this  sense  require  multiple  cases,  as  generalizations  are 
superior when resting on a wider research foundation.310 Contrary to the nomothetic 
methodology,  ideographic  methods apply to  one  specific  case and are hence also 
entitled  “within-case”  method.  Ideographic  methods  use  causal  explanations  to 
explore the peculiarities of a  particular  case.  Such explanations  are  not  meant  to 
apply to a larger set of cases and commonly focus on the particularities of the case 
under analysis. This in-depth analysis of single cases however allows to draw larger 
conclusions. Social processes can be unravelled through a plurality of ideographic 
cases which offer the possibility for comparative methods to kick off.311 
Particularly  ideographic  and  historical  approaches  seem  very  suitable  for 
comparative  research due  to  their  narrative-causal  explanation  framework.312 This 
research will thus use the “comparative historical method” for the comparison of the 
German  and  French  Americanization-discourse.  Comparative  historical  methods 
employ comparisons as a means of gaining insight into causal determinants.313 This 
means that they explore the causes and characteristics of a particular phenomenon. 
Thereby quantitative data such as statistics are mostly avoided as the focus lies on 
causal  social  processes.  The  research  questions  address  concrete  real  world 
phenomena. Consequently, the research of social processes and developments is set 
308  Idem., p. 3ff.
309  Idem., p. 5f.
310  Idem., p. 8.
311  Idem., p. 10f.
312  Idem., p. 13ff.
313  Idem., p. 14.
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in a fixed environment over an extended period of time. The approach is particularly 
suitable for small-n comparisons where an emphasis is  put on whether the social 
processes in the case studies are similar or different without neglecting contexts and 
mechanisms.314 
The  comparative-historical  method  is  like  most  research  methods  subject  to 
some criticism. Historians for example sometimes view the method as to general or 
nomothetic.315 Radical  positivists  on the other hand argue that  it  is  impossible to 
make any sort of general statements as comparative historical methods place inner 
validity  over  external  validity.  The approach is  supposedly  too ideographic,  only 
focusing on one particular case under analysis.316 This criticism actually provides a 
very  good explanation  of  why to  use  the  comparative  historical  method  for  this 
research. The criticism highlights that the methodology seems to be at the interface of  
ideographic and nomothetic approaches. The research on hand will investigate two 
separate cases per concept (i.e. pro- and anti-Americanism, thus four cases in total) 
and the conclusion will  thereafter only relate to these specific  cases,  which is  of 
ideographic  nature.  The  cross-case  comparison  of  these  cases  according  to 
comparative-historical methodology will however aim for minor generalizations, an 
inherently nomothetic approach. The comparative-historical method will thus allow 
to move from the ideographic case studies, beyond a cross case synthesis towards 
potential nomothetic statements and hypothesis.
314 Ibid.; For a study on small-n analysis in comparative methodology see: David Collier, The Comparative Method 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1993) <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1540884> [accessed 12  
January 2017].




In order to fully understand the Americanization debate and the French and German 
America-image  of  the  1920s,  one  must  take  into  account  the  complexity  of  the 
transatlantic  relations.  The investigation of  pro- and anti-Americanism during  the 
interwar  period  cannot  be  oblivious  to  the  overarching  German-American  and 
Franco-American  relations.  After  all,  the  international  relations  with  the  USA 
influenced the French and German realities. The USA was heavily involved in the 
European  decision-making  after  the  First  World  War  and  thereafter  influenced 
politics and economics in both countries. Positive and negative perceptions of the 
USA were hence at least partially shaped by the transatlantic relations. The following 
sections 4.1. and 4.2. will consequently depict the history of German-American and 
Franco-American  relations,  mainly  focusing  on  the  interwar  period.  Thereby  the 
main  goal  is  not  an  in-depth  investigation  of  the  history  of  the  respective 
international relations but rather a selective contemplation of how specific historical 
circumstances led to positive and negative perceptions of the USA. The final section 
4.3.  will  subsequently compare both  evolutions  and develop how these  historical 
factors influenced the opposing America-images of the 1920s and thereby pro- and 
anti-American arguments. 
4.1. German-American Relations
The German-American relations have to be traced back to before the constitutional 
beginning of the USA as immigration from Germany317 towards North America goes 
as far back as the seventeenth century. America as unknown land across the Atlantic 
held a certain fascination and the promise of better  living conditions for German 
settlers  which  came  as  early  as  1607.318 It  is  estimated  that  by  the  time  of  the 
American Revolution (1776-1783) between eight and nine percent of the colonists 
were of German descent which translates to 250,000 people.319 Diplomatic relations 
317  What I here call Germany was of course the Holy Roman Empire, a German speaking confederate states system. In  
order to facilitate the exposition I will here refer to it as “Germany”.
318  Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States, A ‘special Relationship?’(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), p. 28.
319  Idem., p. 27f.
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between Germany and the  USA started  after  the  Declaration of  Independence  in 
1776. These relations were mainly commercial, even though protectionism on both 
sides clearly hindered commercial exchange in the early years. The year 1848, with a 
liberal  revolution  in  Germany  marks  the  first  political  junction  in  US-German 
relations. The growing strive for German national unity kick-started the revolution of 
March 1848 where independence and democracy were demanded from the ruling 
forces of Germany and middle Europe. Even though the revolution failed within a 
few months, it  was apprehended positively in the United States which financially 
supported the Frankfurt parliament and its intended democracy.320 
The next  turning point in  US-German relations was the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-1871). The proclamation of a German empire under William I was monitored 
very carefully  and with fascination across  the Atlantic.  Many German-Americans 
hoped,  that  the  new  German  nation  would  develop  a  more  liberal  form  of 
government in the coming years. By January 1871 Germans in the USA showed their 
interests  in  these  political  developments  by  celebrating  the  German  national 
unification euphorically. On an international level a strong Germany would however 
pose a challenge to the USA and hinder US-German relations. The following years 
were  hence  characterised  by  economic  competition  rather  than  cooperation.  The 
growing  German  military  and  economy  established  a  rivalry  with  the  USA and 
convinced  ruling  elites  on  both  sides  that  future  conflicts  were  possible  if  not 
likely.321
The outbreak of the First World War indeed manifested the differences between 
the hierarchic military structure of the Kaiserreich and the civic-democratic system of  
the United States. In the three years of American neutrality (between 1914 and 1917) 
320  Idem., p. 29.
321  For the German-American relations between 1776 and 1914 see: Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States,  
a ‘Special Relationship?’ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 27-51; Reinhard R. Doerries, 
‘Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917’, in Amerika und die Deutschen: Die  
Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Frank Trommler (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986), pp. 1-14. 
For the German America-image between 1871 and 1914 see: Wolfgang Helbich, ‘Different, but not out of this  
world: German images of the United States between two wars, 1871-1914’, in Transatlantic Images and 
Perceptions, ed. by David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmid, Publications of the German Historical Institute 
(Washington, D.C.; Cambridge [England]; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 109–29. 
For a historiography of the US-German relations in the interwar-period see: Hans-Jürgen Schröder, ‘Deutsch-
Amerikanische Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichtsschreibung und Forschungsperspektiven’, in Amerika  
Und Die Deutschen, ed. by Frank Trommler (Opladen, 1986), pp. 491–513.
For a study on the US-German relations post-WW II see: Michael W. Blumenthal, ‘The Closest of Strangers: 
German-American Relations in Historical Perspective’, GHI Bulletin, 2005, 33–46; Detlef Junker et al., eds., The 
United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War: A Handbook, Vol. 1: 1945-1968, Vol .2: 1968-1990, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
82
the two countries would repeatedly impinge upon various political topics- such as the 
German submarine campaign. The unrestricted German submarine warfare against 
Great-Britain had led to increasing fire on American supply ships heading towards 
the United Kingdom.322 In addition to the German submarine warfare as point  of 
conflict, the American President Woodrow Wilson's role as mediator in the European 
conflict  was  equally  problematic.  The  mediation  efforts  made  by  Wilson  were 
continuously rejected by the Kaiser and the diplomatic leadership partly because of 
the  fear  that  Wilson  would  gear  his  politics  towards  the  Entente  rather  than 
Germany.323 
Conflicts  culminated  on  1  February  1917  when  Germany  declared  the 
unconditional submarine warfare on American ships and thereby de facto pushed the 
United  States  towards  a  war  entry.324 The  declaration  was  combined  with  the 
Zimmerman Telegraph, an allegiance offer towards the Mexican government which 
stated that Texas, Arizona and New Mexico should return to Mexico from the USA. 
It at least seemed as though the German leadership had little to no interest in the 
American neutrality.325 On 2 April 1917 Wilson hence demanded from Congress it 
should accept the German state of war and enter the European conflict. With its war-
entry, the USA took over the military strategy of the Entente. By the end of 1917 
around 176,000 American soldiers had entered the war, by September 1918 one and a 
half  million  American  soldiers  were  stationed  in  Europe.326 The  USA and  its 
President Woodrow Wilson would also cement this leadership claim politically. The 
ʻFourteen Points Planʼ by Wilson as guideline for the post-war peace-negotiations 
was a clear sign of this diplomatic American dominance. It became the basis for the 
322  The Lusitania incident was the sinking of the American passenger ship Lusitania by German submarines on 7 May 
1915. About 1200 people died and 760 survived the attack.
323  Doerries, ‘Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917’, p. 6.
324 For the German-American war-entry see: Gerhard Weinberg, ‘Deutschland und Amerika 1917 Bis 1949’, in Das 
Deutschland- und Amerikabild: Beiträge zum gegenseitigen Verständnis beider Völker, ed. by Klaus Weigelt (Melle: 
E. Knoth, 1986), pp. 21–28; Michael Stürmer, ‘The US Role in German Political Culture’, in Das Deutschland- und  
Amerikabild: Beiträge zum gegenseitigen Verständnis beider Völker, ed. by Klaus Weigelt (Melle: E. Knoth, 1986), 
pp. 29–40.
For the lead up to the First World War see: Justus D Doenecke, Nothing Less than War: A New History of America’s  
Entry into World War I (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2010) <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10466827> 
[accessed 2 November 2016]; Jennifer D Keene, The United States and the First World War (Harlow, England; New 
York: Longman, 2000); Colin Nicolson, The Longman Companion to the First World War: Europe, 1914-1918 
(Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2001); Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: The Road to  
1914, 2013; Conan Fischer, Europe between Democracy and Dictatorship, 1900-1945 (Chichester; Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
325  Doerries, ‘Kaiserreich und Republik. Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen vor 1917’, p. 9.
326  Idem., pp. 9–11.
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armistice negotiations with Germany and included a liberal proposal to the European 
conflict.327 The central pillars of the ʻFourteen Points Planʼ, as formulated by Wilson, 
were  the  autonomy  of  nations,  free  international  trade  and  a  para-governmental 
international institution to guarantee international peace: the League of Nations.328 
When  the  German  leadership  sought  for  armistice  and  peace  negotiations  on  3 
October 1918, it was on the basis of the ʻFourteen Points Planʼ. Wilson consequently 
could not dismiss the German request. Even more so, a dismissal could symbolise 
total defeat for Germany and encourage it to mobilise its last reserves. This could 
have potentially pushed the war until the end of 1918, if not longer. Nevertheless, 
Germany had now officially accepted the ʻFourteen Points Planʼ before France or 
Britain had. Wilson henceforth sent a positive response to the German leadership, not 
completely accepting their request, but not refusing it neither, as there had been no 
consultation with France and Britain.329 
The negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) were to decide the 
outcome of the impending end of the war.330 On the verge of the conference the USA 
and Germany had corresponding agendas and most German politicians were very 
327  Klaus Schwabe, ‘Die USA, Deutschland und der Ausgang des ersten Weltkrieges’, in Die USA Und Deutschland  
1918-1975: Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen zwischen Rivalität und Partnerschaft, ed. by Manfred Knapp and 
others (München: Beck, 1978), p. 11f.
328 For studies on Woodrow Wilson and the Fourteen Points Plan see: Wesley James Reisser, ‘From a World of Empires 
to a World of Nation States: America at the Paris Peace Conference’, 2010; Christian J. Tams, League of Nations 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2007); Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, ‘Theodore  
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy’, Political Psychology, 28.6 (2007), 747–
76; Trygve Throntveit, ‘The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination’, 
Diplomatic History, 35.3 (2011), 445–81.
329 For an account of the US German relations during the First World War see: Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the  
United States, a ‘Special Relationship?’ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 52–74.
For a general overview of the period between 1919 and 1933 see: Zara S Steiner, The Lights That Failed: European 
International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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sympathetic towards Wilson.331 Wilson wanted Germany to have a strong economy in 
order to stabilise the country and shape it as a strong block against the USSR. He saw 
himself more as a referee between the different parties and targeted “peace without 
victory” as he called it,  a peace without complete military and political  defeat of 
Germany.332 Most important to Wilson however was to bring the League of Nations 
into  being  which  led  him to  accept  the  French  and  British  request  to  dismiss  a 
German participation in Paris. Without the presence of Germany or any of the other 
defeated  nations,  the  design  of  the  peace  treaty  was drafted more  negatively for 
Germany than intended. Germany received 24 hours to decide whether to accept the 
Treaty of Versailles in this form or decline it.333 With an impending complete military 
destruction Germany accepted the conditions. It had to accept war guilt, pay high 
reparations and accept territorial losses. Wilson's idea of collective security, with an 
economically  and  military  stable  and  peaceful  central  Europe  was  not  being 
converted  into  action.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  had  become  a  punishment  of 
Germany. The 10 months of diplomatic correspondence between Germany and the 
USA, previous to Versailles, had been characterised by concordance and harmony, 
but remained only an intermezzo in their bilateral  relationship.334 In Germany the 
Treaty of Versailles would from now on dominate and influence the national self-
perception  and  foremost  the  foreign  policy  geared  towards  revisionism  of 
Versailles.335
331 For American perspectives at the Paris Peace Conference see: Wesley James Reisser, ‘From a World of Empires to a  
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Even  though  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  put  a  heavy  strain  on  the  US-German 
diplomacy,  the  post-war  point  of  departure  for  the  interstate-relations  was  not 
completely hostile. In fact, it had the potential of a rapprochement, potentially even 
cooperation.336 From an American perspective it was highly important that Germany 
would remain a republic with a democratic political orientation.337 The USA intended 
to resume a close relationship with Germany through raising its living standard. This 
agenda of security and stability through economic cooperation manifested itself in a 
trade  treaty  in  1923.338 The  USA hence  tried  to  return to  the  Open Door  Policy 
through an economically stable Germany.339
From a German perspective, it was more beneficial to cooperate with the USA 
than  with  France  or  Great-Britain  as  the  USA was  not  opposed  to  a  peaceful 
transformation of the European circumstances in Germany's favour. It was therefore 
assertive for Germany to reach interlocking interests between both countries. These 
would show themselves for the first time with the debate about wartime reparations. 
The reparations debate was nearly unsolvable on an economic level and it had been 
clear since the Paris Peace Conference that the topic of reparations would lead to 
tension between the European powers. Germany continuously hoped to get American 
support for a mitigation of the reparations.  The USA itself  intended a reasonable 
agreement of the European powers, especially because its allies also owed the USA 
wartime debts. Despite this, agreement seemed unlikely. Britain made its demands 
dependent on how much they owed the USA. France wanted a rigid revenge for the 
Germany invasion and Germany to pay strong reparations,  not  even ruling out  a 
military intervention.340
The London Conference  between March and May 1921 sought  to  settle  this 
reparations conflict and negotiate a payment plan. Despite the actual finalisation of a 
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payment plan the reparations problem remained ongoing. The German debt was so 
huge that it was practically impossible to repay. In addition, the German currency, the 
Mark, had been in an inflationary spiral since the beginning of the war. To finance 
the war, Germany had in 1914 suspended the gold standard (one third of the currency 
had to be backed by gold) and issued war bonds which were to be financed by the 
population  in  retrospect.  This  capital  creation  through  money-printing  already 
depreciated the Mark during the war and encouraged inflation. At the end of the war 
the accumulated debt could however not be shed on the wartime enemies through 
reparations, as it had been the case after the Franco-Prussian war. Germany was now 
itself  obliged  to  pay  reparations  in  the  form  of  foreign  currency  and  material 
commodities.  Even  though  these  commodities  were  not  directly  subject  to  the 
growing inflation,  the German government  acquired  them through an  increase in 
paper  money,  which  in  return  increasingly  diluted  the  currency  and  encouraged 
hyperinflation.  The destruction of the own currency was thereby also a  means to 
demonstrate to the allies that Germany was unable to pay reparations. The whole 
reparations  situation  consequently  escalated  when  the  German  government 
consecutively failed to pay reparations in late 1922. On 11 January 1923 France took 
measures  in  their  own hands  and occupied  the Ruhr area in  order  to  extract  the 
reparations themselves in the form of coal and steel.341 The German hyperinflation 
was now in full  swing and the economy began to collapse  under its  pressure. A 
lasting solution for the reparations problem was thus more pressing than ever. For the 
USA,  a  precondition  for  renegotiating  the  reparations  was  a  German  currency 
stabilisation.342 This  was  effectively  realised  through  the  introduction  of  a  new 
currency,  the  Rentenmark,  on 15  November 1923.  The USA consequently  began 
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developing financial  plans to reorganise the reparations which would result  in the 
Dawes Plan of 1924.343 The Dawes Plan had been developed by a committee chaired 
by the American banker Charles Dawes and intended to re-finance the reparation-
payments. The basic idea was that the USA would lend money to Europe, particularly  
Germany, to rebuild its industry. This would increase economic growth, employment, 
international trade and profits. These profits could be reinvested in the industry and 
allow a timely repayment of outstanding loans and reparations.344 
After  the  economic situation  had been temporarily  settled,  various additional 
conferences sought to settle further political issues. Most of the conferences saw the 
German leadership around Chancellor Gustav Stresemann strongly sympathised with 
the USA to potentially improve the German situation. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928 was a representation of this US-German cooperation and called for the peaceful 
settlement of all international conflicts.345 Signed by the USA, France and Germany 
the pact can at least partly be seen as a step towards the revision of Versailles. The 
Kellogg-Briand Pact disempowered France in relation to Germany as it linked the 
reparation  topic and the rearmament question,  both potentially  supporting  the  re-
ascension of Germany.346 A growing interdependence between Germany and the USA 
in terms of debtor and creditor, resulted in similar interests and was thereby a strong 
advantage for the German position.
US-German cooperation and mutual dependence was especially visible on the 
bond market. Main conjunction between both countries were the loans which went 
from  the  USA to  Germany  through  the  Dawes  Plan,  between  1924  and  1930. 
Particularly between 1925 and 1928 more than one billion dollars was loaned to 
German corporations.347 These loans were mostly given out in packs of 10 million 
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dollars and went to large German corporations such as AEG, Thyssen, Krupp and 
Siemens. This consequently led to a strong interconnection of the German economic 
situation and American foreign capital.348
From  an  American  perspective,  it  was  important  to  strengthen  the  German 
economy in order to support the reparation-payments.349 Nevertheless the bilateral 
cooperation  was  mutually  beneficial  and  profitable.  American  businesses  entered 
German corporations  in  sectors  such as  steel,  chemical,  and manufacturing.  This 
introduced advanced American  rationalization  and production  procedures  such as 
Taylorism and Fordism. German knowhow was joined by American productivity. The 
most vital sector for German-American joint ventures was the automobile industry, 
where strong American and German industry branches met. Henry Ford opened his 
first factory in Berlin in 1925; General Motors (which bought up the Adam Opel 
Werke A.G. in spring 1929)350 and Chrysler would soon follow. By 1930 about 210 
million dollars had been invested in the German car industry alone.351 Even though 
some people  began to  speak  of  a  super-alienation  of  the  industry,  the  American 
investments  were  generally  well-received  in  Germany.  The  cooperation  was 
beneficial for both countries: it increased exports, created jobs and generated foreign 
exchange inflows. The German foreign policy from Stresemann (Chancellor in 1923) 
up to Brüning (Chancellor in 1930-32) therefore mainly operated under the agenda of 
economic and financial cooperating with the USA.352
The political consequence for the USA was however that over the second half of 
the 1920s it lost its position as referee in European affairs. Through the financial and 
economic cooperation with Germany it was no longer the so called “third party”.353 
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The USA revised the Dawes Plan at the end of the 1920s with the Young Plan of 
1929, in favour of its own currency- and loan-system. The Young Plan provided a 
new reduced reparations payment plan for Germany with the medium-term goal of 
depoliticising the reparations through converting them into private industrial debts. 
The USA hence reopened the reparations case officially in 1928 and welcomed the 
regrouping  and  commercialisation  of  the  debt.  In  light  of  these  developments 
Germany  slowly  advocated  its  main  goal  of  a  complete  abolishment  of  the 
reparations. Due to the American loans and heavy private investments in Germany it 
was difficult to oppose this German approach politically. The USA tried to increase 
private  investments  without  losing  the  German  subjection  to  reparations,  but  the 
economic interconnection would prove too strong. Particularly the financial crisis of 
1929 with its effect on Germany as well as the USA was the final turning point.354 
The Hoover-Moratorium suspended the reparation payments for one year and was at 
least partially a result of US-German rapprochement.355 
The  US-German  cooperation  had  shown  the  German  political  elite  that  a 
financial solution of the reparation payments would rule out military consequences 
by  France.  This  political  attitude  strengthened  the  German  position  towards  the 
intended to limit international involvements and allegiances (with their subsequent commitments and 
responsibilities) in order to avoid potential undesired confrontations and wars.
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French.  German  foreign  policy  is  a  testimony  of  this  approach  as  it  sustainably 
avoided accepting or even considering the French claims over the 1920s. The French 
concept  of  collective  security  was  slowly  replaced  with  the  American  idea  of 
peaceful  change.356 Truthfully  the  German-American  cooperation  was  eventually 
probably not beneficial for sustainable European peace. Through a gradual revision 
of Versailles, the USA had become Germany's strongest partner - whilst drifting from 
France.  Germany  had  reclaimed  a  position  alongside  the  great  powers  though 
economic  collaboration  with  the  USA.  Economic  cooperation  had  temporarily 
triggered a peaceful evolution of the international order.357
4.2. Franco-American Relations
The relations between France and the United States equally have a long legacy and 
stretch back to colonial times. As early as the 17th century king Louis XIV colonised 
large parts of North America and named them after himself: “Louisiana”. Main rivals 
for the French on the North American continent were the British, controlling large 
parts of the American North-East, and the Spanish, who held Mexico and Florida. 
First quarrels between France and Britain originated in Europe in 1688 and were later 
taken across the Atlantic towards the American colonies: the French and Indian Wars. 
By 1763, after a series of colonial battles, the French and British eventually signed a 
peace treaty in Paris. Britain, who had been victorious in the colonial wars, claimed 
the French lands east of the Mississippi, whereas the French territories west of the 
Mississippi went to Spain.358 
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With  the  outbreak  of  the  American  War  of  Independence,  France  saw  a 
possibility for revenge against the British and of thereby regaining control over some 
of its lost territories. As a consequence, France supplied funds and materials to the 
Americans.  Many  French  aristocrats  and  military  officers,  inspirited  by  the 
republican ideals, joined the war on the side of the revolutionaries. With a victory for 
the revolutionists,  France and the United States signed the Treaty of  Alliance  by 
1778,  where  the  United  States  was  formally  recognized.359 With  the  American 
Revolution as an example,  republican ideas  soon also reached France which  was 
responsive  to  the  idea  of   a  new political  hierarchy.  The post  July  1789 French 
Revolution was partly inspired by American republican ideals. Whereas the United 
States had sought democratic self-determination, the French revolutionaries aimed 
for a total overthrow of the political system and absolute individual liberty.360 
By  1793  France  and  Britain  had  again  gone  to  war  with  each  other.  The 
historical ties between the USA and Great-Britain led the USA to sympathise with 
Britain rather than France, despite the Treaty of Alliance. Trade with both countries 
continued however,  until  Britain  blocked and seized American ships  approaching 
French ports. In order to avoid a confrontation with Britain, the USA signed the Jay 
Treaty  (1795)  which  was  to  facilitate  trade  and  guarantee  peace.  The  French 
perceived the Jay Treaty as a violation of the Treaty of Alliance and began attacking 
American merchant ships. Contentions continued on a diplomatic level when in 1797 
the French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand refused to receive an 
American diplomatic delegation. Both parties however did not want to commit to a 
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360  For the French and American revolution see:  Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La France et les États-Unis des origines à  
nos jours, pp. 19-29.
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full-fledged war. Therefore, the conflict, the “Quasi-War”, was resolved in 1800 with 
the Treaty of Mortefontaine.361
The next  juncture of Franco-American relations was the American Civil  War 
(1861-1865).  Despite  official  French neutrality,  the French Emperor Napoleon III 
saw the  civil  war  as  an  opportunity  to  expand  his  power  in  Central  and  South 
America. Napoleon III favoured the Confederate States as he hoped to destabilise the 
Union  and  gain  an  ally  to  secure  Mexico.  With  the  USA temporarily  unable  to 
enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine362,  he  placed  the  Austrian  archduke  Maximilian  of 
Habsburg on the Mexican throne. The United States refused to accept and recognise 
the new Mexican government.  After the end of the civil  war in  1865 the United 
States therefore increased diplomatic  pressure on France to persuade Napoleon to 
stop his support for Maximilian. Napoleon eventually withdrew the French troops 
from Mexico and Maximilian was executed by the Mexicans.363
When the Napoleonic government was overthrown in the 1870s, the new French 
republican leadership decided to produce a gift to the United States. It intended to 
show its admiration of the republican tradition and hoped to strengthen American 
support for the new French republic. As a result, the Statue of Liberty as symbol of 
republican  values  and  democracy,  sculpted  by  Frederic  Auguste  Bartholdi,  was 
donated  to  the  USA  in  1886.  The  statue  demonstrated  the  general  friendly 
relationship between the  USA and France  in  the  period up until  the  First  World 
War.364
With the outbreak of the First World War the Franco-American relations entered 
a new but continuously allied phase.365 When the USA declared war on Germany in 
361  ‘Relations with France Facts, Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.com Articles about Relations with France’ 
362  The Monroe Doctrine describes a part of the American foreign policy developed by President James Monroe in  
1823. It stated that any interventions of European nations in Latin America would be seen as acts of aggression and 
would be met with military intervention. At USA would at the same time not interfere in European affairs or 
colonies.
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American Diplomacy, 1914-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 
La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours (Paris: Seuil, 1976); David Strauss, Menace in the West: The  
Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 109-156.; 
Grewe, Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, pp. 35-44.; Walter  
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Information, Pictures | Encyclopedia.com Articles about Relations with France’.
For a historiography of French literature on the First World War see: Leonard V. Smith, ‘The “Culture de Guerre”  
and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918’, History Compass, 5.6 (2007), 1967–79.
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1917,  France  was  at  the  end  of  its  supplies  and  military  resources.366 The  USA 
supplied heavily  needed funding and resources for  the  Allied powers,  as  well  as 
military support. This could not be matched by Germany, having suffered enormous 
casualties on both fronts. Under the French Marshall Ferdinand Foch and the strong 
support of American soldiers, the German troops were pushed from French territory 
and the western front by 1918. In France, the American support was at first received 
ecstaticly. Particularly Woodrow Wilson was celebrated as a hero upon his arrival in 
Paris for the peace talks. The negotiations regarding an armistice and possible peace 
settlement would however alter France's relationship with the USA. The USA had 
strengthened its position through its implication in the war. This was reflected by the 
American aspiration to take up the mediator position in the peace negotiations.367 
These  intentions  disappointed  French  representatives  who  particularly  perceived 
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points as an overly idealistic  approach to the peace-
negotiations. The claim that American moral values were superior to the rest of the 
world and should be the benchmark for the negotiations displeased the French. It 
proved to them that overbearing moralism was a signature characteristic of American 
foreign policy.368 When the French demands at the Paris Peace Conference and later 
in Versailles were not met, it casted a negative shadow on the relationship between 
the wartime allies.369 Demands for a buffer state between Germany and France (under 
French influence) and a reinstatement of the French frontiers as of 1814 (meaning not 
just the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but also of the German Rhineland), had to be 
dropped  under  pressure  from Wilson  and  his  determination  to  push  through  the 
Fourteen Points.370
For a general study on France and the First World War: John Horne, ‘Demobilizing the Mind. France and the Legacy 
of the Great War, 1919-1939’, French History and Civilization, Papers from the George Rudé Seminar.2 (2009), 
101–19.
For literature on the Franco-German relations during the same period see: Ralph Blessing, Der mögliche Frieden:  
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2008); Conan Fischer, ‘The Failed European Union: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression of 
1929–321’, The International History Review, 34.4 (2012), 705–24.
366  Grewe, Das Amerikabild der französischen Schriftsteller zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, p. 35.
367  For the American war-entry and Wilson's approach for peace see: John W. Coogan, ‘WIlsonian Diplomacy in War  
and Peace’, in American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993, ed. by Gordon Martel (London: Routledge, 
1998), pp. 71–89.
368  Sommer, Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939., p. 17f, with further references in 
footnote 3. 
369  For the French approach at the Paris Peace Conference see: Peter Jackson, ‘A Tran-Atlantic Condominium of 
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Conference’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 16.2 (2015), 179–207; Blumenthal, Illusion and Reality in  
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Relations  between  the  USA  and  France  were  further  aggravated  by 
disagreements about French security issues.371 Main concern for France was a distrust 
for  Germany and the fear  that a  German return to  old strength would encourage 
future aggressions. The aim for the French Premier Minister Georges Clemenceau 
was therefore an American promise to commit to French security in the near future. 
France hoped to cripple Germany economically, and thereby prohibit it from possible 
future  hostilities.  This  would  however  prove  incompatible  with  Wilson's  peace-
keeping  approach.  In  addition  to  the  disagreement  about  territorial  security  and 
peace-keeping,  disarmament  was  another  controversial  topic.372 In  the  Fourteen 
Points, Wilson had demanded a reduction of arms to guarantee future world peace. 
France did not want to commit to such a disarmament as it feared it could not be able 
to protect itself against possible German aggression.373 
In  the  light  of  these  disagreements,  France  attended  the  Washington  Naval 
Conference  (1922)  which  addressed  naval  disarmament  and  the  international 
relations of  major  and minor powers in  East  Asia  (i.e.  China).  Not  only did this 
present an opportunity for France to make its security case, it also kept the French 
hope alive that with an agreement at the conference, the USA would retreat from 
interventions  in  European  affairs  and  return  to  isolationism.  French  hopes  were 
however  soon  destroyed  when  the  United  States,  Great-Britain  and  Japan  began 
discussing  naval  issues  in  secret  meetings.  From then  on,  the  French  navy  was 
limited to only about one third of the tonnage of the USA and Great-Britain in the 
capital ship sector. Even worse was the French loss in prestige as it lost its position 
among the former members of the Entente.374
After  the  disappointment  of  the  Washington  Conference,  France  refused  to 
attend the Geneva Conference of 1927. It wasn't until the Kellogg-Briand-Pact that 
an agreement not to use war to settle disagreements in international conflict could be 
371  For the French security concerns see: Blumenthal, Illusion and Reality in Franco-American Diplomacy, 1914-1945, 
p. 101ff; Strauss, Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times, pp. 109–22; Sommer, 
Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939, pp. 22–29.
372  For literature on disarmament and the Washington Naval Conference see: Richard W Fanning, Peace and  
Disarmament: Naval Rivalry & Arms Control, 1922-1933 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015); 
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Studies, 29.2 (2006), 225–46.
373  Strauss, Menace in the West, pp. 109–112.
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reached.375 The  final  attempt  to  solve  the  disarmament  conflict  was  the  World 
Disarmament Conference of 1932-34. Here once again French and American views 
differed. The American calling for global disarmament was opposed by the French 
proposition  of  a  strong  international  army  for  conflict  resolution.  This  Franco-
American  disagreement  was  symptomatic  for  the  development  of  the  security 
question over the past decade.376
A further  pivotal  topic  for  the  Franco-American  relationship  was  the  debate 
about post-war reparations.377 After the end of the First World War France expected 
the  United  States  to  entirely  cancel  its  wartime  debt.  France  argued  that  it  had 
suffered enormous human and material losses in the years prior to the American war-
entry.  France reckoned that  the American loans had been a compensation for the 
delay  of  American  troops  in  entering  the  European  fighting.  In  addition,  France 
advocated  that  it  had  defended  American  democracy  against  German  military 
expansion. The USA would however insist on a repayment of these debts. The debt-
debates poisoned the relationship between both countries in the post-war years. It 
displeased  the  Americans  that  France  retained  a  repellent  attitude  towards  the 
repayment of the debt, as it displeased the French that the Americans failed to abstain 
from the demands in light of the huge sacrifices France made during the war.378
In reality the debt  issue could not be isolated from the reparations-topic,  the 
American loan policy or the evolution of the monetary situation.  With the heavy 
financial borrowings during the war, the French currency, the Franc, had decreased in 
value. Particularly during the first half of the 1920s the Franc declined to an extent 
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that the monetary stability became a subject of public and political  debate.  What 
added to this problem was that the currency decrease was not only a French problem. 
The hyperinflation in Germany in 1923 rendered the German government unable to 
pay any form of reparations to France. This consequently put the French economy 
under even more pressure.379
France therefore insisted on a connection between the debt it inadvertently owed 
the  United  States  and the  reparations  it  was  to  receive  from Germany.  It  would 
however not be until the Dawes Plan that the United States government would be 
responsive to the French demand of linking debt and reparations.380 In the previous 
years they had acted as though there existed no connection. With the Dawes Plan in 
early  1924 the  German reparations  were  renegotiated.  The  Dawes  Plan  not  only 
provided a payment plan for the German reparations, it also terminated the French 
occupation  of  the  Ruhr.  It  on  the  one  hand  settled  and  guaranteed  the  German 
reparation payments, and on the other provided the French Prime Minister Poincaré 
with  a  solution  to  retreating  French  troops  from  the  Ruhr  without  political 
consequences  and  without  losing  face.  In  this  sense,  the  Dawes  Plan  not  only 
favoured Germany, it also favoured France.381 As a consequence the Dawes Plan, at 
least  temporarily,  solved  and  regulated  the  reparation  payments.  The  debt 
controversies  were finally  settled by the Mellon-Bérenger  Treaty,  signed between 
France and the USA on 29 April 1926.382 The Mellon-Bérenger Treaty provided the 
first  written  settlement  of  the  debt  issue.383 The  USA and  France  agreed  on  the 
amount and rate of the French debt payments: full repayment with a reduced interest 
rate of 1.67 percent384 and over a time span of 62 years.385 
The  Mellon-Bérenger  Treaty  was eventually  connected  to  the  Young Plan of 
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1929  in  order  to  settle  the  debt-reparations  debate  lastingly.386 The  Young  Plan 
initially revised the Dawes Plan after it had become clear that Germany would and 
could not repay the reparations as intended. With the ratification of the Young Plan in 
1930, Germany agreed it would pay its reparations regularly as long as France would 
repay  its  wartime  debt  -  for  62  years.387 France  therefore  had  an  interest  in 
renegotiating  the  Dawes  Plan  into  the  Young  Plan  to  guarantee  the  reparation 
payments.  The Young Plan was generally taken up positively in France as it  had 
temporally  settled  the  reparations  debate  even  though  France  had  to  clear  the 
Rhineland it had occupied since 1919.388 Unfortunately for France, by 1931 the Wall 
Street Crash and the following German depression made it clear that Germany could 
not  follow the  Young Plan and reparation  payments  had to  be terminated.389 The 
Hoover  Moratorium  suspended  the  payments  for  one  year  and  at  the  Lausanne 
Conference in 1931 the European powers ultimately agreed to reduce the German 
reparations by 90 percent.390 
The relationship between France and the USA during the interwar period was not 
limited  to  matters  of  foreign  politics.  As in  Germany the  United  States  invested 
heavily in the French post World War One economy.391 After the First World War had 
destroyed large parts  of the French economy and industry,  American investments 
were welcomed. The largest part of these investments was geared towards the oil and 
electricity  industry.  American  firms  brought  new  methods  to  France  and  mainly 
focused  on  improving  manufacturing.  In  addition  to  electric  equipment 
manufacturing,  American  companies  took  over  large  parts  of  the  telephone 
communication  market.  This  raised  some  French  concerns.  The  oil  and 
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telecommunications industry were strategic wartime industries and their American 
control  potentially  endangered  France.  The  many  controversies  over  debts, 
reparations  and  security  had  shown  France  that  a  fruitful  collaboration  with  the 
United States seemed unlikely and some concerns of an American takeover of the 
French telephone system were voiced. However, these fears ultimately proved to be 
groundless.392 
The French automobile industry was affected to a different level than electronic 
manufacturing  or  telecommunications.  While  France  was  the  European  leader  of 
automobile production,  the USA was the global forefront.  Henry Ford opened an 
assembly factory  in  Bordeaux in 1919 and in Asnières  in  1925.  General  Motors 
maintained warehouses in Marseilles during the same period. Together both firms 
employed  11,375  French  workers.  Compared  to  Germany  the  actual  American 
investments in the French automobile industry remained limited. Bigger competition 
came  from  the  American  automobile  firms  through  other  European  countries. 
General Motors had bought up the Opel-works in Germany in 1929 and produced 
200,000 cars annually. Ford in return had built large production works in Dagenham 
near London with a similar production scale.  These works supplanted the French 
automobile industry as the largest producer of passenger cars.393 
The  largest  impact  American  investments  had  on  France  were  in  the  film 
industry. Prior to the First World War the French movie industry had been the largest 
in the world, but during the war this industry completely collapsed. In the post-war 
period the movie industry was taken over by the USA and by 1924 as much as 85 
percent of all movies shown in French cinemas were American-made.394 American 
dominance in the French movie industry went beyond the films themselves. About 75 
percent  of  the  largest  cinemas  in  France  were  owned  by  American  companies. 
American investments in the movie industry were therefore far more controversial 
than investments in other sectors. This was also because the film was originally an 
invention by the French Lumière brothers.395 
Overall,  during the 1920s, France became increasingly wary of the American 
investments even though they had been highly appreciated at first. Investments in the 
oil, electricity, automobile and film industry, were increasingly perceived as a form 
392  Strauss., p. 140ff.
393  Strauss., p. 145.
394 Idem., p. 146.
395  Idem., pp. 147–150.
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of American imperialism, impairing French independence.396 The debate on American 
imperialism  was  a  French  peculiarity  and  went  beyond  the  simple  private 
investments  of  the  United  States.397 It  was  seen  as  something  that  incorporated 
politics  and military.  The  acquisition  of  California,  New Mexico  (1848)  and the 
Philippines (1902) were to France some examples of a militant form of American 
imperialism.398 French circles argued that this imperialism showed itself particularly 
in Latin American. According to France the so-called Dollar-diplomacy399 entailed 
American investments and trusts which were used to destabilise governments and 
thereby exploit  new American markets.  France was displeased with the unilateral 
interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  was  supposedly  used  to  the  American 
advantage and cast a negative light on international interventions. The USA indeed 
had a strong naval presence in the Pacific, however mainly in order to defend its 
position against the rise of Japan. France feared that the USA would aim for naval 
predominance and at some point, endanger French colonies.400 
Even  though  the  French  theory  of  American  imperialism  was  not  very 
prevailing, it does show the general tendency of the Franco-American relations in the 
interwar  period.  They  were  marked  by  a  growing  suspicion  towards  the  United 
States.  The security  issues  as  well  as  the  debt  and reparations  controversies  had 
contributed to a growing French discontent with its wartime ally. The relationship 
between France and the United States moved from wartime cooperation as equals, 
towards  American  domination  and  strong  contention  points.  The  callous  French 
mind-set  towards  the  debt  repayment  and  the  fact  that  it  insisted  on  crippling 
Germany as revenge for the wartime sufferance, did not help the Franco-American 
cause.  Neither  did  the  American  attitude  of  underestimating  and  defaulting  the 
important French security demands. Nor the strict reclamation of the wartime debt, 
whilst simultaneously gradually reducing the German reparations. The period of the 
396  For a study on the French perceptions of US financial imperialism during the currency crisis see: John Keiger,  
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1920s was hence branded by worsening Franco-American relations without getting 
truly conflictual to the point where they would become dangerous.
4.3. Comparison
The history of the relations between the United States of America and Germany on 
one side and France on the other respectively reach back to the 17 th century. The early 
interactions in colonial times were in both cases largely shaped by immigration and 
trade. France generally showed stronger involvement on the American continent over 
the course of the 18th and 19th century. This is highlighted through the ideological 
proximity of the American War of Independence and the French Revolution. Both 
events  were  inspired  by  one  another  and provided both  countries  with  a  similar 
republican constitutional orientation. Territorial interactions between France and the 
USA such as the Louisiana Purchase or the French involvement in  the American 
Civil War further document the strong Franco-American relationship up until the 20th 
century. Whereas these interactions between France and the United States prior to the 
First  World  War were  of  an  active  political,  commercial  and military nature,  the 
interactions  between  Germany  and  the  USA were  more  passive  in  comparison. 
German-American relations were characterised by German immigration and minor 
trade agreements. It was not until the Franco-Prussian War and the time leading up to 
World War I, that relations intensified. The outbreak of the First World War itself 
figured as magnifying glass for both German- and Franco-American relations. When 
German hostility pushed the USA into an intervention in the European conflict by 
1917, the United States joined an allegiance with France and the Entente.
The  post-war  situation  regarding  Franco-American  relations  and  German-
American  relations  was  consequently  opposing  and  conflictual.  The  Paris  Peace 
Conference and the Treaty of Versailles would however slowly change this situation. 
France and the United States had different conceptions for the peace treaty and the 
future of Germany. These differences made the USA and France slowly drift apart. 
This became particularly visible in the debate about wartime reparations. The debt 
and reparations topic heavily influenced the foreign relations in France as well as in 
Germany. France pushed for a connection of the debt and reparations issue whilst 
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Germany worked towards the cancellation of all wartime reparations. In the light of 
shaping Germany as  strong bulwark  against  the  USSR,  the  USA rather  took the 
German  demands  into  consideration  than  the  French  ones.  The  USA diminished 
German reparations whilst  insisting on the full  repayment of the French wartime 
debt. The payment plans of the 1920s such as the Dawes- and Young-Plan henceforth 
rather favoured Germany than France and resulted in improving German-American 
relations and worsening Franco-America relations. 
This shift is exemplified by the French concern about the security issue. Since 
the Paris Peace Conference France had insisted on an American security commitment 
against future German aggressions. This demand however contradicted the American 
foreign-policy  of  isolationism on the  one  hand and the liberal  peace  proposal  of 
Woodrow Wilson on the  other.  Discord in  the security debate was intensified  by 
differing  views  about  the  rearmament  topic.  While  France  insisted  on  a  strong 
military  as  shield  against  German  aggressions,  the  USA tended  towards  general 
disarmament.  These  incongruous  differences  were  further  propelled  by  German-
American rapprochement. Weakening the French positions through fruitful German-
American relations had the  largest  potential  for  Germany to  revise  the  Treaty of 
Versailles, despite the American ambition for disarmament. 
Evidently the relationship between France and the USA and Germany and the 
USA, did start from different positions. Nevertheless, the 1920s did show a general 
trend of German-American relations continuously improving whilst Franco-America 
relations deteriorated.  Germany tended to side with the United States in political 
debates  and  took  a  generally  anti-French  position.  This  foreign  policy  approach 
proved favourable to regain German economic and military power over the course of 
the 1920s. The interconnection of German and American interests tied up the German 
situation with the American one up to a point where it became difficult for the USA 
to make anti-German decisions. Particularly the American investments in Germany 
are  a  representation  of  this  policy.  Germany  welcomed  American  investments 
whereas France was more reluctant of American interference in the French markets. 
American foreign direct investment in Germany supported economic recovery and 
led to a level of cooperation which no longer allowed the USA to jeopardise this 
economic partnership politically. The USA as a consequence lost  its “third party” 
position as referee in European affairs.
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The Wall Street Crash (1929) and the following Great Depression were the final 
impulse in altering the relationship between Germany, France and the USA over the 
course of the 1920s and 1930s. The Hoover Moratorium suspended the reparation 
payments and the Conference of Lausanne de facto abolished wartime reparations 
altogether.  Germany's  foreign  policy  geared  towards  revisionism  of  Versailles 
through Americanophilia had thus indeed shown effectiveness. Improving German-
American relations over the 1920s and deteriorating Franco-American relations had 
shifted  the  power  ratio  from  enemies  and  allies  towards  political  equity.  This 
fluctuation in interstate relations evidently influenced German and French America-
images during the interwar-period. Many anti- and pro-American perceptions were 
rooted in the political developments described above. 
German anti-Americanism on a political level for example drew particularly on 
the legacy of the First  World War to voice discontent and anti-American images. 
Kick-off  spots  for these images  were thereby not  confined to  the wartime defeat 
itself. The role of Woodrow Wilson having supposedly betrayed his promises of the 
Fourteen Points Plan made Wilson the personification of the negative America-image 
in  Germany.401 This  narrative  was  fed  by  the  negotiations  at  the  Paris  Peace 
Conference.  The  fact  that  Germany  was  denied  a  presence  in  Paris  and  was 
eventually  forced  to  accept  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  were  attributed  to 
American treachery.  Moreover,  accepting  the  terms of  the Treaty of  Versailles,  a 
peace agreement Germany had not co-authored, became a central pillar of German 
anti-Americanism during the following years. Revisionism of the Treaty of Versailles 
thereby figured as cornerstone of the German foreign-policy as much as it was a key 
feature of political anti-Americanism in the public discourse during the 1920s. 
Other  developments  in  the  German-American  relations  did  however  also 
produce a positive image of the USA. American support in the German reparations-
demands was welcomed by all parts of the political spectrum. After all a reduction or 
cancellation  of  the  reparations  signified  a  German  re-empowerment  and  was 
thereafter  also  supported  by  anti-Americans.  Particularly  the  Dawes-Plan  and 
associated loan-payments influenced positive perceptions of the USA in the early 
1920s. The Kellogg-Briand pact and the appreciation of Germany's rearmament and 
reparations expectations added to these pro-American images. The largest source of 
401  For an investigation of the evolution of the German Wilson-image see: Peter Berg, Deutschland und Amerika,  
1918-1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre. (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1963), pp. 9–47.
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pro-Americanism  relates  to  foreign  direct  investments  in  the  German  economy. 
American  investments  in  German  businesses  mended  the  strained  economy, 
increased exports  and created jobs.  Taylorism and Fordism as  American methods 
increased  economic  productivity  and  therewith  economic  prosperity.  US-German 
cooperation in areas such as the automobile industry are thus the main reason that 
German  pro-Americanism became most  prevalent  in  the  industrial  and economic 
sector. In this sense, the interlocking of German and American economic interests 
was a strong source for the affirmative assessment of Americanization. In the end, it 
was this interlocking of economic interests that was the basis for American support in 
the revision of Versailles through the Young-Plan and later the Hoover Moratorium. 
In France, the interstate relations with the USA were equally a source of positive 
and  negative  America-perceptions.  First  positive  images  of  the  USA can  in  this 
respect  be  largely  attributed  to  shared  republican  values.  Similar  ideological 
underpinnings  of  the  American  and  French  Revolution  influenced  early  pro-
Americanism and ultimately also diplomatic allegiances. The Statue of Liberty is a 
representation of this close Franco-American relationship and can be seen as a token 
of mutual affection. Eventually these strong political relations climaxed in the First 
World War allegiance which further amplified pro-American images. The liberation 
of  France  added  components  of  gratitude  and  fellowship  to  the  philo-American 
narrative. This was particularly visible upon Woodrow Wilson's arrival in Paris for 
the peace negotiations where Wilson was celebrated as France's liberator. Over the 
course of the 1920s however political developments between France and the USA 
were  rarely  source  of  positive  America-images.  It  would  rather  be  America's 
economic  potency  and  American  investments  in  the  French  economy  which 
characterised  French  pro-Americanism.  American  private  investments  and 
productivity  measures  were  seen  as  supportive  of  the  French  economy  and 
consequently backboned affirmative America-perceptions.
Nevertheless,  the  Franco-American  relations  particularly  politically  led  to 
negative images of the USA. First and foremost, the Paris Peace Conference kick-
started interwar anti-Americanism. The moral high-ground of the USA and President 
Wilson in dictating the post-war peace negotiations and insisting on the Fourteen 
Points, displeased the French. Displeasure grew as French demands for a buffer state, 
general security issues and a restoration of the borders from 1814 were disregarded. 
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Negative  America-images  were  furthermore  influenced  through  the  Washington 
Naval Conference. The naval restrictions and a weakened French position among its 
wartime  allies  were  associated  with  American  decision-making.  In  addition, 
controversies about the debt and reparation-question persisted over the majority of 
1920s. The fact that the USA insisted on a repayment of the wartime loans despite the 
French casualties prior to the American war-entry was one of the main reasons for 
political  anti-Americanism  in  this  period.  On  an  economic  level,  American 
investments in France were as much a source of negative perceptions as they were of 
positive ones. Particularly American influences in the strong French automobile and 
movie  industry  raised  preoccupations.  They  stimulated  concerns  about  American 
imperialism which effectively became a source of negative image-making and anti-
Americanism. 
As  one  can  see,  the  interstate  relations  in  both  countries  had  a  noticeable 
influence  on  the  general  perception  and  assessment  of  the  USA.  Positive  and 
negative  America-images  were  thereby  in  the  interwar-period  a  combination  of 
current political developments and previous historical events. While anti-American 
images in Germany tended to draw on the repercussions of the First  World War, 
negative French America-perceptions rather developed over the course of the 1920s. 
French pro-American images in contrast were nurtured by the long history of the 
Franco-American  relations  while  in  Germany  particularly  the  economic 
rapprochement of the mid-1920s influenced an endorsement of the American model. 
Despite  the  importance  of  this  political  and  economic  background  for  the 
development of German and French pro- and anti-Americanism they are only one 
piece  in  the  overall  picture.  Both  concepts  represent  independent  streams  which 
combined diverse characteristics into their affirmative or dismissive narratives. The 
following main  chapters  will  therefore  elaborate  these  different  characteristics  in 
detail. The investigation of the sources can then show to which extent the historical 
background  which  has  been  described  above  contributed  to  the  actual  America-
images of the authors and their assessment of the USA.
105
5. Pro-Americanism
5.1. Case Study: German pro-Americanism 1918-1933
The  European  perception  of  the  United  States  of  America  has  since  the  very 
beginning  been of  a  very  interesting  and  particular  nature.  It  appears  as  though 
Europeans  were  never  indifferent  towards  the  evolution  of  the  USA and  of  the 
American social model. People would always perceive the progression of the United 
States either optimistic or pessimistic. This European curiosity with America went 
beyond the practical history we have explored in the preceding chapter. The America-
affection was also generated by the belief  that the  USA was an incubator  of the 
European future. A dominant conception was that American developments would in 
the near future reach, and thereafter change, Europe. Once American influences did 
in  fact  reach  Europe  and  transformed  cultural  and  economic  practices  at  the 
beginning of the 20th century the concern with the USA would be amplified. People 
began to connect American influences to a possible Americanization of Europe which 
led to a heated debate about the potential and dangers of adapting to the American 
model. The following section will develop the pro- or philo-American perspective of 
selected  personalities,  which  vocally  pleaded  for  an  adaptation  of  this  American 
model. In their literary works, they formulated the advantages of a- at least partial- 
Americanization and demanded the implementation of American methods in a timely 
manner.  Before  we  investigate  the  complex  background  of  this  narrated  philo-
Americanism  we  will  commence  with  a  general  overview  of  German  philo-
Americanism, thereafter its French pendant will be presented.
5.1.1. General Perspective
Whilst  the  main curiosity  during  most  of  the  19th century  had been the  political 
system of the United States, this changed at the beginning of the 20th century.402 With 
the economic ascension of the USA, technology and economy were now the focus of 
the German America observation and assessment. The debate about Americanization 
402  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 7f.
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developed into a debate about the possibilities (and risks) of American technology 
and the adoption of an American economic-model. In countries such as Germany and 
France where the economies stagnated at the end of the 19th century the applicability 
of American methods was of great importance for the progression of the national 
economies.403 In a first phase German pro-Americanism was thus geared towards the 
economic advantages and applicability of the American model. The term which was 
commonly  used  to  describe  these  developments  was  the  German  word 
ʻAmerikanismusʼ (Americanism). Americanism did not initially incorporate political 
and cultural dimensions, but was rather an economic model, which could transcend 
other parts of society and would in the following years, also, have an impact on non-
economic areas. Later debates about the American lifestyle and its consequences for 
private  and  corporate  life  would  therefore  all  be  rooted  in  the  initial  economic 
developments referred to as Americanism.
The fascination with the American model started out as a profound interest in the 
standardisation  of  workflows,  initiated  by  Frederick  Winslow  Taylor.  Taylor  had 
developed  a  form  of  scientific  management  during  the  1880s  and  1890s  which 
intended to standardise and rationalise production processes. These methods, which 
would become known as Taylorism, reached their highpoint during the 1910s and 
increased labour efficiency by standardising labour practices (working hours, wages, 
and  job  qualifications)  and  manufacturing  processes.  The  tool  for  this  economic 
efficiency model was scientific assessment of management and manufacturing on an 
industrial  level.  In  Germany,  Taylorism  as  economic  model  was  forced  and 
implemented  particularly to  rebuild German industry  and manufacturing after  the 
First World War. The pursuit of efficiency and productivity would however enter a 
new phase with the publication of Henry Ford's autobiography My life and work404 in 
1923.  My life and work  became the most prevalent and highest grossing America-
work in Germany during the interwar years and was responsible for numerous travels 
to the USA of people who wanted to witness the economic progress first hand.405 For 
the Americanism debate this  meant  that it  would shift  from Taylorism towards a 
debate about the nationwide implementation of Fordism. In  My life and work Ford 
described  his  life  path  and  most  importantly  his  innovations  of  the  automobile 
403  E. J Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), pp. 41–52.
404  Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, My Life and Work, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922).
405  Gassert, ‘"Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought": Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939’, p. 224.
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business, namely the development of the Ford Motor Company at  Highland Park. 
From an economic  perspective,  the  mass-production and assembly line workflow 
Ford  had  initiated  revolutionised  manufacturing.  It  allowed a  drop in  production 
costs and thereby boosted the sales of the famous “Model T” due to its affordability. 
In  the  following years  mass-production  (mainly  through assembly lines),  product 
standardization and stable well-paying wages became the cornerstones of Fordism as 
an economic model.
In Germany, the Americanism debate after 1923 thus entered a new phase which 
was heavily shaped by Henry Ford's economic precept. Had the debate pre-Ford been 
labour-centred, it  was now enlarged to the entire production-process. German pro-
Americanism during the mid-1920s hence remained economically oriented but was 
now pro-Fordism before  anything  else.  One vocal  supporter  of  Fordism was  the 
economist  Friedrich  von  Gottl-Ottlilienfeld.  Von  Gottl-Ottlilienfeld  introduced  a 
differentiation between the practical application he called Fordisation (German) and 
its  theoretical  and  intellectual  content  which  he  called  Fordismus.406 Von  Gottl-
Ottlilienfeld thus on the one hand created and on the other hand popularised the term 
Fordism for the German debate.407 The elevation of Fordism to a theoretical concept 
or even ideology led to reflections about its adaptability for other parts of society. 
Fordism was considered as a third way between unchecked capitalism and the social 
revolution of Marxism.408 Pro-Americans argued that Fordism conciliated the social 
needs of the workers and liberty of the capital.  Social  unrest  could be prevented 
through  modernisation  according  to  Fordist  principles  and  in  the  context  of  one 
ethnic community.409 
The debate about Americanism thereby once again entered a new phase where 
modernisation and modernism became a catchphrase and synonym for Americanism. 
The concept of modernism could surpass the economic area and incorporate specific 
American developments into the German reality. Modernity as substantial narrative 
of the Weimar Republic offered various possibilities for the progress of Germany.410 
Conceptually  the  term  rationalization  would  be  at  the  heart  of  this  modernism 
406  Idem., p. 229f.
407  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 197.
408  Gassert, ‘"Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought": Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939’, p. 226.
409 Idem., p. 242.
410  For a publication on the future- and modernity-discourse in the Weimar Republic see: Rüdiger Graf, Die Zukunft  
der Weimarer Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in Deutschland 1918-1933 (München: Oldenbourg, 2008).
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discourse.  Thereby  rationalisation  allowed  the  redevelopment  of  society  and 
everyday culture and opened up a possible path towards modernity. These different 
paths of (German) modernity have been interpreted, according to their destructive 
potential, by historians such as Jeffrey Herf and Detlef Peukert.411 Jeffrey Herf has 
developed the idea of Reactionary Modernism412 in a same-titled publication, which 
describes the German fascination with technological modernisation on the one hand, 
whilst  increasingly  rejecting  republican  values  and  democratization  on  the  other. 
Detlef  Peukert  has  pointed  out  that  this  anti-parliamentarian  tendency  later 
culminated  in  National  Socialism,  highlighting  the  conflictual  potentials  of 
modernity.413 Rationalisation  of  the  workspace,  home  space,  and  everyday  life 
became  a  continuum of  modernism the  Nazis  would  take  up.414 They  created  a 
dehumanized  version  of  the  rationalization  movement,  showing  the  destructive 
potential  of  modernity  and  the  danger  of  concepts  as  hybrid  as  modernity  and 
rationalisation.415 Nevertheless, National Socialism was only one potential version of 
modernism.416 Rationalisation,  technology  and  economics  were  generally  viewed 
independent from politics.417 
The  general  trend  hybrid  concepts  such  as  modernism  and  rationalization 
showed, was that even though they were rather apolitical, they began surpassing the 
economic  sector.  Pro-Americans  began  applying  said  concepts  to  the  social  and 
cultural array of society. Unlike the terms Taylorism or Fordism, rationalisation as 
key concept  of modernity  could incorporate  and transcend other parts  of society, 
away  from  industry  and  economy.  Discussing  rationalization  (and  its  place  in 
modernity) could germanise different versions of Americanism and lead the way to a 
broader public debate about American developments.418 Initially rationalization was 
seen as purely industrial  but began moving past the economic sector:  unions and 
Social Democrats saw large benefits in rationalization as it would harmonize wage 
411  Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahre der klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1987).
412  Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge 
[Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
413  Adelheid von Saldern, The challenge of modernity: German social and cultural studies, 1890-1960 (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2002), p. 94f.
414  Idem., p. 113f.
415  Idem., p. 114.
416  Idem., p.  96.
417  Nolan, Visions of Modernity, p. 3.
418  Idem., p. 71.
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levels  and  working  times.419 Industrials  weren't  necessarily  pro-rationalization  as 
many of them disapproved a full-fledged restructuring of businesses. Nevertheless, 
rationalization  was  becoming  more  than  simply  increasing  efficiency  and 
productivity  mechanically  or  technologically,  it  began incorporating  the  complete 
restructuring of labour and management.420
Soon the rationalization concept would surpass economics altogether and was 
seen as a social system. Rationalization was projected on all parts of society and 
became a discussion about societal change and the sociocultural future of Germany. 
The original American reality thereafter only played a subordinated role. Debating 
rationalization  under  the  American  aspect  gave  the  debate  scope,  focus  and 
immediacy.  When  pro-Americans  discussed  the  USA  with  its  economic  and 
sociocultural model, it served as an incubator and projection surface for a German 
problematic. Similar to that which pro-Americans hoped for Germany, the USA had 
taken its economic model i.e. rationalization and projected it on all parts of society. 
After  all  it  had  been  the  USA itself  which  was  the  first  place  to  experience 
Americanization as a form of economic evolution. The USA hence became the only 
reference  point  for  pro-Americans  in  their  rationalization  debate  and  quest  for 
modernism. As Mary Nolan put it: “[For Germans] discussing the USA was the only 
available  language for  expressing visions  of modernity”421.  Or to  phrase it  in  the 
words of Peter Berg: “[the German] picture of America shows an explicitly German 
problematic”422.  Americanism  was  no  longer  a  synonym  for  economic  and 
technological progress it had become a sociocultural model, a lifestyle with profound 
social  consequences.  The Americanism discourse and the progress relation of  the 
rationalization dogma,  thus to a certain extent,  had an emancipatory force on the 
social model.423 Pro-Americanism incorporated an interesting interplay: on the one 
hand the fascination with rationalization led to a general admiration of the American 
model, also in sociocultural terms. This sociocultural model, however, on the other 
hand  only  became  possible  through  the  rationalization  of  the  economy. 
Rationalization had become a model that was applicable to the entire society and had 
419  Ibid.
420  Idem., p. 72f.
421  Idem., p. 9.
422  Berg, Deutschland und Amerika, 1918-1929. Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre, p. 8. The quote 
is originally in German. 
423  Nolan, Visions of Modernity, p. 10; where she relates to: Max Horkheimer and Theodor W Adorno, Dialectic of  
enlightenment ([New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).
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thereby  conceptually  created  new  political  and  social  realities.  When  these  new 
realities later became subject to criticism, pro-Americans might have initiated and 
provoked  cultural  criticism  by  anti-American  voices,  through  their  universal 
application of concepts such as rationalization.424 
In conclusion, the German pro-Americanism post-WWI began as support and 
implementation of Taylorism in order to rebuild the destroyed German industry and 
manufacturing sector. With the publication of  My life and work by Henry Ford in 
1923 the debate hereafter developed into a fascination with Fordism. Fordism was 
perceived  as  a  vision  and  ideology  which  could  be  the  solution  to  larger 
socioeconomic problems: a third way between capitalism and socialism. The Fordist 
dogma  was  then  incorporated  into  one  of  the  central  concepts  of  the  Weimar 
Republic: modernism. Particularly pro-Americans tied up the progress of Germany 
with  a  quest  for  modernism.  Thereby  the  key  precept  of  modernism  was  the 
rationalization of all parts of society. This broader application of the concept led to a 
debate away from the economic area onto a discourse about the socio-cultural future 
of Germany. 
Conceptually  pro-Americans  never  referred  to  themselves  as  such  but  rather 
functionally used the term Americanism (ʻAmerikanismusʼ) to describe the positive 
effects of originally American developments.  Americanism was a vague term and 
could  incorporate  all  of  the  concepts  described  above,  such  as  Fordism  or 
rationalization. As Philipp Gassert has said, Americanism “could refer to anything 
that was “modern” and could even remotely be linked to materialism, efficiency, size, 
mechanization,  standardization,  automation,  technocracy,  uniformity,  pragmatism, 
reform  consciousness,  naïve  optimism,  spontaneity,  generosity,  openness, 
advertising,  democracy,  or  influence  exercised  upon  the  masses.”425 Gassert's 
statement  shows how nearly all  developments  that  were associated with progress 
could  also  be  associated  with  the  USA.  German  pro-Americanism  was  thus  in 
conclusion  a  functional  admiration  of  the  USA,  which  had  its  foundation  in  the 
applicability of American economic developments, which were eventually projected 
on the entire society. 
 
424  Idem., p. 11.
425  Gassert, ‘"Without Concessions to Marxist or Communist Thought": Fordism in Germany, 1923-1939’, p. 220.
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5.1.2. Julius Hirsch
Few authors offer a better picture of the characteristic traits of pro-Americanism than 
Julius Hirsch in his work Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder426. Hirsch provides a 
technical  analysis  of  the  American  socio-economic  model  and  argues  that  the 
imitation  of  American  developments such as  mass-production,  mechanisation and 
rationalisation would lead Germany towards progress and modernity. Hirsch's work 
thereby touches upon the key features of German pro-Americanism and synthesises 
the particularities of the concept. His life and work as well as their mutual relation 
and impact will be subject of inquiry for this section.
The biography of Julius Hirsch can be retraced and researched in great detail due 
to the extensive body of source material on his life. This material is collected by the 
Leo Baeck Institute, Center for Jewish history in New York. The Julius and Edith 
Hirsch collection has been processed in 2012 and contains materials by and about 
Julius  Hirsch  and  his  wife  Edith.427 The  source  materials  have  been  completely 
digitalised and range from published works and printed materials to correspondences 
and manuscripts. The bulk of the collection focuses on 1942 until 1960, particularly, 
the curriculum vitae does, nevertheless, provide a solid grasp of his life path during 
the 1920s and will be the basis for this biography. Despite the collection of the Leo 
Baeck Institute, other biographies additionally provide an overview of Hirsch's life 
and  work.  Most  biographies,  such  as  the  one  in  the  International  Biographical 
Archive however remain undetailed and show chronological contradictions.428 Finally 
the Guide to the archival materials of the German-speaking Emigration to the United  
States after 1933429 provides a complete overview of all the materials available on 
Hirsch's  life.  Besides  the Leo Beack Institute  there exists  a  private  collection  on 
Hirsch  from  his  wife,  which  is  only  accessible  through  written  consent  and 
supposedly contains a short autobiography. According to the  Guide to the archival  
materials some material on Hirsch also exists in the American Philosophical Society 
(a correspondence with Simon Flexner), Harvard University (letters to Fritz Redlich) 
426  Hirsch, Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder.
427  ‘Julius and Edith Hirsch Collection; AR 1254; Leo Baeck Institute’.
428  ‘Julius Hirsch - Munzinger Biographie’ <http://www.munzinger.de/search/go/document.jsp?id=00000005198> 
[accessed 29 September 2015].
429  John M Spalek and Sandra H Hawrylchak, Guide to the Archival Materials of the German-Speaking Emigration to  
the United States after 1933 [1]. [1]. (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1978).
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and a compiled file in the manuscript division of the New York Public Library.430 
Julius Hirsch was born on October 30, 1882 in Mandel, near Mainz, to Salomon 
and Mathilde Hirsch of Jewish descent.431 His father was a merchant and general 
agent for an insurance company. After his primary education, Julius Hirsch attended 
Aachen  High  School  until  1897.  In  the  following  years,  Hirsch  worked  for  a 
manufacturing textile firm, a chemical-pharmaceutical business and as a wholesaler. 
Between 1902 and 1903 he attended the military service. During this time period 
Hirsch pursued economics and business administration studies at the Aachen Institute 
of Technology. By 1907 he had fulfilled the university entrance requirements, caught 
up his baccalaureate and began studies of economics and law at the University of 
Bonn. In 1909, he wrote and defended his doctoral dissertation entitled “Department 
Stores in West Germany” and habilitated,  as associate professor in economics,  by 
1913 at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Cologne. 
During the First World War Hirsch was stationed in France and Poland but was 
given leave in late 1915 after being wounded. Between September and December 
1915,  he  was  reinstated  at  the  University  of  Cologne.  In  1917,  he  became 
extraordinary professor for private enterprise economics at Cologne University and 
received a professorial chair two years later. Since 1916 Hirsch held several public 
positions,  such  as  being  advisor  to,  member  and  later  chairman  of  the  German 
Federal  Price  Control  Board.  In  1919 Hirsch  was promoted to  the  German State 
Secretary for the Ministry of Commerce where he also had responsibilities towards 
the Federal Food Ministry. As part of the Ministry of Commerce Hirsch took part in 
numerous reparations negotiations up until 1923. He partook in conferences in Paris, 
Berlin  and  Cannes,  as  well  as  being  a  member  of  the  German  Government 
Delegation to the World Economic Conference at Genoa in 1922. During this time, 
he also saw to the food deliveries to Germany and attended meetings with the later 
American  President  Herbert  Hoover  on  this  topic.  In  1923  Hirsch  drafted  the 
currency stabilization plans during the allied Ruhr occupation,  which were partly 
accepted  through  the  German  Economic  Council's  Committee  on  Currency 
Stabilization.
From 1924 until 1933 Julius Hirsch lectured and worked at the Berlin Graduate 
430  Idem., p. 418f.
431  The biographical information and mentioned works in this biography is based on: ‘Julius and Edith Hirsch 
Collection; AR 1254; Box 1; Folder 5; Leo Baeck Institute’
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Business School (Handelshochschule Berlin).  Moreover, in 1926, he was appointed 
Honorary Professor for economics and business economics at Berlin University. One 
year later he would also become appointed Honorary Professor at the Berlin Business 
School. The time-period between 1924 and 1933 was very active with regard to his 
scholarly activities, the public political discussions he attended, his publications and 
his corporate business activities. In 1925, he held a speech in Paris at the request of 
the  French  minister  of  reconstruction  Loucheur  on  How Germany  stabilized  her  
currency432.  One year later he held another speech in Paris, on December 10, 1926, 
under  the  chairmanship  of  the  French  Trade  Minister  Bokanowsky  entitled  La 
rationalisation de la production433.  The conference was held by the Redressement 
Français and Hirsch's speech was introduced by its president Ernest Mercier. A final 
trip  to  Paris  in  1927 saw him discuss the same topic on request  of  later  French 
President  Vincent  Auriol.  In  1926  Hirsch  had  given  a  speech  in  London  at  the 
Imperial Institute on his experiences with the German Cartel  system. In the same 
year, he would also start discussions with a Polish trade delegate on creating a neutral 
corridor between both countries.
On  a  governmental  level,  Hirsch  co-founded  the  German  economic  inquiry 
commission,  for  which  he  edited  twelve  volumes  regarding  wholesaling  and 
retailing. At the end of 1926 he prepared a study on international monopolies for the 
League of Nations and International Labor Office at the Geneva World Economic 
Conference in 1927. Julius Hirsch's activities in the private sector were also extensive 
during the 1920s. He was part of numerous corporate directorships in the industrial 
sector and banks such as the Nordische Bank für Handel und Industrie (Berlin) as 
well as real estate. His directorship in the industrial area ranged from cement, with 
large  corporations  such  as  Heidelberger  Cement,  to  textiles-  where  he  was  vice-
chairman of Berlin Gubener Hutfabrik- and finally to iron and steel companies such 
as the Upper Silesian Railroad Supply Corporation. All the German activities, be it 
academic, publicist or in the public and private sector, however gradually ceased in 
1933 with the accession to power of the Nazi party. Because of his Jewish heritage 
his life and work became increasingly threatened. Immediately after Hitler came to 
power  Hirsch  was  called  to  act  as  a  professor  in  Denmark  and  migrated  to 
432  Julius Hirsch, How Germany stabilized her currency.
433  Julius Hirsch, La Rationalisation de la production (Centre d’études et d’action sociales, économiques et politiques, 
1927).
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Copenhagen,  where  he  became  professor  for  marketing  and  trade  policy  at  the 
Copenhagen Graduate Business School.  Between 1933 and 1941 he was also the 
managing director of the Copenhagen Distribution Research Institute.  He was the 
editor of the Journal of Business Economics and published various articles and books 
such as  the  Turn of  the  Economic Tide  in  1937 and the  Latest  Developments  in  
Retailing in 1939, translated into several languages.
In 1941 Julius Hirsch migrated to the United States where he resumed public and 
private sector activities, whilst remaining active in academia. From February 1941 
onwards  he  resided  in  New  York  and  began  teaching  as  visiting  professor  for 
economics and business economics at the graduate faculty of the New School for 
Social Research, New York. In 1954, he founded- and became director of the New 
School's Center of Business Administration, where he would organise round tables 
and collaborate with other renowned universities, such as Harvard and Northwestern. 
In  1952,  he  received an honorary degree  (dr.  rer.  Pol.)  from the  Free  University 
Berlin, which would be his  second honorary degree after one of the Koenigsberg 
Graduate School of Business (dr.  oec. Publ.) in 1931. Additional to his  academic 
work, Hirsch worked for the US Price Administration and was an advisor to public 
offices. From October 1941 until 1943 he was chief consultant to the Office of Price 
Control and collaborated in price and food policy questions with Presidential Advisor 
Bernard M. Baruch until 1950. He would contribute to various reports on food and 
agriculture for the US Department  of Agriculture. In 1948 Hirsch was advisor to 
Governor  Earl  Warren of  California  and from 1950 until  1952 advisor  to  Senate 
minority  leader  Wherry.  1952  saw Hirsch  become  advisor  to  the  Committee  for 
Economic Stability at the International Monetary Conference in Mexico City and he 
helped  set  up  the  United  Nation's  expert's  committee  on  international  price 
regulation. In the private sector, Hirsch advised corporations in manufacturing, radio, 
banking and finance. He for example advised the bank Lehmann Brothers in 1943-44 
and the Jeans Manufacturer Levi's. Julius Hirsch died on August 14, 1961 in New 
York at the age of 78.
When Julius Hirsch died, he left behind an extensive collection of articles and 
books. The publications he contributed in his area of expertise would often appear in 
different languages and thus addressed a large audience.  The American Economic 
Miracle was  his  first  larger  success  and was,  according to  the  archival  material, 
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published in 13 editions in German and (partly) translated into Russian, French and 
Hebrew.434 Even though the archival material on Hirsch does not verify it, there exists 
reason to  believe  that  Hirsch  visited  the  USA before  writing  the  book,  it  would 
therefore  reflect  the  experiences  he  gained  in  the  USA.435 As  the  title  already 
suggests,  Hirsch  provides  an  analysis  of  the  American  economy,  highlighting  its 
advantages and pleading for a German imitation. As an economist, he carries out a 
very  technical  analysis  of  the  American  economy,  providing  many  figures  and 
statistics explaining the American success. His main arguments include that he sees 
the  USA  as  a  role-model,  which  could  lead  Germany  towards  progress  and 
modernity.  Hirsch  supports  the  application  of  mass-production,  standardisation, 
rationalisation and mechanization in the German economy, particularly industry and 
manufacturing. He calls for a combination of American mass-production and German 
workmanship, an evolution through incorporation of American methods. For Hirsch, 
any social question can be answered through economic prosperity and even cultural 
activity is only an expression of economic prosperity. Hirsch favours an interweaving 
of  the European economies through American methods which ultimately leads to 
stability  and  peace.  According  to  Hirsch  “we  must  adapt”436,  as  “we  cannot  do 
without Americanization”437.
The  ideas  portrayed  in  The  American  Economic  Miracle  exhibit  a  close 
interrelationship with Hirsch's life. The author's economic academic background is a 
premise for  the  macro-economic  approach of  the book.  The arguments  raised by 
Hirsch  are  generally  supported  by  statistical  data,  the  work  thus  pursues  a  very 
technical and statistical standpoint, even when assessing cultural developments. His 
academic background in economics thus had an impact on his line of argumentation 
and  the  manner  he  presented  data.  The  fact  that  Hirsch  focuses  strongly  on 
economics is nevertheless not only a product of his academic background, it can also 
be explained by his working experience in manufacturing prior to his studies where 
he  witnessed  the  production  processes  first  hand  for  textile  manufacturing  and 
chemical-pharmaceuticals.  When he  later  argued  in  favour  of  mechanization  and 
434  ‘Julius and Edith Hirsch Collection; AR 1254; Box 1; Folder 5; Leo Baeck Institute’
435  When Ernest Mercier introduced Julius Hirsch to the audience for his lecture La Rationalisation de la production he 
referred to Hirsch's travels to the USA. For inquiry see: Julius Hirsch, La Rationalisation de la production (Centre 
d’études et d’action sociales, économiques et politiques, 1927). In addition, on page 164 of Das Amerikanische  
Wirtschaftswunder Hirsch recounts that he has visited an American Mail Order House. 
436  Hirsch, La Rationalisation de la production, p. 252.
437  Idem., p. 258.
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standardisation  in  The  American  Economic  Miracle  he  had  concrete  empirical 
experience to assess abstract changes in production. This proximity to industry was 
something Hirsch maintained up until 1933 being part of the corporate directorship 
of textile, cement and railroad corporations. Once again Hirsch was in direct contact 
with the production processes and was most likely involved in the rationalisation and 
process-optimisation of the manufacturing companies.  Being part  of the industrial 
decision-makers it  must  have been Hirsch's  desire  to  educate  and convince other 
industrial leaders of the progressive economic methods he supported through writing 
his book.
In addition to his academic and industrial background Hirsch's political activity 
also had an impact on the ideas he presented in The American Economic Miracle. As 
early as  1916 Hirsch  held positions  in  the  German Federal  Price  Control  Board, 
before being part of the Ministry of Commerce and was hence part of the political 
decision  making.  His  work  put  him  in  near-daily  contact  with  the  political  and 
economic approach of the USA and the impact it had on Germany. The close work 
with American delegates could have had a positive impact on the perceptions he had 
about the general American socio-economic model. After all Hirsch worked closely 
with the USA regarding the food deliveries to Germany, also attending meetings with 
Herbert Hoover. His work with the American officials on the food deliveries must 
have made Hirsch more familiar with the USA in general and re-enforced the idea he 
would later proffer in  his  book:  that economic prosperity could answer all  social 
questions. Hirsch even dedicated an entire chapter of his book to the key economic 
principles of Herbert Hoover, clearly showing that the political experiences Hirsch 
made  later  re-occurred  in  his  writing.  This  is  equally  visible  with  regard  to  the 
reparations negotiations and the currency stabilization plans he handled. As an expert 
on  economic  stability  and taking  part  in  transnational  negotiations,  Hirsch  could 
assess the position of the German economy from a European perspective. It is thus 
not  surprising that this topic would be taken up in his  book as he argued for an 
interlocking  of  the  European  economies.  The  political  work  of  Hirsch  provided 
proximity and thereby deeper insight into the socioeconomic model of the USA. This 
might even have been one of the reasons he emigrated to the USA in 1941.
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The  largest  impact  Julius  Hirsch's  life  had  on  his  ideas  and  arguments  is 
connected to his professional activities. The majority of his various publications were 
related to or originated from these activities. His work was thereby far from being 
confined  to  academic  publications.  His  membership  in  various  national  and 
international commissions required diverse publicist activity. Around the time Hirsch 
published The American Economic Miracle he, for example, prepared a study for the 
League of Nations. This certainly influenced his positive perception of international 
cooperation.  Hirsch's  strong advocacy of  pan-European  advantages  as  well  as  an 
interconnection with the USA are related  to  him being affiliated to  supranational 
institutions.438 A final connection between Hirsch's life and his literary work is related 
to  the  historical  surrounding.  Hirsch,  a  wartime  survivor,  experienced  economic 
devastation  and  food  shortages  during  the  war  and  the  post-war  period.  The 
restoration  of  economic  activity  and  a  sustainable  living  standard  were  political 
priorities.  These developments permanently affected Hirsch's perception of wealth 
and prosperity. In his publication, he consequently argues that economic prosperity 
and a high standard of living are the prerequisite for all cultural activities. And as for 
Hirsch  the  American  model  is  the  most  suitable  for  economic  prosperity  it  is 
thereafter the condition to achieve social and cultural progression.
The experiences of Julius Hirsch consequently governed the beliefs he conveyed 
in  The American Economic Miracle,  the publication however also had an influence 
on his life. The relative success of the book increased the level of awareness for 
Hirsch,  broadcasting  his  expert  status  in  economic  questions.  This  could  have 
influenced his selection for economic commissions and might have even led to a 
larger  transnational  awareness.  The various  lectures  he  held in  Great-Britain and 
especially France certainly indicate this. Particularly the lecture on the rationalisation 
of  production Hirsch held for the Redressement  Français,  is  of interest  here.  His 
lecture in Paris, on 10 December 1926, under the chairmanship of the French Trade 
Minister Bokanowsky illustrated the historical development of the modern economy 
and industry in Germany and France and,  thereafter,  explained the advantages of 
rationalisation as a new economic method. According to  Hirsch rationalisation as 
technical process was divided into the rationalisation of work, industry, markets and 
438  For information on Hirsch's pan-european approach see: Ernst Fraenkel, Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen  
politischen Denkens; Äusserungen deutscher Staatsmänner und Staatsdenker über Staat und Gesellschaft in den  
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959), p. 286.
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production.  His general argument was that the adaption of modern rationalisation 
methods was already prevailing in Germany and implemented according to American 
methods.  Hirsch  strongly  supported  the  European  economic  cooperation  which 
would stabilise the economy and lead to prosperity.439
Hirsch  had  been  introduced  by  the  president  of  the  Redressement,  Ernest 
Mercier who in his epilogue raised similar arguments Hirsch had put forward in The 
American Economic Miracle. Mercier explained that all forms of social progress and 
even  moral  progress  could  only  exist  with  economic  prosperity  as  their 
precondition.440 The general argumentation structure of Mercier and Hirsch regarding 
economic prosperity and progress is thus nearly identical and shows the transnational 
dimension of pro-American ideas in the 1920s. The German discourse and the French 
discourse related and influenced one another. It is even very likely that Hirsch met 
Lucien  Romier,  the  intellectual  head  of  the  Redressement,  whose  work  is 
representative for the French pro-Americanism. Even though no archival material or 
sources can prove Romier's attendance of Hirsch's lecture, one can assume that they 
have met in person. 
Evidently there exists a strong relationship between Hirsch's experiences and the 
ideas he conveys in his book.  The American Economic Miracle  was to educate the 
public and industrial leaders on the application of new American economic methods. 
The work reflects his economic background, be it political, industrial or academic as 
well  as the experiences he made during his most  likely trip to the USA.441 Even 
though Hirsch seemed to have visited the USA before writing the book, it does not 
necessarily convey a “true” analysis of the American society. He rather provides the 
readership with his vision for Germany which combines his personal experiences and 
political convictions. Hirsch's concern was to support the progress of the German 
economy and its social progress. The fact that his work did reach certain attention, 
shows that the debate about progress, modernity and Americanization was embedded 
in the public discourse. The book was published at the highpoint of the America-
interest during the 1920s. The American Economic Miracle was thus certainly aimed 
at  the general  public  for  educational  purposes  as  well  as  leaders  in  industry and 
politics to convince them of economic changes. Because of his technical approach 
439  Hirsch, La Rationalisation de la production.
440  Ibid.
441  See footnote 435.
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the book must have been most popular with representatives of industry and economy. 
The  majority  of  pro-Americans  were  part  of  the  economic  sector  anyway  and 
therefore amenable to the US-model Hirsch promoted.
5.1.3. “Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder”
Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder was first published in 1926 by the publishing 
house Fischer in Berlin. The S. Fischer Verlag was, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century,  the  most  important  and  prestigious  publishing  house  and  its  catalogue 
included famous German authors such as Thomas Mann. Up until  the end of the 
1920s it  was  chaired by its  Jewish founder  Samuel  Fischer,  until  his  son in  law 
Gottfried Bermann would take over the company in 1928. The name and the Jewish 
background of the Fischer publishing house were both likely reasons for Hirsch to 
choose  this  particular  publishing  house.  Then  again,  the  fact  that  his  work  was 
published by Fischer speaks for the relevance of the book and gave it a potentially 
large sales market. 
The book is divided into twelve chapters of which the first four elucidate the 
fundamentals  and  background  to  the  economic  analysis  of  the  USA which  is  to 
follow in the main part. The first chapters describe the development of the American 
economic forces and its preconditions. Moreover, it establishes the “factual basis” of 
Hirsch's  key  concept:  prosperity.  Chapters  five  through  ten  provide  an  in-depth 
analysis of the various forces of the American economy Hirsch deems important. 
These include the features and organisation of industry, case studies of the slaughter 
houses  and  Ford  Motor  Company,  as  well  as  considerations  about  the  American 
agriculture, transport system, trade, finance and stock market. The final two chapters, 
eleven and twelve, depict the relationship between economics and culture and the 
future development trends of Germany and the USA. 
The following constructivist  analysis of the book will  be carried out through 
looking at  two dominant  conceptions  which highlight  Hirsch's  argumentation and 
simultaneously  provide  a  point  of  reference  for  the  relationship  between  the 
conveyed pro-Americanism and national identity on a conceptual and interpretative 
level. A first part will be looking at the concept of prosperity (german: Reichtum), its 
120
importance and the means to achieve it. The second part will investigate the socio-
cultural consequences of economic prosperity and its impact on the development of 
the future. When contemplating the statements and arguments of Hirsch it will be 
necessary to bear in mind their subjective dimension. Despite Hirsch probably having 
visited  the  United  States  and  providing  a  very  analytical  investigation  of  the 
American economy, the focus for this research will lie on Hirsch's motives to portray 
this specific America-image. Whether the content of the book is accurate and can be 
verified  is  of  subordinated  importance  to  this  research.  The  goal  is  rather  to 
understand the causalities of the portrayed America-image and its relationship, if any, 
with Germany and more specifically with its national identity. As for the American 
image, the German national identity is a construction, we will thus try and find the 
means for their creation and a structural connection between the two concepts.  
The road to prosperity
The  central  concept  around  which  the  entire  argumentation  of  The  American 
Economic Miracle rotates is prosperity. Hirsch presents prosperity as abstract concept 
and benchmark for the evaluation of success, be it on a personal or more importantly 
national level. Thereby prosperity is initially pictured as something purely economic, 
which  then  at  a  later  stage  impacts  different  socio-cultural  settings.  The  author 
creates  prosperity  as  a  super-ordinated  objective,  towards  which  all  social  and 
national  activity  should  be  geared.  The  first  part  of  Hirsch's  work  is  therefore 
dedicated to explaining how the USA figures as a role model for the concept  of 
prosperity.  Hirsch begins by developing its  fundamentals  which are based on the 
natural resources of a given country.  Natural  prosperity will  then at  a later  stage 
translate into the society of a nation or as Hirsch puts it: “Der Reichtum des Landes 
Amerika  wandelt  sich  mehr  und  mehr  in  einen  bewußt  genutzten  Reichtum des 
Volkes.”  -  The  wealth  of  the  country  USA is  changing  more  and  more  into  a 
consciously utilised wealth of the people.442 In the USA this economic wealth does 
not,  however,  rest  only  on  natural  richness,  it  is  also  combined with  rigid  work 
organisation and exceeding productivity. The criteria Hirsch thus uses, to determine 
442  Hirsch, Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder, p. 9.
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the success of any given country, are purely economic and figuratively culminate in 
the concept of prosperity.
The  analysis  of  American  prosperity  is  multi-layered  and  begins  with  what 
Hirsch  considers  its  foundations  in  historical  perspective.  This  includes  natural 
resources, political unity, economic energy, work organisation and the organisation of 
merchandise and finance.443 This foundation is the basis for Hirsch's analysis of the 
USA and already shows which areas are important for a conceptual understanding of 
prosperity. What prosperity symbolises on a national level, what one would call the 
“standard of living” symbolises on a private level.444 Hirsch measures this standard of 
living by criteria such as wage levels, demonstrating the macroeconomic approach he 
pursues.445 The  author  argues  that  what  constitutes  the  success  of  the  USA is  a 
fundamental will for economic accomplishment and efficiency. This will is based on 
the immigration of foreign labour in order to achieve a higher living standard. Not 
only does Hirsch argue that Europe can learn from this use of workforce,  it  also 
clearly shows how both concepts refer back to each other. 
Probably the most  important  requirements for prosperity or  Reichtum  can be 
found in the American industry. As a consequence, the largest part of the book is 
dedicated  to  investigating  industry's  driving  forces.  Its  cornerstones  include 
rationalisation,  the  standardisation  of  consumption  and  production,  as  well  as 
evolution in corporate organisation.446 Hirsch argues that rationalisation allows mass 
production and mass production inevitably leads to standardised mass consumption. 
The standardisation of production and consumption thus goes hand in hand. This 
standardisation in industry is effectively represented by the introduction of assembly 
lines, which Hirsch refers to as “the landmark of decisive work progress”447 (“Das 
Wahrzeichen entscheidenden Arbeitsfortschritts”).  Assembly lines were one of the 
revolutionary means of production that Henry Ford had introduced in his automobile 
factory  at  Highland  Park  and  were  largely  responsible  for  the  affordability  and 
thereafter success of the Model T. According to Hirsch assembly line production is 
mass production's highest accomplishment.448 This pro-Fordist attitude is in line with 
443  Idem., p. 15.
444  Note here that Hirsch, except for the term “prosperity” does not refer to the “standard of living”. These concepts  
rather symbolise reoccurring narratives.
445  Hirsch, Das amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder, p. 21.
446  Idem., p. 30.
447  Idem., p. 40.
448  Idem., p. 40.
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the general German pro-Americanism of the 1920s and the prevailing appreciation of 
Fordism  at  the  time.  Julius  Hirsch's  discussion  of  Henry  Ford  and  his  work 
underlines how pronounced this reception of Ford was in Germany.
Hirsch's appraisal  of assembly line production thereby not only relates to the 
prevalent Fordism-discourse, it also mirrors the historical circumstances and Hirsch's 
personal experiences. American-style economic rationalisation in German businesses 
was  ongoing  and  widespread  by  the  time  Hirsch  published  Das  Amerikanische 
Wirtschaftswunder  in 1926. Standardisation in the industrial sector was one of the 
main sources for positive America-images as it increased production and profitability.  
Hirsch experienced these developments first hand through his corporate directorships 
over the course of the 1920s. As we have discussed in the previous section these 
ranged from Heidelberger Cement to the Berlin Gubener hat factory and iron and 
steel companies such as the Upper Silesian Railroad Supply Corporation. Particularly 
in  textile  manufacturing  such  as  the  Gubener  hat  factory,  mass  production  and 
mechanisation were part of the regular manufacturing process already, shortly after 
the First World War and certainly during the mid-1920s.
Hirsch's  argument  that assembly line production leads to  a  decrease in retail 
prices while simultaneously increasing wages and production is thus little surprising. 
It simply underlines his positive perception of the American economic model which 
is presented through innovation of economic methods. Additionally, it however also 
shows, how important the subjective and personal dimension is in Hirsch's positive 
assessment  of  the USA. The author's  vocal  pro-Americanism and glorification of 
economic  prosperity  arise  out  of  the historical  circumstances  as  well  as personal 
experiences. Hirsch's pro-Americanism consequently merges objective characteristics 
of the American-model with a subjective construction. His assessment for example 
that assembly line production symbolises labour as humanities highest good clearly 
exaggerates the relationship between assembly line production, industrial success and 
socio-economic prosperity.449 This subjective dimension of Hirsch's pro-Americanism 
is not only visible through the prosperity-narrative but also through his choice of 
words.  While  the  title  “economic  miracle”  already suggests  his  America  affinity, 
Hirsch in addition repeatedly uses terms such as “miraculous” when he discusses 
American mass consumption, highlighting his pro-American perspective and ultimate  
449  Idem., p. 43.
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construction of a shining America-image.450 
This construction and functional dimension of a positive America-image through 
the reoccurring narratives of prosperity and the standard of living is further visible 
through constructivist theory. As we have seen in the theoretical part the main focus 
for the Constructivist is to understand the causality of structures and agents. First of 
all, it  is therefore necessary to determine what can be considered as structure and 
agency in  The American Economic Miracle.  For Constructivists  agents are active 
participants in a given society or a given context (see chapter 3.1.). In the particular 
context of this source the active participant is the narrator/author, thus Julius Hirsch. 
Through  the  ideas  raised  in  his  book  Hirsch  becomes  an  active  part  of  the 
Americanization-discourse  and  the  debate  about  the  American-model.  From  a 
constructivist  perspective  Hirsch  therefore  represents  the  structurationist 
interpretation of agency. The author, as agent, is thereby influenced by patterns of 
stable  meaning:  the  structures.  These  structures  influence  the  character  and 
convictions of the author and he consequently acts based upon his assumptions about 
the structures. In this case acting signifies the conscious development of narratives 
about the importance of socio-economic wealth and prosperity. 
The constructivist causality of structures and agents here, therefore, relates to 
understanding and explaining why the author constructs these dominant narratives. 
As described above, they can certainly be explained by the historical circumstances 
of the 1920s and Hirsch's personal experiences. On top of that however Hirsch's call 
for  increased  prosperity  and  progress  symbolises  that  he  clearly  perceives  the 
German  economy  as  underdeveloped  in  international  comparison.  From  a 
constructivist  perspective  Hirsch's  progressive  arguments  are  based  upon  his 
assumptions  about  the  state  of  the  German  economy,  more  precisely  its 
backwardness.  This  particular  perception  of  the  German  economy showcases  the 
central constructivist structures in The American Economic Miracle: progression and 
stagnation. Hirsch's argumentation throughout the book is essentially an endorsement 
of  progress  and  innovation  and  a  disapproval  of  economic  conservationism. 
Structurally,  progress  and  stagnation  henceforth  exist  in  juxtaposition.  Hirsch 
seemingly intends to prevent any form of economic stagnation through an appraisal 
of  the  American-model,  through  which  he  tries  to  underline  the  importance  of 
450  Idem., p. 12.
124
progressing the German economy. The exemplary use of the American model in this 
sense highlights the functional dimension of Hirsch's pro-Americanism. 
The  construction  and  repetition  of  the  progression-narrative  is  consequently 
reoccurring throughout the book. It is for instance a large part of what Hirsch deems 
the  most  important  factors  of  the  industrial  success  of  the  United  States.  These 
mainly  include  the  general  approach  and  attitude  of  employers  and  employees 
towards industry. According to Hirsch the American society collectively attempts a 
multi-layered promotion of rationalisation. On top of rationalisation and productivity 
Hirsch  therefore  considers  the  nature  of  American  employees  as  decisive  for 
industrial success.451 Particularly the progressive and positive attitude are viewed as 
determining  factors.  On  an  ideological  level  the  American  Dream  ensures  this 
endorsement of material success and averts any form of class struggle. Progress is in 
economic  terms  denoted  the  “countries  general  religion”.452 This  metaphorical 
equalisation of progress and religion highlights the importance and influence of the 
constructivist  progression  structure.  The  author  creates  and inflates  the  progress-
narrative to the central precept of socio-economic wealth. This is also visible in one 
of Hirsch's most important arguments: “We will  solve the social question through 
economic prosperity!” (Wir lösen die soziale Frage durch Wohlstand!)453 Hirsch here 
clearly suggests that economic prosperity provides more than an intrinsic value and 
impacts the society as a whole,  beyond simple economics.  Industrial  success and 
therewith economic progress are ultimately projected onto the social economy. This 
demonstrates  the  persistence  of  the  progress-narrative  throughout  Hirsch's 
argumentation and its  importance as  most  influential  constructivist  structure.  The 
phrase “We will solve the social question through economic prosperity!” additionally 
highlights  the  functional  component  of  Hirsch's  pro-Americanism:  Hirsch 
demonstrates how the carry-over of the US-model ultimately serves the purpose of 
enhancing the German social structure.
The author's exceptional focus on economic prosperity and its influence on the 
entire society can not only be explained from a constructivist perspective but also 
relates to the historical circumstances. As discussed in the section on the US-German 
relations  (chapter  4.1.)  the  first  half  of  the  1920s  was  in  Germany  marked  by 
451  Idem., p. 68.
452  Idem., p. 70.
453  Idem., p. 68.
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increasing  inflation  and economic  difficulty.  When Hirsch  published his  book in 
1926, it appeared three years after the highpoint of the hyperinflation and two years 
after  endorsing  the  Dawes  Plan.  Hirsch  had  himself  witnessed  how the  post-war 
period was effectively characterised by economic stagnation if not regression. The 
actual German reality during the mid-1920s thus demonstrated how financial  and 
economic prosperity indeed fostered social and political stability. Thereby Hirsch's 
professional  and academic surrounding certainly supported  his  awareness  of  how 
social development was effectively sustained by economic prosperity. On top of that 
the actual importance of the USA in developing the Dawes Plan and consequently 
assisting  in  a  cyclical  development  of  Germany  surely  encouraged  the  author's 
positive  America  image.  After  the  economic  hardship  of  the  post-war  years  an 
endorsement of prosperity combined with a high standard of living and a coincident 
rejection  of  economic  stagnation  is  thus  not  surprising,  nor  is  the  pro-American 
attitude of an economist. 
In his work, Julius Hirsch thus demonstrates his readership how the culmination 
of prosperity looks like in the USA and how adopting a similar economic strategy 
can have positive effects on Germany. In order to investigate the actual features of 
American  economic  prosperity  he  provides  two  case  studies:  the  slaughterhouse 
industry in Chicago and the Ford automobile enterprise at Highland Park.454 In his 
investigation  of  the  slaughterhouse  industry  Hirsch,  instead  of  taking  a  moral 
approach, rationally examines the industry regarding the technical innovations it has 
initiated.  While  Hirsch  describes  the  Chicago  slaughterhouses  as  innovative  and 
exemplary,  anti-Americans  have  repeatedly  portrayed  the  same  industry  as  the 
culmination of a perverse mass society that values standardisation and productivity 
over  morality.  Hirsch  contrastingly  views  Chicago  as  prime  example  of 
standardization, rationalisation and productivity. This contradicting approach to the 
slaughterhouse industry shows, how similar developments were assessed in complete 
opposition by pro-Americans and anti-Americans.  Moreover,  it  demonstrates how 
functionally pro- and anti-Americanism refer to a larger context than simply their 
relation to the USA or the American economic model. Pro-Americanism and anti-
Americanism for that matter have a paramount significance in relation to national 
realities and identities. Assessing the same developments as antithesis highlights the 
454  Idem., pp. 79-106.
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functional dimension of said concepts and how they relate to a larger framework. 
Hirsch's investigation of the Ford Motor Company provides similar insights into 
the  further  stages  of  his  pro-Americanism.  In  an  assessment  of  Ford's  corporate 
organisation  Hirsch  investigates  whether  assembly  line  work  and  its  working 
monotony  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  workers.  Particularly  this  working 
monotony is once again a frequent criticism of anti-Americans. For Hirsch, however 
the  standardisation of  work flows has  actually  led to  positive influences  such as 
fewer corporate changes in personnel. Hirsch thus concludes that it is important to 
learn from these principles rather than rejecting them on the basis of old-fashioned 
claims.455 The author's account of the Fordist methods thus further demonstrates the 
educational  component  of  his  work.  It  is  thereby  another  example  of  how  the 
depicted America-image relates to the German reality: in his account of the American 
automobile industry, Hirsch stresses that Germany should not close itself off from 
what he calls “one of the most beautiful inventions of modern times”456. He demands 
innovative  economical  politics  instead  of  asceticism.  The  automobile  thereby 
metaphorically  symbolises  progress  and  development,  whereas  everything  else  is 
discarded as backward. The overarching constructivist structures we have recognised 
above become very visible through these passages. They highlight the antithesis of 
progressive economic thinking and backward conservationism, i.e. progression and 
stagnation.  Progression  as  paramount  structure  allows  to  germanise  a  selective 
version of the American model without losing what it means to be German. Therefore 
progression, as constructivist structure, is a catalyst for a new conceptual design of 
the German future. Hirsch's comparison between the United States and Germany thus 
emphasises both structures and demonstrates how the portrayed pro-Americanism is 
connected to the German national reality and in a broader sense also its national 
identity. 
The author's call for a carry-over of the economic US-model demonstrates how 
he  intends  to  support  and  foster  his  personal  perception  of  Germany,  which  is 
simultaneously his  perception  of  the  German national  identity.  Hirsch's  progress-
narrative contains preselected characteristics of the American-model which he uses to 
encourage  German  socio-economic  prosperity.  Progress  is  the  functional  utopia 
Hirsch constructs in order to advance Germany and re-enforce its national identity. It 
455  Idem., p. 106.
456  Idem., p. 145.
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is created as absolute and inherently positive structure which requires Germany to 
incorporate  innovative  economic  American-methods  to  pursue  collective 
advancement. Any form of economic stagnation is by contrast rejected and devalued. 
The United States consequently serves as super ordinated platform which is used to 
develop prosperity and wealth narratives (and build the structure of progression). 
Through using the USA as structural platform for progression, Germany does not 
need to adapt the entire American-model, it can rather extract specific developments 
for national advancement. It again allows to Germanise a handpicked version of the 
American economic model,  which Hirsch has created as utopian structure. To the 
Constructivist, emphasizing the advantages of economic prosperity and creating the 
structure  of  progression,  allow  a  selective  incorporation  of  the  representation 
structure, into the own German national identity. Thereby the platform USA allows a 
debate about modernity, progress and a new design for the future, independent of 
cultural  criticism.  Progress  is  unbiased  and free  of  moral  connotations  while  the 
American-model as a whole is not. For the author, it seems as though a carry-over of 
its technological and economic aspects is possible without losing the German cultural 
identity. 
The constructivist paradigm of incorporating or rejecting structural identity can 
also be recognized in  Hirsch's  account  of trade and finance in the United States. 
Particularly the mail order industry, which Hirsch apparently visited during a stay in 
the USA, provides many paragons for Germany in regard to its particular evolution 
and  features.457 The  author  for  example  argues  that  they  provide  extraordinary 
production speed and saving of labour. Hirsch here once again stresses the exemplary 
function of the United States and argues that Germany can use parts of the American 
developments to improve its own economy, in this case an expansion of the mail 
order  industry.  The  constructivist  progress  structure  here  allows  a  selective 
incorporation  of  the  American  model  and  thereby  a  reinforcement  of  national 
identity.  This structural incorporation is fundamentally  based on the constructivist 
idea of identity-insecurity. As discussed in the section on constructivist methodology 
identities are constantly changing and thereafter figure as inconsistent representation 
structures. They need to be reconstructed and renegotiated in relation to the current 
individual or national circumstances. Identity insecurity thus demands reinforcement 
457  Idem., pp. 162ff.
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and enhancement of identities, national ones in particular. In this case reinforcing 
German  national  identity  means  applying  American  developments  to  support 
progress:  the  USA is thus  a  catalyst  that provides the  building blocks for  a new 
conceptual design of the German future. 
Hirsch's discussion of American commodity trading and mail order businesses 
also  highlights  the functional  dimension of  the American-model.  Here  the author 
argues  that  American  innovations  in  commodity  trading  will  certainly  also  reach 
Germany in the near future, the only question is whether Germany should let the 
USA take the initiative.458 Once again Hirsch demonstrates, that his pro-Americanism 
is  mainly  channelled  to  advance  Germany.  The  glorification  of  the  American 
economy was hence only a tool to convince the German public of the advantages 
economic progress would bring; how it would lead to prosperity and eventually a 
higher  living  standard.  If  Hirsch's  pro-Americanism  did  not  have  a  functional 
dimension or subliminal goal, he wouldn't insist Germany should hinder American 
firms establishing commodity trading businesses on German soil. It seems as though 
Hirsch's objective is to support German independence and sustainability through the 
incorporation of necessary and inevitable economic processes. This argumentative 
independence between the USA and Germany becomes particularly visible in the 
following section on the socio-cultural consequences of prosperity. The independence 
thereby has a particular impact on the conceptual future design of national identity. 
 Prosperity and its socio-cultural consequences
The  final  chapters  of  The  American  Economic  Miracle  are  dedicated  to  the 
relationship between culture and economics. They discuss the future tendencies of 
the USA as well  as Germany's  future development.  Once again,  the most  pivotal 
relationship between economics and its socio-cultural implementations relates to the 
American approach to progress. According to Hirsch, the key to American progress is 
not surprisingly its economy: its construction speed and growth rate. This economic 
energy is  supported by a  political  and private  will  for  uniformity.  To Hirsch this 
economic will of the USA consists of a strong urge for standardisation. He even uses 
458  Idem., p. 174.
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the term “culture of uniformity”459 to describe the American quest for standardisation, 
particularly  of  production,  demand  and  consumption.  Despite  the  culture  of 
uniformity,  the  author  argues  that  while  German  immigrants  in  the  USA  are 
politically  and  economically  American  they  culturally  remain  German.460 This 
distinction  between  both  countries  shows  how  he  fundamentally  differentiates 
between Germany and the USA on a cultural level. The essence and nature of both 
countries seem different and unique, regardless of his call for economic amendment. 
Hirsch  thereby  introduces  the  first  real  distinction  between  both  countries 
irrespective  of  his  claim  that  Germany  should  adapt  American  developments. 
Additionally, Hirsch argues that there exist differences in the cultural affinity of the 
German and American upper class: Germans here being more affine to culture than 
Americans.461 
These passages demonstrate  how Hirsch's  work relates to  the construction of 
national identity. The constructivist conception of national identities focuses on the 
minimal  group  paradigm  and  how  group  identities  inevitably  emerge  in  social 
interaction (see chapter 3.1.1.). The minimal group paradigm illustrates that national 
identities are mainly created through comparison between groups- the “we-vs-them” 
dichotomy. Whilst the “self” is assessed positively, outside influences are perceived 
negatively. As a consequence, people tend to exaggerate their perception of others 
and of differences. These distinct categories lead to strengthened group identities i.e. 
national identities. In this particular case, the German identity- which we will call 
Germanity-  serves  as  the “we”,  whereas  the  American identity  serves as “other”. 
Hirsch's assessment that Germany is culturally superior to the USA strengthens these 
group  identities  i.e.   reinforces  the  German  national  identity.  This  reasoning 
highlights  structural  differences  between  both  countries  and  the  importance  of  a 
unique  culture  for  the  creation  of  national  identity.  As  a  consequence,  Hirsch's 
cultural  conception  of  Germanity  premises  on  irrational  factors  rather  than 
economics. 
Aside from Hirsch's cultural comparison, his description of the actual cultural 
characteristics  of  the  USA develops  important  arguments.  The  author  states  that 
culture was never a phenomenon that was the result of intellectual coincidences, but 
459  Idem., p. 219.
460  Idem., p. 221.
461  Idem., p. 222.
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rather  the  expression  and  consequence  of  economic  prosperity.462 As  he  puts  it: 
“Kultur war nie eine lediglich auf geistigen Zufällen beruhende Erscheinung, sondern 
stets ein Ausdruck wirtschafltichen Wohlstandes, sei es einzelner Klassen (oder auch 
einzelner  Familien),  sei  es  ganzer  Nationen.”463 (Culture  has  never  been  a 
phenomenon only based on intellectual coincidences, but always an expression of 
economic prosperity, be it of particular classes (or particular families), or of entire 
nations.) Economic prosperity is thus the prerequisite for any cultural activity and 
cultural progress. This is certainly one of the reasons why Hirsch focuses a large part 
of his book on the importance of economic prosperity and declaring it  any given 
society's  main  goal.  Through describing  the  cultural  component  of  prosperity,  he 
underlines its necessity for Germany and further legitimises his claim that economic 
progress is the basis for national headway. After Hirsch had constructed an absolute 
version of the American economy, as functional basis for structural incorporation, in 
the first part of his work, this final part is in contrast strengthening and upgrading 
Germany on the basis of cultural superiority. This highlights the clear relationship 
between Hirsch's constructed America image and the German national  identity.  It 
once more shows the functional dimension of pro-Americanism which here serves 
the purpose of reinforcing and reconstructing his version of Germanity. 
According to Hirsch cultural differences between the USA and Germany also 
relate to the evolution of mass society. He argues that the cultural influences of the 
United States are “not always the best”464 and that American customs are really not 
needed in Germany.465 When the author here refers to Germany he uses the term of 
“we”.466 This linguistic approach is one of the typical features used in the creation of 
national  identity:  drawing  on  a  subjective  feeling  of  belonging  to  the  same 
community and inclining superiority. Hirsch linguistically portrays himself as part of 
the “in-group” which he contrasts with the American “out-group”. In addition, this 
particular phrasing relates to one of the main constructivist tool of collective identity 
formation: hierarchy. National identity, as any other collective identity, is based on 
the  ʻwe-them-dichotomyʼ  and  this  differentiation  from  others  always  contains  a 
dimension  of  superiority.  After  all  national  identity  rests  on  providing  a  social 
462  Idem., p. 224.
463  Ibid.
464  Idem., p. 229.
465  Idem., p. 231.
466 Ibid.
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representation  model,  which  is  at  least  in  parts  required  to  be  superior  to  other 
identities  to  emit  legitimacy.  The  fact  that  Hirsch  portrays  the  German  national 
identity as superior, reinforces it on the constructivist conceptions of hierarchy.
Hirsch's rather negative perception of American mass culture also allows some 
final assumptions about the features of his pro-Americanism. Even though Hirsch 
certainly  is  generally  very  pro-American,  he  is  not  in  complete  admiration  of 
everything American. His pro-Americanism is in essence economic, which favours a 
selective incorporation of only economic developments in Germany. Despite Hirsch's 
assessment that any cultural activity was only the expression of economic prosperity, 
he apparently thought it was possible to incorporate the economic American-model 
without adopting its cultural peculiarities. This emphasizes the functional relationship 
between pro-Americanism and the  German national  identity:  the  fact  that  Hirsch 
rejects  the  cultural  dimension  of  the  American-model  provides  the  German 
readership  with  a  preselected  toolkit  Germany  should  adapt  for  progress  and 
modernity.  A certain  cultural  condescension towards  the USA here reinforces  the 
German national  identity  morally  and thereby allows the  adaptation of  economic 
processes more easily, without losing or subjugating what it means to be German. 
The  concluding  part  of  The  American  Economic  Miracle  investigates  the 
possible future developments of the USA and Germany respectively. Hirsch's vision 
for the German future thereby draws upon historical arguments. He argues that unlike 
today, “back then” people enthused about the degree of technisation and organisation 
of  the  German  industry.467 These  passages  draw  on  historical  developments  and 
nostalgia  to  reinforce  the  perception  that  Germany  is  in  need  of  rebuilding  its 
economy  to  make  up  for  lost  times.  The  use  of  nostalgia,  historical  genealogy, 
superiority  and  irrationality  thereby  all  support  the  creation  of  national  identity. 
Hirsch hence intends a reinforcement of Germanity by promoting it should “return” 
to its former economic prosperity. With this in mind Hirsch's final thesis reads: “Wir 
werden  uns  amerikanisieren  […]  weil  wir  es  müssen”468: we  will  Americanise, 
because we have to. It is once again an explicitly call for incorporation. Clearly the 
positive image of the American economy Hirsch created in the first part of the book 
ultimately  served  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  receptiveness  for  economic 
development, which he perceives as fundamental for Germany's future. 
467  Idem., p. 252.
468  Idem., p. 255.
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5.1.4. Discussion and Implication of the Research
The two dominant narratives of  The American Economic Miracle are the conceptual 
peculiarities of prosperity on the one hand and its sociocultural consequences on the 
other hand. Hirsch dedicated the first part of his work to establishing prosperity as 
the  main  goal  for  the  German  society.  Prosperity  as  dominant  narrative  was 
characterised  by  the  importance  of  mass-production  and  the  pursuit  of  industrial 
success.  According to Hirsch,  prosperity was the precondition for progressing the 
German sociocultural future. In order to lead Germany towards modernity the author 
created two opposing structures: progression and stagnation. Whilst progression was 
the ultimate goal for the German society, stagnation had to be fenced off. Prosperity 
was  created  as  functional  utopia  to  advance  Germany  and  re-enforce  German 
national  identity.  The  structure  of  progression  allowed  to  germanise  a  selective 
version of the economic model USA, which in constructivist terms recreated national 
identity through selective incorporation. The USA became a platform for a German 
debate  about  modernity  and  a  new  design  for  the  German  future.  Therefore, 
advancing Germany and patching the German national identity, which was clearly 
broken through the First World War, were the underlying narratives of Hirsch's work. 
The USA as catalyst provided the building blocks for a new conceptual design of the 
German  future.  The  fact  that  Hirsch  repeatedly  referred  to  Germany  as  “we” 
underlines  his  desire  to  improve  Germany  with  his  work  and  shows  the  clear 
relationship between the pro-Americanism and the German national identity. After 
all,  “we”  versus  “them”  are  the  classic  tools  of  creating  national  identity  on  a 
structural  and  constructivist  level.  Demarcation  and  incorporation  are  leading 
towards a reinforcement of the German national identity on a multitude of levels. 
The second narrative about the sociocultural consequences of prosperity made a 
clear  distinction  between  the  German  and  the  American  culture.  Here  German 
national  identity  was  structurally  opposed  to  an  inferior  American  culture.  This 
reinforcement  was  a  combination  of  the  we-vs-them  dichotomy  and  the  use  of 
hierarchy as tool for the creation of collective identities. Hirsch upgraded the German 
national identity through reinforcing its cultural superiority towards the USA after the 
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first part had subordinated Germany to the USA in economic terms. 
A comparison  of  Hirsch's  work  with  the  general  German  pro-Americanism 
shows  that  multiple  arguments  in  Hirsch's  work  fit  the  dominant  narratives. 
Modernity  and  rationalisation  are  both  key  narratives  of  the  German  pro-
Americanism,  and  the  general  canon  of  the  Weimar  Republic.  The  methods  he 
requests, such as mass-production, standardisation and mechanisation are based on 
Fordist  principles  and  similar  to  more  general  German  pro-Americanism  of  the 
1920s.  The  book  nevertheless  surpasses  the  mere  pro-Americanism  and  is 
interconnected to the historical developments. A call for economic stability and even 
currency stability must be seen in relation to the post-war hyperinflation, economic 
depression and the reparations-discussion. These topics not only reoccur in the book, 
they were reasons for the book. Hirsch himself was strongly involved in the currency 
stabilization and the reparations-negotiations during the Weimar Republic.  In  this 
sense the economic post-war situation, the professional activities of Julius Hirsch and 
his pro-American work The American Economic Miracle all influenced one another. 
5.2. Case Study: French pro-Americanism 1918-1933
5.2.1. General Perspective
The admiration of American economic progressivism was geographically not limited 
to Germany. Pro-Americanism was as much of a French phenomenon as it was a 
German one. Not surprisingly there indeed existed a connection between the debates 
in both countries. This connection would show itself through various publications as 
German and French pro-Americans developed an intellectual exchange. Even though 
there overall existed less pro-American publications in France than in Germany, the 
argumentative  foundations  in  both  countries  were  similar:  French  pro-Americans 
equally  supported  the  adaptation  of  American  economic  methods  after  the  First 
World War, namely Taylorism. “Taylorisme”, as the French would call it, was seen as 
an answer to Socialism whilst being the backbone of France's wartime ally USA. 
Taylorism and “machinisme” i.e. mechanisation of manufacturing and industry, were 
to rebuild the destroyed French economy. The support for Taylorism was thereby 
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independent of different political convictions and was also supported outside of the 
industrial circles.469 
The great significance of “Taylorisme” did not diminish with the publication of 
Henry Ford's  autobiography.  Whilst  it  indeed had some success  in  France  it  was 
nowhere near as prominent  as in Germany, where its  reviews had led to an own 
literary genre. The first French translation of My life and work470 appeared in 1925, 
but relatively few reviews discussed the pros and cons of Fordism. Ford's methods 
were  rather  perceived  as  a  more  practical  and  humanised  implementation  of 
Taylorism. Ford's work did nevertheless inspire voyages to the USA by industrial 
pioneers  such  as  André-Gustave  Citroen  (1878-1935)  and  Louis  Renault  (1877-
1944). They supported an adoption of Ford's methods in light of Americans economic 
supremacy  and  perceived  Fordism as  example  of  the  possibilities  “machinisme” 
offered,  particularly  in  the  auto-industry.  Taylorism  nevertheless  remained  a 
catchphrase and one of the main references for the Americanism debate of the French 
philo-Americans  during  the  1920s.  Whilst  Ford's  methods  were  genuinely 
apprehended,  they  did  not  become  the  nucleus  of  a  technization  debate.  There 
emerged  no  clear-cut  distinction  between  Fordism  and  Taylorism  as  it  did  in 
Germany. What the term Fordism was to Germany, Taylorism was to France.471
Even without a direct and extensive Fordism debate, the discourse would still 
centre on industrial mass-production, rationalisation and the genuine adoption of the 
American economic model.472 This debate moved in the focus of public attention 
when a rationalisation movement emerged around the industrialist Ernest Mercier in 
1925.  The  so  called  Redressement  Français  (French  Recovery)  aspired  to 
technocratic  corporatism,  a  Fordist  inspired  technological  and  productive 
modernisation  of  France  through  top-down  implementation.473 The  Redressement 
Français  published a  journal  entitled  Cahiers  du  Redressement  Français474,  where 
they would formulate their economic suggestions and reform proposals. The goal was 
to  convince the general  public  of their  productivist  goals and ultimately exercise 
influence  on  political  decision  making.  The  representatives  of  the  Redressement 
469  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 215; Sommer, Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen  
Publizistik. 1924-1939., p. 97.
470  Ford and Crowther, My life and work.
471  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, pp. 216–218.
472  Idem., p. 218.
473  Idem., p. 218f.
474  Cahiers du Redressement français. (Paris: Éditions de la S.A.P.E., 1927).
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sought  to  create  a  French  industrial  society  by  modelling  it  after  the  American 
paragon. The Redressement saw the USA as a functioning mass-civilization, which 
was the ultimate benchmark for prosperity. Liberalism and Socialism would not offer 
a sufficient resolution to the existence of the mass-phenomenon. The conclusion was 
hence  the  rationalisation  of  French  industry  to  create  mass-production,  a  mass-
market, and ultimately a mass-society. The ideological idea behind this approach was 
that one could only truly assess a society according to its living standard and not its 
culture and it was only a mass-society that would support this high-living. The design 
for  the  French  future  was  one  of  rationalization  and  productivity  following  the 
American example.475
On  a  political  level  the  Redressement  Français  favoured  a  government  of 
functional elites. The oligarchic structure was to be composed of industrialists and 
economists  and  renew  France  with  the  economy  as  the  starting  point.  The 
Redressement  advocated  the  creation  of  a  “union nationale”,  a  national  union of 
employers,  employees  and  consumers  which  was  to  be  the  prerequisite  for  the 
modernisation  of  France.476 As  the  Redressement  Français  was  critical  of  the 
parliamentary structures and favoured oligarchy, they have been called the French 
version  of  Reactionary  Modernism  by  some  historians.  Egbert  Klautke  has  for 
example  highlighted  parallels  between  both  movements  which  include  the  mass-
productivist orientation, the technological paragon of the American model and the 
anti-parliamentarian or anti-democratic tendencies.477 
To  implement  their  conception  of  an  industrial  society,  the  Redressement 
Français exerted increasing influence on French politics. They held close contacts to 
André  Tardieu  who was  member  of  Prime  Minister  Raymond  Poincaré's  cabinet 
between 1926 and 1928, before becoming elected Prime Minister himself in 1929. As 
member of Poincaré's cabinet Tardieu became Minister of Transport in 1926 where 
he  promoted  the  rationalization  of  semi-public  businesses.  By  1928  he  became 
Minister of Domestic Affairs under Poincaré's successor Aristide Briand and would 
succeed him as Prime Minister one year later whilst remaining Minister of Domestic 
Affairs. Despite the Redressement's close contacts to Tardieu the political influence 
of the group was kept  within limits.478 They certainly shifted the public  attention 
475  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 219.
476  Idem., p. 221f.
477  Idem., p. 222.
478  Ibid.
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towards technological modernisation in industry through their various publications of 
the Cahiers. The fact that the Redressement counted tens of thousands of members by 
the end of the 1920s in this sense testifies to their public reach. If the group around 
Mercier ever did have accountable political influence, it declined after a rupture with 
Tardieu, even before he seized office in 1930. Eventually the worldwide economic 
crisis  of  1929  destroyed  the  Redressement  Français'  goal  of  a  technological 
modernisation of France.479
Also outside the Redressement Français, industrial rationalisation and methods 
of mass-production were supported and exerted. American economic progress was 
perceived as a top-down process and French pro-Americans demanded an identical 
carryover.  Progress  for  France  was  viewed  as  a  combination  of  industrial 
rationalisation  on  the  one  hand  and  domestic  consumerism on  the  other.  French 
industrial  backwardness  was  consequently  tackled  by  applying Taylorist  methods 
during and shortly after the First World War. Thereby a link between Taylorism and 
corporate welfarism was of a typically French nature. Pro-Americans additionally 
demanded  a  strong  managerial  role  of  the  state  in  economics.  The  state  was  to 
facilitate a gentler version of Taylorism in the interwar period. Despite these general 
demands  and  strong  technophilia,  rationalisation  during  the  interwar  period  was 
almost  exclusively  limited  to  large  firms.  There  simply  existed  too  much 
disagreement over the orientation of rationalization in the political economy. 480 
This rationalisation debate was, alongside the Taylorism discourse, the second 
focal  point  of  pro-Americans  during  the  1920s.  Interestingly  there  existed  a 
deliberate exchange between the French and the German rationalisation debate. A lot 
of the literature on rationalisation (and Fordism for that matter) was received and 
considered through German sources. In this sense, not only the USA but to a certain 
extent  also  Germany  was  seen  as  an  example  of  technological  and  economic 
superiority to French pro-Americans.481 The Franco-German exchange process was 
not  only  limited  to  publications,  it  was  also  manifested  through  lectures  and 
presentations.  Julius  Hirsch  for  example,  whose  life  and  work  we  have  already 
considered in the previous section, held a lecture in Paris on 10 December 1926 at 
the invitation of the Redressement Français. In his presentation La rationalisation de  
479  Ibid.
480  ‘Fordism and the American Dream in France, 1919-1939’ 
<http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/digitalfordism/fordism_materials/frost.htm> [accessed 29 September 2015].
481  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 227.
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le production482 Hirsch elucidated the advantages of general economic rationalisation. 
The  rationalisation-process  thereby  included  industry,  production  and  workforce. 
Clearly there existed a substantial connection between the patterns of argumentation 
of  German  and  French  pro-Americans.  The  consensus  was  that  the  economic 
situation  of  France  demanded  the  concrete  application  of  rationalisation  and 
technization despite all criticism.483 
Even  though  key  politicians  and  publicists  had  very  different  political 
orientations, French pro-Americanism was generally independent of political colour. 
The  debate  surpassed  the  technological  and  economic  area  and  pro-Americans 
irrespective of their political affiliation would discuss even cultural advantages of the 
American  model.  Authors  such  as  Durtain,  Maurois,  Braunschvig,  and  Romier 
intended  a  balanced  analysis  of  American  developments  and  highlighted  its 
advantages  for  the  French  society.  According  to  Dubreuil  and  Braunschvig  for 
example the American model could be characterised by social harmony.484 Durtain 
opposed  the  dominant  idea  that  the  USA was  nothing  but  a  mechanized  and 
rationalised  society.   Maurois  and Romier  elaborated  the  dynamic  rhythm of  the 
American  society  and  with  it  the  advantages  of  rationalisation.  Particularly  the 
support  of  American  youth  and  education,  opposed  to  the  French  and  European 
gerontocracy,  were  supposedly  cornerstones  of  American  superiority.  American 
culture  could  surpass  technological  and  material  realities  and  offer  intellectual 
paragons  the  French  society  should  adapt.  A synthesis  of  mass-civilisation  and 
individualistic  elite  culture  was  attainable  according  to  leading  French  pro-
Americans.485
In conclusion, the French pro-Americanism discourse during the 1920s initially 
kicked off as an economic implementation of Taylorism in order to rebuild France 
after the First World War. Post 1925 Fordist methods added to the debate but would 
never  reach  the  centre  of  the  techinization  and  modernization  discussions.  The 
discourse  rather  focused  on  the  general  application  of  the  American  model  and 
thereby mixed Taylorist rationalization principles and Fordist mass-production. This 
debate  was  particularly  promoted  by  the  rationalisation-movement  Redressement 
Français, created in 1925 around the manufacturer Ernest Mercier. The Redressement 
482  Hirsch, La Rationalisation de la production.
483  This criticism included negative effects of standardisation, materialism and machine-dependency. 
484  Sommer, Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939, p. 90f.
485  Idem., pp. 85–97 with further references; especially p. 93.
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supported technocratic corporatism and favoured a political rule of functional elites, 
preferably  from  the  economic  sector.  With  its  monthly  journal  Cahiers  du 
Redressement Français, the circle was substantially responsible for the shift of public 
interest  towards  pro-American  technical  modernisation  and  rationalization. 
Rationalization as an abstract concept thereby superseded industry and economy and 
was  perceived  as  a  shield  concept  applicable  to  the  entire  society  including  the 
domestic sphere. 
All  perceptions  of  the  US  model  were  thereby  independent  of  political 
worldviews.  Even  though  pro-Americanism  was  most  frequently  supported  by 
liberal-conservatives, namely the Alliance Républicaine Démocratique around André 
Tardieu,  affinity for Taylorism and rationalisation was conceivable in all  political 
camps.  Thereby  the  rationalisation  literature  was  quite  often  received  through 
Germany. The lecture by Julius Hirsch for the Redressement Français in Paris is in 
this  sense  a  tribute  to  the  close  relationship  of  both  pro-American  circles.  The 
rationalisation debate in both countries showed large intellectual similarities whereas 
terminologically there existed differences. Whilst Fordism and modernism were the 
nucleus  of  German  pro-Americanism,  the  catchphrase  for  French  pro-Americans 
were Taylorisme and Machinisme.486 Rationalisation  was conceptually  part  of  the 
transnational  canon.  Generally,  French pro-Americans  tended towards  a  complete 
take-over of the American model,  whilst  German pro-Americans were inclined to 
only employ certain developments for the German socioeconomic reality.487 In this 
sense France was more positive about the social effects of Americanization compared 
to Germany and its quest for retaining the German culture.
 
5.2.2. Lucien Romier
As  we  have  seen  the  Redressement  Français  functioned  as  a  platform  for  the 
formulation of pro-American ideas during the interwar period. It encouraged their 
propagation through its large public reach and regular publications. Intellectual head 
of the Redressement  Français was the French journalist  Lucien Romier.  Romier's 
486  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 237.
487  Sommer, Die Weltmacht USA im Urteil der französischen Publizistik. 1924-1939., pp. 85–97.
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books  Qui sera le Maîre- Europe ou Amérique488 and  Idées très simples pour les  
français489 thereby  together  formulate  a  representative  roundup  of  the  generally 
prevailing pro-American perceptions. 
Lucien  Romier's  life  and work can  most  thoroughly  be retraced through the 
archival collection of the French National Archives.490 This collection in Pierrefit-sur-
Seine  has  been  donated  by  Lucien  Romier's  wife  Yvonne  in  1980-1981.  The 
inventory  is  comprised  of  six  parts,  containing  materials  on  his  biography, 
correspondences, travels, personal photographs as well as bibliographies of his work. 
On  a  biographical  level,  there  exist  three  different  works  on  Romier.  First,  a 
biography by Michel Francois, published in the Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes in 
1944.491 Secondly a university thesis by Micheline Perrin entitled Quelques aspects  
de  la  pensée  politique  de  Lucien  Romier492 from  1968,  including  a  four-page 
biography which is missing in the archival inventory. Finally, a work by Christine 
Roussel entitled Lucien Romier493 on his life and political work, published in 1979. 
Even though the archival material includes a part on Romier's travels, it  does not 
contain any information of his voyage to the United States. The work by Roussel 
however indicates that Romier did visit the USA from 20 April until 8 July 1927.494 
Jean-Baptiste Lucien Romier was born on 19 October 1885 in Moiré- close to 
Lyon.495 He  was  the  third  child  to  Blaise  Romier  and  Jeanne-Marie-Isabelle 
Berchoud, a viniculture family in the Beaujolais region. Romier attended a Jesuit 
school in Mongrée before beginning his studies at the École Nationale des Chartes in 
1905  where  he  studied  history.  By  1909  he  graduated  as  an  archivist  and 
palaeographer.  Romier  continued  his  historical  studies  in  Rome  at  the  École 
Française de Rome from 1909 until the summer of 1912 and thereafter at the Institut 
française d'Espagne in Madrid until  1914. He would round off his  studies with a 
doctorate in history in 1913 on the political origins of the religious wars entitled Les 
origines  politiques  des  guerres  de  religion.  This  period  of  Romier's  life  was 
dedicated to historical research and saw the publication of various works which won 
488  Romier, Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?
489  Romier, Idées très simples pour les français.
490  ‘Fonds Lucien Romier; 408AP/1-408AP/10; Archives Nationales de France’
491  Michel François, ‘Lucien Romier’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, 105 (1944), 338–44.
492  Micheline Perrin, ‘Quelques Aspects de La Pensée Politique de Lucien Romier’ (Université de Lyon, 1968).
493  Christine Roussel, Lucien Romier (1885-1944): historien, économiste, journaliste, homme politique (Paris: Editions 
France-Empire, 1979).
494  Idem., p. 124.
495  This biography is mainly based on: Christine Roussel, Lucien Romier.
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him the Premier Prix Gobert from the French Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-
Lettres three times, including his doctoral thesis.
During the First World War a very strong myopia (short-sightedness) hindered 
Romier's deployment. Nevertheless, also writers and researchers were expected to 
participate and contribute to the wartime efforts. Romier, being part of the ancillary 
service as a consequence became part of the economic department of the Ministry of 
War.  One  year  earlier  he  had  joined  the  Association  nationale  de  l'expansion 
économique. Here Romier became head of customs, transport and exchange rates of 
the  Association  which  undertook  a  survey  on  French  industrial  production  and 
foreign competition. This work would introduce him to the economic sector.
Romier, combining his journalistic activity and economic affinity, would publish 
various political-economic articles and joined the Journée Industrielle in 1921 for 
which  he  became  one  of  the  editors.  On  1  February  1925,  he  left  the  Journée 
Industrielle to join the journal Figaro where he became editor in chief. On 25 April 
1927 Romier resigned from this position due to disagreements with his co-director 
and began extensive travels through Asia, North Africa and North America. Here his 
voyage to the USA between 20 April and 8 July 1927 stands out as it triggered his 
publications on the USA. During this time, Lucien Romier became a member of the 
Redressement Français and was part of its board from October 1927 onwards. His 
work Idées très simples pour les français was published through the Redressement's 
printing platform Cahiers du Redressement Français.
From 1925  onwards,  Romier  had  been  president  of  the  Societé  d'économie 
nationale and part of the editorship of the journal La réforme économique. Romier 
also  maintained  connections  to  the  Comité  franco-allemand  d'information  et  de 
documentation  which  was  established  in  1926.  In  1932  Romier  was  fielded  as 
political  candidate  for  the  Alliance  Républicaine  Démocratique  in  the  legislative 
elections  in  Dieppe  but  was  not  successful.  On  1  June  1934  Romier  therefore 
returned to Le Figaro as editor in chief until 28 December 1940. From August 1940 
onwards Philippe Petain, chief of state of the Vichy Regime, had repeatedly asked 
Romier to take on a consulting position in his cabinet. After multiple refusals and 
despite recurring health problems, Lucien Romier accepted Petain's request and went 
to Vichy on 8 February 1941. In August of the same year Petain would elect Romier 
Minister of the State. 
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Romier's  ongoing  cardiac  health  problems forced  him to  leave  Vichy  in  the 
winter of 1941 for his convalescence. His deteriorating physical condition forced him 
to leave Vichy once again from October 1942 until April 1943 for an operation. After 
Petain had insisted on his return, Romier returned to Vichy one last time. His final 
political phase was marked by an anti-German stance which put his name on the list 
of undesirables because of which he was forced to resign on 23 December 1943. 
Lucien Romier died shortly afterwards of a heart-attack on 5 January 1944 when the 
Gestapo came to arrest him.
Of special interest for this research is Romier's journey to the United States and 
the publications which resulted therefrom. Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique  
was published in 1927 by the publishing house Hachette. In this travelogue, Romier 
investigates the emergence and characteristics of the economic masses. He perceived 
the “masses économiques” (economic masses) the greatest challenge for the modern 
nation-state. His overall image of the masses and their effect on sociocultural life was 
very  ambivalent.  Whilst  the  masses  had  led  to  the  introduction  of  important 
economic developments, they had had a negative impact on cultural life. In his work 
Romier discussed the USA as a role model on how to deal with this mass-effect. As 
the USA had been exposed to the emergence of economic masses since its creation, it 
provided a relevant case study on their effects. His general image of the USA was 
thereby very positive as the country had, despite some sinister cultural peculiarities, 
adapted well to the challenges of an economic mass-society.  Romier's second work 
on the USA entitled  Idées très simple pour les français  from 1928 rounds off his 
America perception.  Idées très simples pour les français  provided France with an 
economic guideline on how to deal with the emergence of economic masses. Romier 
characterised the USA as the main example to follow, particularly in economic terms. 
His ultimate goal for France was a materially prosperous society through application 
of American innovations.  According to Romier the means for prosperity included 
rationalization and improvements in economic areas such as industry, agriculture and 
infrastructure. Romier called for a top-down implementation of these practices with 
as little state involvement as possible.
Romier's  biography  influenced  his  perception  of  the  USA and  the  ideas  he 
formulated in  his  works.  Initially  his  academic historical  background gave him a 
foundation  for  sociocultural  research  and  demonstrates  an  interest  in  social 
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phenomena. Through Romier's work in the economic department of the Ministry of 
War he additionally developed an affinity for and proximity to the economic sector. 
His subsequent membership in the national association for economic expansion and 
his editorship of the Journée Industrielle added to his close contact with everyday 
economic developments. These professional activities shaped Romier's perception of 
the French economy and it's potential. In addition, his work led him to travel to the 
USA which would influence his subsequent America image.
Romier's active membership in the Redressement Français had a further impact 
on his economic worldview and probably also influenced his beliefs about the role of 
state  involvement  in  the  economy.  The  Redressement  Français,  as  rationalization 
movement, sharpened the economic convictions he would voice in his publications 
and simultaneously provided a platform and audience for his writings. Especially the 
active support for political change by the Redressement Français can be retraced in 
the  educative  purpose  Romier  stressed  in  his  publications.  The  conviction  for 
economic change in France is further highlighted through his pursuit of a political 
career. His affiliation with the Redressement Français and his relative prominence as 
a writer and journalist must have helped him in fostering this political career.
Lucien Romier's publications were certainly prevalent and part  of the French 
public-discourse  on  Americanization.  The  reputation  of  the  publishing  house 
Hachette  added  to  the  distribution  of  Romier's  first  work,  as  did  the  large 
membership of the Redressement Français, through which Idées très simples pour les  
français  were published. The success of the books can further be explained by the 
time they appeared: the interest in the USA was at a highpoint during the mid-1920s, 
particularly because of the visible American investments in the French economy and 
the constant evolvement of the Franco-American relations (see chapter 4.2.). 
Despite  many  influences  of  Romier's  life  experiences  on  his  work,  the 
publication of his America related books in contrast also exhibited some influences 
on his further life and career path. Their success added to his prominence and thereby 
supported his later political career. In addition, the publications cemented Romier as 
intellectual  head  of  the  Redressement  Français.496 This  special  position  in  the 
Redressement facilitated an introduction to the later French Prime Minister André 
Tardieu, to whom the Redressement had close contacts.
496  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 220.
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5.2.3. “Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique” & “Idées très 
simples pour les français”
The basis  for Lucien Romier's America-works was his  journey to North America 
between April and July 1927. Romier processed his experiences throughout the USA 
in  Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?  (Who will be the master? Europe or 
America). Contrary to what the title might suggest, the work does not essentially 
compare Europe and the United States. It rather provides an investigation of what 
Romier  deems  the  new  socio-economic  driving  force:  the  emergence  and 
characteristics of a mass-economy. This explanation is succeeded by an investigation 
of what the effects of the mass-economy are on the USA, where Romier draws minor 
comparisons with Europe.
 Qui sera le Maître? was published in 1927 by the publishing house Hachette in 
Paris. The  book  is  divided  into  four  parts  of  which  the  first  one  describes  the 
historical developments that led to the evolution of the phenomenon of masses and 
their relation to the nation-state. The second part focuses on Romier's key concept: 
the ascent of the masses, their influence on politics, their relation to the nation-state 
and their influence on the gender roles. The third part provides a case study on the 
USA  and  its  reaction  to  the  mass-phenomenon,  subdivided  into  the  social 
characteristics of the mass civilisation, its cultural consequences on the American 
mores and the economic basis of the USA. The final part discusses the innovative 
and conservative approach towards dealing with the mass-phenomenon and its socio-
economic consequences.
Romier's  America-image and subliminal  pro-Americanism was not  limited  to 
Qui sera le Maître? but has to be viewed in combination with his work  Idées très  
simples pour les français (Very simple ideas for the French). Idées très simples pour  
les  français  was  published  in  1928,  one  year  after  Qui  sera  le  Maître?  and  is 
significantly shorter. Instead of providing an analysis of the mass-phenomenon and a 
case  study of  the  USA,  it  rather,  as  the  title  suggests,  provides  an  improvement 
proposal for the French society and economy and guidelines on how to cope with the 
development of the masses (partly based on the American example). Romier's mantra 
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is thereby how to create a “peuple riche”,  a prosperous society in order to provide 
stability for France in the future.
Idées très simples pour les français  was published through the journal of the 
Redressement Français, the Cahiers, which were to educate the French society on 
socio-economic advantages of rationalization and appeared in 35 volumes after their 
establishment  in  1926.  The  fact  that  Idées  très  simples  pour  les  français  was 
published through the Cahiers (they were printed by the Éditions S. Kra in Paris) 
explains their educational approach and their focus on rationalization and prosperity. 
Idées très simples pour les français is divided into three parts with a foreword that 
describes the backwardness of France and a need for change. The first part develops 
the current French problems such as housing and employment. The second part is 
dedicated  to  creating  prosperity  in  society  through  developing  areas  such  as 
agriculture, industry and transport. The final part provides a conclusion on how to 
reach political stability in France, particularly with regard to state-involvement.
The overall picture Romier constructs of the USA is thus a combination of both 
books. The first work provides the foundation through an elucidation of the mass-
phenomenon and its influences on the USA. This case study of the USA reflects 
Romier's  observations  during  his  travels  through  North  America  and is  therefore 
based on personal experiences. This does not necessarily make Romier's statements 
true, but it certainly gives them a sense of accuracy. The second work,  Idées très 
simples pour les français, is designed to provide a guideline for the improvement of 
France striving towards prosperity. Romier here picks up the intellectual framework 
he developed in  Qui sera le Maître?  and relates it to the socio-economic reality of 
France and its orientation toward the future. The following inquiry of both works will 
thus commence with Qui sera le Maître? and investigate the construction of Romier's 
central concept “les masses” and the America-image he provides, which is partly a 
reaction  to  the  concept  of  mass-civilisation.  Thereafter  the  inquiry  of  Idées  très  
simples pour les français will reflect upon the vision Romier produces for France and 




The prerequisite and key aspect for Lucien Romier's line of argumentation is  the 
evolution  of  the masses.  Romier  considers the  development  of  a  mass-society  as 
natural part of the socio-economic human evolution and first provides the readership 
with the historical background of the mass-phenomenon.497 According to the author 
individuals face initial complex tensions which are generated through a combination 
of the egoistic human nature and increasing universal influences. This tension has 
been amplified through the mechanical  innovations of the First  Word War.  It  has 
effectively led to opposing pairs on a political level, corporatism and socialism, and 
on a more abstract level the contrast between the universality of material influences 
and the resilient nature of the nation-state. Romier argues that “now”, thus in the 
1920s,  the  human  kind  has  entered  a  new  phase  which  is  characterised  by  an 
equilibrium of society through the evolution of the masses.498 The human strives for 
affiliation and solidarity have created the dynamics of what Romier calls the “masse 
économique”499, an economic mass-civilisation which figures as a new benchmark 
for civilizations. The author argues that any mass-civilisation requires resources, is 
characterised by its growth, a tendency towards integration and a common will for 
progress.  The  beginning  of  Romier's  work  thus  accounts  for  the  evolution  and 
properties  of  mass-civilizations  i.e.  the  “masses  économiques”.  He  characterises 
them as a natural part of human evolution which will eventually affect any given 
social construct. According to the author this can for example be seen through their 
relation to the nation-state: he argues that the liberalism and cooperation of mass-
civilisations  have  led  to  increasing  prosperity  which  in  the  long  run  erodes 
nationalism.500 The inevitability of the “masse économique” as social evolution here 
promotes the idea that any nation state in a traditional sense needs to adapt to this  
new socioeconomic model. In  Qui sera le Maître? the USA provides an important 
case study for Romier in how Europe can adjust to the evolution of the masses. Being  
founded with an already existing mass-phenomenon it is an effective role model on 
how to cater for the needs of a mass-society. 
Before  his  investigation  of  the  American  society  the  author  however  first 
develops the evolution of the masses themselves, the “poussée des masses”501, which 
497  Romier, Qui sera le Maître, Europe ou Amérique?, p. 9ff.
498  Idem., p. 11.
499  Idem., p. 12.
500  Idem., p. 19.
501  Idem., p. 31.
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includes the political,  economic and cultural  dimension of the mass-phenomenon. 
Firstly,  the  political  dimension here relates to  the different  forms of  government. 
Romier's account of the relationship between the masses and politics highlights how 
throughout  history  there  have  only  existed  two democratic  republics  which  have 
provided exterior security and were based on resource rich territory: the USA and 
France.502 According to the author both countries were founded on the principle of 
equality,  with  the  USA having additionally  created  a  distinct  form of  prosperity. 
Romier's argumentation in this sense already suggests the pro-American design of his 
work  to  come.  He  constitutes  the  USA as  economic  paragon  which  has  created 
economic wealth while he at the same time accredits France a similar potential for 
the future.
Romier further argues that the traditional functions of politics, government and 
administration  have  been  increasingly  influenced  by  the  “masses  économiques”. 
With  their  strong  economic  impact,  they  have  effectively  denaturized  politics: 
politicians now need to consider the interests of the masses and their influences on 
the  economy  which  has  decreased  the  power  of  political  elites.  Finance  and 
economics  have  increasingly  become  political  and  diplomatic  constants  as  a 
consequence  of  the  political  capability  of  the  masses.  According  to  Romier,  the 
economic  masses  and  economic  evolution  will,  in  the  long  term,  remove  class 
struggle and make the standard of living the only benchmark for the assessment of 
society. To Romier the “masses économique” entail the positive political potentials of 
material  progress  and  consumption.  Nevertheless,  they  are  incapable  of  securing 
intellectual and moral values and thereafter foresee the long-term development of the 
state. Romier thus argues that politics needs to take into account the material interests 
of  the  masses  on  the  one  hand,  whilst  promoting  and supporting  intellectuals  as 
counterpoise on the other.503 
This  influence  of  the  “masses  économiques”  on  politics  and  economics  is 
effectively showcased through the economic  concurrence between different  mass-
civilizations.  Historically this  concurrence  is  based on natural  resources  but  once 
material wealth has been accumulated the needs of the masses exceed the securing of 
natural resources and move towards the conquering of markets. Romier argues that 
this can be accomplished through either imperialism or protectionism. To Romier the 
502  Idem., p. 38.
503  Idem., 33-61.
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USA, in particular, today shows an example of protectionism and the author demands 
that France should emulate this economic approach. This call for French economic 
protectionism and independence here certainly relates to the historical circumstances. 
As we have seen in the chapter on the Franco-American relations (chapter 4.2.), the 
second half of the 1920s was characterised by an increasing French fear of American 
imperialism. These fears mainly related to American investments in French wartime 
industries, namely the oil- and telecommunication sector. On top of that, investments 
in  the  historically  strong  French  car  and  movie  industry  were  perceived  as 
restrictions of French independence. Romier's demand for economic protectionism 
can  therefore  be  seen  as  a  reaction  to  the  increasing  investments  in  the  French 
industry.  When  Qui  sera  le  Maître?  was  published  in  1927  public  opinion  had 
already  shifted  to  a  sceptic  assessment  of  American  investments,  despite  open 
appreciation a few years earlier. The author's reasoning consequently does reflect the 
historical circumstances and the contemporary debate about the pending alignment of 
the  French  economy.  His  novel  focus  on  the  economic  masses  thereby  certainly 
introduced an additional component to the debate. 
The role of the “masses économiques” as a dominant and reoccurring narrative 
in Qui sera le Maître? can furthermore be understood through constructivist theory. 
In order to provide this complementary understanding of the economic masses and 
showcase their constructivist functionality it is first necessary to determine how they 
relate  to  the causality  of  structures and agents.  Similar  to  the German source by 
Hirsch,  our  contemplation  thus  begins  with  defining  what  figures  as  agent  and 
structure and a  subsequent  assessment of the actor  properties.  The designation of 
agency primarily relates to who can be considered the active participant in the given 
context.  Here,  this participation is  represented by the author and narrator,  Lucien 
Romier,  who  consequently  figures  as  agent.  Through  his  investigation  of  the 
economic  masses  and their  effect  on  different  societies  Romier  takes  part  in  the 
formulation  of  political  opinion.  His  work  is  thereby  guided  by  his  personal 
assessment of the “masses économiques” and their all-encompassing influence. They 
are portrayed as inevitable evolution and overarching concept to which every country 
is forced to adapt. The “masses économiques” are consequently the first and most 
dominant constructivist structure in  Qui sera le Maître?.  After all, Romier's entire 
argumentation  intends  to  establish  how  a  given  nation-state  should  adapt  to  the 
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influences  of  the  mass-civilisation.  It  is  also  in  this  context  that  Romier's  pro-
Americanism needs to be understood. The USA provides a role  model on how a 
nation,  more  particularly  France,  can  and  should  cope  with  the  challenges  of 
emerging economic masses. On top of that the structural dominance of the “masses 
économiques”  forces  France  to  apply  new  economic  models,  mimicked  after 
American developments. This endorsement of the American-model here testifies to 
the transformative-educational character of Romier's work. 
Despite this prevailing pro-Americanism, the USA simultaneously for Romier 
also figures as a cautionary example of how the mass-phenomenon can have negative 
effects on the culture. This cultural component can effectively be recognised through 
an  alteration  of  the  gender-roles.  Romier  argues  that  the  mass-civilisation  has 
changed  the  role  of  women  who  have  become  ejected  from  their  traditional 
environment.504 Women have been forced to enter the labour market, leading to a 
destruction of traditional homes and a reduction in birth rates. Romier perceives this 
new female-role as a social crisis, where the traditional sense of families has been 
destroyed  through  the  economic  mass-civilisation.505 It  has  alienated  men  from 
women  and  created  masculine  discomfort  through  an  excess  of  female  liberty. 
Romier argues that it is necessary to educate the masses on these developments as 
changes in economic and material circumstances have led to changes of the mores. 
From a theoretical perspective, Romier's account of what he considers the negative 
cultural  effects  of  the  mass-society  relates  to  the  constructivist  conception  of 
collective  identities.  This  conception  premises  on  the  we-them-dichotomy,  a 
fundamental  differentiation  between  the  in-group  and  the  out-group  (see  section 
3.1.1). This in- vs- out-group distinction is amplified through a negative assessment 
and exaggeration of out-group attributes. Now that Romier highlights the negative 
effects of the “masses économiques” he thus encourages the rejection and negative 
assessment of the structure. 
The cultural dimension of the “masses économiques” consequently provokes a 
negative reinforcement  of the structure which now functionally serves  as counter 
identity. This counter-identity dimension here essentially relates to the constitutive 
dualism  of  constructivist  identities  (see  chapter  3.1.2.).  To  the  constructivist, 
identities can be constructed by the agents as much as they can be dictated by the 
504  Idem., p. 87.
505  Idem., p. 95.
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structure. Counter-identities in this sense relate to the second possibility: structure 
constituting the identity of agents. When representation structures impose identities 
on the individual he/she can either accept and incorporate this identity or reject it. 
Therefore,  in  the  argumentation  of  Lucien  Romier,  the  economic  masses  are 
constructed as a negative identification structure which is to be functionally rejected 
by the own identity. The “masses économiques” in this sense figure as a counter-
identity. They thereby additionally assist in defining and reinforcing the own identity. 
The counter-identity figures as “other”  allowing the formulation of the “self”, which 
in this case means the protection of the French national identity against the cultural 
consequences of the economic masses. The mass-civilisation as an abstract structure 
demands new ways to protect, reinforce and reconstruct the French national identity 
in light of the inevitable consequences the evolution of the mass-society has evoked. 
In order to identify these new ways, Lucien Romier provides a case study of the 
USA which describes the consequences of the mass-phenomenon on the nation-state 
and  the  unique  manner  in  which  the  USA has  responded to  them.  According  to 
Romier  this  American  uniqueness  is  mainly  exhibited  through  the  creation  of  a 
superior  form of  living.  Different  American preconditions  have  led to  a  different 
social  model  than  in  Europe  which  is  particularly  characterised  by  its  social 
attraction.  The  independence  of  American  economic  activities  and  politics  have 
spawned an economic supremacy that has a strong appeal to foreign labour. These 
immigrants take part in the generation of wealth. The USA is thus the first system 
that  can  actually  satisfy  the  masses.  Contrary  to  other  nation  states  where  the 
evolution  of  the  masses  met  an  already  existing  political  framework,  the  USA 
developed parallel to the evolution of a mass-society. The American civilisation was 
thus created by the masses, for the masses and provides numerous advantages: its 
focus on youth, the collective nature of businesses and its tolerance. Together, these 
social factors form what Romier calls “l'originalité Américaine”506,  the “American 
originality”.507 Romier  assesses  the  USA as  “le  type  le  plus  avancé  de  societé 
économique”508 , the most advanced economic society, which clearly highlights how 
France can learn from the American originality.
Despite this role-model character of the USA, the American society does face the 
506  Idem., p. 107.
507  Idem., p. 110.
508  Idem., p. 127.
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cultural  consequences  of  the  mass-phenomenon.  It  slowly  loses  its  creative, 
intellectual and artistic side. Romier therefore inquires whether Europe can prevent 
these developments from occurring “back home” in the future.509 His analysis of the 
USA  hence  highlights  the  structural  difference  he  makes  between  the  mass-
civilization as an abstract and overarching concept on the one hand and the USA as 
nation-state  on  the  other.  Whilst  the  USA as  a  nation-state  is  economically  well 
adapted to the influence of the “masses économiques” as a main structure it is still 
subject  to  cultural  hazards.  In  this  sense,  the American originality  constitutes  the 
socio-economic  answer  to  the  mass-civilisation.  The foundation  of  Romier's  pro-
Americanism is thus functionally based on how the USA adapts to the “threat” or 
consequences of the “masses économiques” economically. 
Culturally however, France needs to follow a separate path than the USA as his 
treatise on the peculiarities of the American mores highlights. The author argues that 
the USA as “communauté d'origine économique” has  defined the idea of making 
money  the  central  goal  of  social  interaction.510 Materialism  has  consequently 
radically changed American mores. According to Romier, American social morality 
is thus only based on material  wealth. This new form of American morality does 
provide  some  advantages,  such  as  the  prohibition  of  alcohol,511 but  also  great 
weaknesses. The instability of the family for example is a big problem in the USA, a 
notion Romier had already developed in his treatise on the evolution of the masses. 
The author claims that the American society is challenged by new gender roles and a 
destruction  of  the  concept  of  marriage.  Romier  here  once  again  underlines  the 
negative cultural consequences of the mass-society. Thereby negative dimensions of 
the American society are only related to consequences of the mass-phenomena and 
not the American-model as such. The USA thus remains a sample on how the mass-
society effects the nation state and how Europe and France can learn from the given 
developments.
The conclusion of Romier's Qui sera le Maître? therefore reviews the rudiments 
and lessons one should draw from the evolution of the mass-phenomenon. He argues 
that the “masses économiques” have influenced and changed the traditional notion of 
the  nation-state.512 Every  aspiration  to  improve  the  nation-state  and  its  social 
509  Idem., p. 137.
510  Idem., pp. 121,146.
511  Idem., p. 155.
512  Idem., p. 207ff.
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conditions hence need to be orientated towards the masses. In practical terms, this 
means that the political systems and ideologies need to be adjusted according to these 
new circumstances. Romier argues that liberalism, having created an incentive for 
work, profit and success should stress the collective rather than individual material 
preoccupation. Socialism on the other hand sacrifices the long-term progress of the 
masses for immediate interests in terms of class struggle. What Romier thus proposes 
is a “capitalisme de la richesse circulante”513, a capitalist and liberal circulation of 
goods and trade.  A fixed  and dividable  distribution  of  wealth leads  to  economic 
fragmentation.  Economic  evolution  is  thus  based  on  the  fluid  movement  of 
production  and  consumption.  In  addition,  this  evolution  requires  a  dimension  of 
solidarity  to  secure  collective  material  contentment.  The  USA is  to  Romier  an 
example of this circulating wealth. 
According to  Romier  the only risks of  material  contentment  lies in  its  finite 
character.  Material  prosperity  is  no final  destination,  the main conceptual  goal  is 
progress, be it economic or scientific. A crucial task for the future is therefore what 
Romier  calls  the  deproletarisation  of  the  masses:  to  educate  society  on its  moral 
virtues, develop the talents of the individual and thereby allow it independent work. 
Romier's abstract analysis concludes with guidelines for future development in two 
main positions: the “position novatrice” and “position conservatrice” (innovative and 
conservative  positions).514 The  innovative  position  stresses  the  importance  of 
education for society, particularly regarding science and economics. The conservative 
position highlights the necessity of supporting society's cultural dimension in light of 
mass-economical  changes.  This  includes  promoting  intellectual  work,  supporting 
families and encouraging charity. Romier concludes by suggesting that only the role 
of education and families can positively influence the future. 
The “peuple riche”- prosperity for France
Qui sera le Maître? provides the analytical backdrop for Idées très simples pour les  
français which were published one year later. In Idées très simples pour les français  
the approach is less analytical and more pragmatic, providing a clear proposal for the 
513  Idem., p. 218.
514  Idem., pp. 207-239.
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development of France, particularly its economy. The necessity for change derives 
from the evolution of the masses on the one hand and the relative backwardness of 
France  on  the  other.  Romier's  preliminary  remarks  are  based  on  describing  this 
backwardness,  judging France by its lack of prosperity and effectiveness.  Romier 
feels that France has missed out on the mechanization and modernization movements 
of the early 20th century and is 50 years behind in comparison to other nations.515 
France is currently what Romier considers a “peuple arrière”, a backward populace, 
branded  by  the  “développement  du  machinisme”516 (development  of  machinery). 
Despite this backwardness, France however shows enormous potential and Romier 
argues that if France had a competitive economic environment it would surpass other 
nations.  Whenever a  French person is  actually  part  of  such an environment  in  a 
foreign country he/she excels,  or as Romier  puts  it:  “[...]  il  prend rapidement  de 
l'avance dans toutes les carrières.”517 These passages by the author here relate to the 
dimension of superiority in the creation of national identity. As already elaborated 
previously,  national identity is  fundamentally based on the comparison between a 
“self” and an “other” and an apprehended hierarchy between them. The supremacy of 
the “self” is supported through this comparison with the “other” while at the same 
time being defined by it. This dimension of hierarchy relates to the constructivist idea 
of how agency constitutes structure as a form of collective identities (see section 
3.1.2.). By claiming that French people automatically surpass others in competitive 
economic environments/conditions, Romier establishes the superiority of the French 
national identity. Romier thus imminently bases this sense of “Frenchness” on the 
constructivist conception of hierarchy. “Frenchness” figures as shared belief of an 
underlying  supremacy of  the  French  national  identity  based  on an  irrational  and 
moral  argumentation-framework.  In  a  constructivist  sense  Romier  reinforces  his 
perception  of  the  French  national  identity  through  means  of  hierarchy,  which  is 
therefore a clear example of how agency can constitute structural identity. 
In order to deliberately exploit the potential of France and its population, Romier 
argues that it is first necessary to inventory the current state of the nation. Romier 
therefore considers “ce qu'il faut demander d'abord”518: the most prevailing French 
socio-economic  problems.  In  this  sense,  particularly  the  social  distribution  and 
515  Romier, Idées très simples pour les français, p. 10.
516  Idem., p. 9.
517  Ibid.
518  Idem., p. 13.
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infrastructure  in  France  are  of  Romier's  main  concerns.  He  argues  that  the 
overpopulation and lack of commodities in the cities are the main reason for the 
deficient birth and elevated mortality rate. He demands an organised development of 
the  urban  areas  as  they  inherently  determine  the  development  of  society.  Social 
progress is inevitably tied to the job opportunities and housing-standards the cities 
provide. Especially the banlieu, the suburbs of the cities, are poorly urbanised and 
bear the risks of accidents and epidemics. They consequently need to be adapted to 
the  needs of  the  workers.  This can only be  achieved though urban planning and 
legislation which improves transport and communication between suburbs and city 
centres. These urban difficulties relate back to the economic masses, as Romier had 
described them in  Qui sera le Maître?. According to Romier every country in the 
world faces these infrastructural difficulties, with the exception of the USA where 
urban development has preceded population growth.519 
After this inventory of the French grievances, Romier proposes his guide for the 
French progression and the sustainable creation of wealth or as he calls it: “comment 
on fait un peuple riche”520 (how to create a prosperous/wealthy society). Similar to 
the work of Julius Hirsch, the concept of prosperity thereby serves as a central goal 
for the evolution of French society. This prosperity can mainly be achieved through a 
combination  of  increased  education,  rationalisation  and  production.  Economical 
mechanisation  and  improved  work-organisation  can  lead  towards  a  higher  living 
standard -  the ”peuple riche”521 (wealthy society). For Romier, economic progress is 
thereafter  a  combination  of  an  increase  in  salaries  and  production,  with  a 
simultaneous  decrease  in  retailing  prices.  Mechanisation  and  standardisation  will 
lead to a higher economic output per worker. As Romier puts it: “C'est vers là qu'il  
faut aller”522 (this is the way we have to go). For these processes, the USA serves as 
clear  example.  Romier  argues  that  mechanisation  has  led  to  higher  productivity 
which,  in  return  has  increased  salaries.  The  pronounced  work-specific 
education/technical  instruction,  combined  with  the  collective  will  for  material 
progress have led to the material success of the USA. According to Romier “nous 
pouvons faire aussi bien qu'eux, et même mieux, [...]”523- we can do as good as them, 
519  Idem., p. 25 & 30.
520  Idem., p. 37ff.
521  Idem., p. 40f.
522  Idem., p. 42.
523  Idem., p. 41
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if not better. Romier thus underlines the potential supremacy of France and refers to 
it  as  “we”,  portraying  himself  as  part  of  the  “in-group”.  From  a  structural 
perspective, France can and should thus incorporate the positive characteristics of the 
American-model and will  not surrender the supremacy of its national identity i.e. 
“Frenchness”. The American-model, which has been created through adapting to the 
“masses  économiques”,  is  thus  the  perfect  paragon  for  the  reinforcement  of  the 
French national identity. Other countries only provide negative examples, such as the 
Soviet  Union,  which  is  characterised  by  a  de-organisation  of  the  public  services 
according to Romier.524
In  order  to  actually  develop  France  and  create  prosperity  Romier  mainly 
considers  the  rationalisation  of  industry  and  a  development  of  the  national 
infrastructure. He argues that a collective and rationalised approach to industry and 
infrastructure  will  lead  to  stable  growth which  in  return leads  to  a  higher  living 
standard.  Romier  bases  industrial  progress  on  a  combination  of  education, 
organisation and the rationalization of man and machine. Rationalization is thereby 
defined as every man, and every machine - located at the optimal spot- producing the 
highest quantity and quality in the shortest amount of time, with the least possible 
effort and a maximized profit.525 Once again the USA figures as a role model in this 
respect. Romier argues that France possesses all the necessary preconditions to apply 
rationalization methods and relates his  ideas to the politics of Raymond Poincaré 
who  supported  the  “rationalization”  of  the  French  industry,  aiming  for  lower 
production  costs,  more  revenue  and the  protection  of  the  market  against  foreign 
concurrence. Overall the rationalisation of industry is the aggregation of methods to 
increase  industrial  output.  This  clear  focus  on  rationalization  shows  multiple 
connections  to  Romier's  biography  and  the  prevailing  argumentation  of  the 
Redressement  Français.  The Redressement  Français  i.e.  French Recovery  was,  in 
essence, a rationalization-movement which intended a productivist modernisation of 
France. It was thereby the main voice of French pro-Americanism as it channelled 
demands  for  industrial  productivity  and  mass-production  modelled  after  the 
functioning American mass-society.  Together  with Ernest  Mercier,  Lucien Romier 
spear-headed the intellectual reform proposals for the French economy and voiced 
them in the publishing platform Cahiers du Redressement Français. Lucien Romier's 
524  Idem., p. 95.
525  Idem., p. 63.
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arguments in  Idées très simples pour les français  hence not surprisingly coincide 
with the propagated suggestions of the Redressement,  especially because they were 
published  as  part  of  the  Cahiers.  Romier's  call  for  rationalisation  and  industrial 
progress  are  thus  an  imprint  of  his  affiliation  with  the  Redressement and  a 
representation of the predominant pro-Americanism. A positive image of the USA is 
in  this sense just  as much a reflection of his  personal  subjective convictions and 
experiences as it is an objective assessment of American influences.
This interweaving of personal narration and political fruition is also reflected in 
the final part  of  Idées très simples pour les français.  Here Romier  elucidates  his 
political conception of the French future. His work thus concludes with the political 
implementation of the reform suggestions he developed in the main part of his book. 
He consequently argues that any form of multi-layered economic progress needs to 
be supported by political stability and effectivity or as he calls it “une politique de 
réalisation”526 (politics of realisation). For Romier, this political realisation can hardly 
be  implemented  through  parliamentarianism.  Any  functioning  parliamentary 
structure  could  and  should  only  consist  of  a  two-party  system,  according  to  the 
author.  France  however  currently  aggregates  multiple  parties  which  has  led  to 
political  fragmentation and hindered executive decision making.527 On top of that 
French parliamentarism is challenged by the evolution of Marxism which intends to 
destroy  the  socio-economic  framework  of  the  parliamentary  structure.528 As  a 
consequence  Romier  therefore  calls  for  a  “union  nationale”  (national  union),  a 
collective committee of functional elites with executive political  power. His main 
purpose is to limit the power and involvement of the state and decentralise France: “il  
n'est qu'un moyen de fortifier l'État, c'est de limiter sa fonction”529 (the only means to 
fortify/strengthen a state is to limit its function/power). Romier perceives the state 
merely  as  guarantee  of  individual  liberty  and  collective  progress.  The  “union 
nationale” can consequently remove the political power from the legislative and rest 
it on a more functional executive framework. This can solve ongoing problems such 
as  the  financial  instability  of  the  Franc  more  effectively.  The  national  union 
additionally figures as counter draft to Marxism and can guide France “au fond de 
526  Idem., p. 105.
527  Idem., p. 112ff.
528  Idem., p. 114.
529  Idem., p. 126.
156
ʻl'expérience Poincaréʼ ”530 (to the heart  of the ideas of Poincaré).  Romier's final 
passages  are  thus  once  again  intertwined  with  the  ideological  objectives  of  the 
Redressement Français and the historical  circumstances.  The creation of a “union 
nationale” was one of the cornerstones of the Redressement's political precepts. It 
merged  their  oligarchic  tendency  and  aspirations  for  industrial  modernisation. 
Thereby anti-parliamentarianism was as much a directive of the Redressement as the 
endorsement of minimal state-involvement. The Redressement's political influence 
was mainly constituted through their proximity to André Tardieu, who was minister 
of interior in the cabinet of Raymond Poincaré by the time Idées très simples pour  
les français  was published in 1928. Romier's referral to the “expérience Poincaré” 
therefore in essence relates to the political design of Raymond Poincaré which was 
characterised by financial austerity and economic stabilisation. 
In conclusion, Romier's reflections in Idées très simples pour les français exhibit 
a close relationship to his membership in the Redressement Français as well as larger 
connections to  the historical  circumstances.  Therefore,  both his  positive America-
image  and  pro-American  attitude  imply  a  subjective  component.  Intellectually 
Romier's  Idées très simples pour les français  is  comprised of reform proposals for 
France and intends to create a “peuple riche”. This “peuple riche” essentially centres 
on the rationalisation of the French economy through an application of American 
developments. Romier's conception of “Frenchness” and the general construction of 
the French national identity is thereby based on the receptivity of economic processes 
and openness towards modernity. In light of the evolution of the mass-civilization 
France has been forced to adapt to its inevitable demands. The USA thus serves as a 
role  model  to  France  as  the  “American  originality” provides  the  most  successful 
model to cope with the emergence of the “masses économiques”. The USA offers an 
inspiration for the challenges of modernity, more specifically of the mass-society. 
Whilst  the  mass-society  has  influenced the  USA negatively  in  cultural  terms  the 
progressive economical methods of the USA offer a paragon of how to adapt the 
nation  state  to  the  challenges  of  the  masses  and  modernity.  Applying  American 
rationalization  methods  was  thereby  value  free.  It  did  not  challenge  the  French 
national identity or the French self-conception. Romier could repeatedly reinforce the 
moral and intellectual peculiarities of France and thereafter its inherent superiority. 
530  Idem., p. 115.
157
The general supremacy of the French national identity was not challenged through 
incorporating  American  developments,  it  rather  reinforced  and  refined  it  in  its 
outlook for the future. The portrayed pro-Americanism was in this sense a multi-
layered tool to reinforce the French self-conception in its outlook for the future and 
thereby inherently also its national identity.531  
5.2.4. Discussion and Implication of the Research
As discussed above, the America-image and Americanization-perception of Lucien 
Romier can be fully retraced trough his works  Qui sera le Maître?  and  Idées très  
simples pour les français. Whilst the former work investigates the characteristics of 
an emerging mass-civilization, the latter provides a guideline for France on how to 
cope with the mass-phenomena and achieve prosperity. The USA thereby serves as 
main model for the realignment of the French economy according to the needs of the 
masses.  On  a  constructivist  level  Romier  builds  up  the  economic  masses  as  a 
structure  that  fundamentally  changes  political  and social  coexistence.  He thereby 
builds on the insecurity of personal and collective identities which are threatened 
through  a  new  dominant  representation  structure.  French  national  identity  thus 
demands new ways and methods to adapt to these structural shifts. On a cultural level 
the influences of the “masses économiques” figures as structural counter identity. 
Romier creates a need to protect “Frenchness”, - i.e. what it means to be French - 
through  fencing  off  against  the  cultural  consequences  of  an  overarching  mass-
civilization. The USA thereby serves as case study for the investigation of the effects 
of  the  mass-civilization and possibilities  for adaptation.  According to  Romier  the 
USA provides a role model for the ways in which France can adapt to the challenges 
of the mass-civilization without adapting its negative characteristics such as a decline 
of  mores.  The  USA and  the  economic  masses  structurally  overlap,  yet  remain 
separate entities. It is in the French interest to incorporate parts of the American-
model  to  fence off  against  negative  characteristics  of  the masses.  Romier's  work 
Idées très simples pour les français  thereby provides the cultural backdrop. Here a 
clear separation between “Frenchness”, the “American originality” and the “masses 
531  I thereby draw a similar conclusion as Richard Kuisel draws for the post-war period: Kuisel, Seducing the French, 
p. xi & p. 6.
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économiques” is visible. The economic peculiarities of the USA function as paragon 
on how to construct the French national identity according to the challenges of the 
economic masses.  Thereby the use of rationalization and the American economic 
model is  value free,  France wouldn't  lose what it  actually culturally meant  to be 
French, its unique national identity. 
This  subliminal  argumentation  by  Romier  shows  some  similarities  to  the 
prevailing  French  pro-Americanism  of  the  interwar  period.  Particularly 
rationalization  was  a  key  concept  of  the  more  general  French  pro-Americanism. 
Moreover,  rationalization was also the main theme of the Redressement  Français. 
With his work, Romier thus took part in the quest of the Redressement to change the 
French economy and subsequently also its political structure. Another characteristic 
of French pro-Americanism was that rationalization was often used as a shield term 
and  applied  to  the  society  in  general.  Romier  is  clearly  in  line  with  this 
argumentation as he too projects the change of the French economy on the entire 
society. His inherent goal is thereby progress in all areas, including areas such as 
medical  research,  in  order  to  achieve  the  final  goal  of  a  “peuple  riche”,  an 
economically prosperous society. 
Finally, Romier's America-image cannot be fully contemplated without a relation 
to the general historical circumstances. Particularly in light of the ongoing wartime 
debt-negotiations with the USA, economic independence and self-sustainability was 
for  France  more  than  ever  a  priority.  Moreover,  the  First  World  War  and  the 
American  liberation  had  shown  that  there  indeed  existed  new  technological  and 
economic circumstances in Europe to which countries like France needed to adapt. 
Once again, there was a need for self-sustainability of the economy which is reflected 
in Romier's work. With an impaired French economy and American investments in 
France,  the  USA offered  an  economic  model  to  forge  the  French  economy  and 
therewith its socioeconomic reality and national identity. 
5.3. Comparison
The publications by Julius  Hirsch and Lucien Romier show various parallels  and 
differences  on an  argumentative  and constructivist  level.  Both  authors  personally 
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visited the USA and therefore portray what to them was an accurate investigation of 
the American society. Even though their works are not travelogues in an actual sense, 
the experiences both authors had in the USA are the basis for their publications and 
subsequent  America-images.  The  focus  of  both  works  primarily  rests  on  the 
economic  area  and  in  both  cases,  formulates  strong  pro-American  views.  The 
economic approach of Hirsch and Romier is paired with an inherent conviction to 
educate the population and convince it of the necessity for economic progress. Both 
authors call for the adaptation of the American economic model in order to upgrade 
and advance the German and French economies respectively. Argumentatively the 
publications  by  Hirsch  and  Romier  thus  show  many  similarities.  Both  authors 
highlight  prosperity  as  a  central  concept  in  their  works.  To  Hirsch  prosperity  is 
society's main goal towards which all political and economic activity is supposed to 
be geared. Romier's counterpart is the “peuple riche”, an economically prosperous 
society and main socio-economical target. The dominant narratives in the works of 
the  authors  therefore  align.  A key  characteristic  for  the  adaptation  of  American 
economic  methods  is  the  rationalization  concept.  This  explicit  focus  on 
rationalization  is  very  much  in  line  with  the  predominant  pro-Americanism  in 
Germany and France during the interwar years. Rationalization figured as the most 
important  transnational  concept  of  both  circles  during  the  1920s.  It  is  hence  not 
surprising  that  both  authors  are  considered  as  representative  of  their  respective 
debates. The relative commercial success of their works certainly adds to the special 
position both authors take up in their respective debates. 
Besides the prevailing pro-Americanism, both authors however also agree on a 
European superiority over the USA in cultural terms. Hirsch argues that the cultural 
imports of the USA are inferior to what is offered in Germany while Romier states 
that some cultural peculiarities in the USA, such as the American mores, are inferior 
to French morality. Despite minor cultural criticism, the publications heavily stress 
the  importance  and  positive  value  of  the  incorporation  of  American  economic 
methods  in  the  national  economies.  The  starting  point  for  the  assessment  of  the 
necessity of economic Americanization here however differs between both authors. 
Julius Hirsch perceives prosperity as the most important goal for any society and 
thereafter demonstrates how Germany could reach this prosperity through American 
methods. Romier in return investigates the mass-phenomenon and concludes that in 
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order  to  cope with  the  emergence  of  economic  masses  there  exists  the  need for 
economic Americanization. This differing approach is reflected on a hermeneutic and 
argumentative level. Hirsch, as an economist, provides a more factual and statistics 
oriented assessment of the USA and its relation to Germany. Romier being a historian 
on the other hand demonstrates a more belletrist style with less focus on numbers. 
Whereas Hirsch focuses very strongly on the advantages of the American model, 
Romier seems to focus more on France and its potential, for which the USA figures 
as mere guideline. Finally, Romier's work argues for as little state involvement as 
possible,  which  is  coherent  with  the  anti-parliamentarian  orientation  of  the 
Redressement Français.
On  a  constructivist  and  hermeneutic  level  there  exist  an  equal  number  of 
similarities and differences between both authors. The fundamental toolkit regarding 
the construction of collective identities can be equally applied on Hirsch's work as it 
can be on Romier's. It is possible to interpret both works according to the use of the 
ʻwe  vs.  themʼ  paradigm,  as  well  as  the  reinforcement  of  national  and  personal 
identities  on  the  basis  of  identity  insecurities  and  selective  incorporation. 
Functionally,  both  authors  use  the  concept  of  prosperity  to  support  their 
argumentation. Structurally, Hirsch and Romier both create unique national identities,  
“Germanity” on the one hand and “Frenchness” on the other. These structures are 
contrasted with the USA on a cultural level and a prevailing feeling of superiority of 
the own national identity is evoked. National identity is thus in both cases culturally 
re-enforced through hierarchy. Both authors on a cultural level utilize the USA as 
counter  identity  and  use  its  negative  characteristics  to  reinforce  the  positive 
characteristics of their own collective identity. Structural identity is by Hirsch and 
Romier created as inevitable representation structure whose characteristics become 
exaggerated.  The  selective  incorporation  of  economic  American  developments  in 
their  own national identity does not  challenge the essence of the unique national 
identities and is therefore value-free. Romier and Hirsch are thereby both examples 
of the possibility and role of agency in the structure/agency interplay. They both take 
part in the formation of political opinion and try to actively change and influence the 
socioeconomic  reality.  Moreover,  they  voice  the  arguments  of  the  existing  pro-
Americanism of the time, represent their views and thereby figure as agents of whom 
self-determination, independence and representation are its very foundation.  
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Whilst  the  creation  of  structural  identity  is  functionally  similar  in  the 
publications of Hirsch and Romier,  the actual  structures themselves differ. Hirsch 
creates  the  counter  structures  progression  and  stagnation  and  ties  progress  to 
positivity  while  tying  stagnation  to  negativity.  The  structural  use  of  progression 
thereby  allows  the  selective  value-free  incorporation  of  American  methods  and 
developments into the German national identity. Romier on the contrary creates the 
economic  masses  as  overarching  structure  that  influences  societal  coexistence 
completely. The “American originality” constituted the peculiar America approach of 
how to deal with the influences of the economic masses. The American originality 
thereafter figured as structural identity and partial role model for the adaptation to the 
economic masses. The French national identity could be reinforced by the selective 
incorporation  of  American  developments  without  adapting  negative  cultural 
influences.  Whereas  Romier  argues  in  favour  of  a  complete  carryover  of  the 
American originality, Hirsch rather supports selective incorporation of the American 
model.  This disparity  very much represents the general  trend of the German and 
French Americanization-canon. Whereas France was more positive about the social 
effects of Americanization, Germany favoured a partial incorporation of American 
developments, independent of the socio-cultural sphere.  
These  differences  also  extend  to  the  structural  properties  of  the  collective 
identities.  Hirsch  endorses  progress  through  the  construction  of  a  clear  counter 
identity i.e. stagnation. Romier, in contrast, only functionally uses a counter identity 
to highlight the cultural superiority of France. From a constructivist perspective one 
can therefore argue that Romier shows a more structural approach to Americanization 
than  Hirsch.  Romier's  focus  on  the  inevitability  of  the  emergence  of  economic 
masses underlines this very structural approach in the sense that the individual has 
little possibility to resist the structure and its representation grid. Hirsch by contrast 
can be seen as arguing from a more agential angle in the sense that he stresses the 
importance  of  progress,  modernity  and  prosperity,  all  on  the  basis  and  with  the 
inherent goal of self-sustainability.
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6. Anti-Americanism
6.1. Case Study: German anti-Americanism 1918-1933 
6.1.1. General Perspective
German  anti-Americanism  has  a  historic  legacy  that  dates  back  to  the  German 
Romanticism and emerging nationalism during the 19th century. With the turn of the 
century and the First World War, negative perceptions of the USA were amplified and 
altered.  German anti-Americanism became  a  mixture  of  historical  narratives,  the 
consequences of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles as well as cultural  
criticism  of  Americanization.  Culturally  German  anti-Americans  of  the  1920s 
radically  opposed  the  American  lifestyle  and  its  influences  on  German  society. 
Succumbing  to  Americanization  meant  the  downfall  of  the Occident,  therefore 
Americanization had to be fought.532 The following part will address the background 
of  German  anti-Americanism  during  the  1920s  and  review  some  of  its  most 
important authors.
The political background of German anti-Americanism was mainly rooted in the 
legacy of the First World War. Particularly the American President Woodrow Wilson 
became a central enemy-image for German anti-Americans after the war. His role in 
the peace negotiations in Paris and the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles were 
heavily  criticised.  But  even  after  Wilson  ceased  to  be  president  political  anti-
Americanism  remained  vocal.  Particularly  the  financial  power  of  the  USA was 
increasingly  picked  up  by  anti-Americans.  Here  anti-Americanism partly  merged 
with  anti-Semitism as  the political  right-wing argued that  the USA was ruled by 
Jewish capital and had transformed into a Jewish state.533 The political left, mainly 
supporters of the German communist party (KPD), perceived the USA as the most 
important  capitalist  enemy. Especially  the  Dawes-plan  symbolised  the  financial 
dominance  and  influence  of  the  USA and  was  strongly  rejected.  The  USA was 
generally  perceived as  hindering  German social  and  economic  development.  The 
political left argued that the USA was hindering a proletarian revolution whilst the 
532  Egbert Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 269.
533  “Klaus Schwabe: Archäologie des Anti-Amerikanismus.” Access: 29.09.2015, 8pm.
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political right perceived the USA as hindering Germany's return to world power.534
German anti-Americanism during the 1920s, was, however, more than a political 
rejection of the USA on the basis of historical developments. Economic and cultural 
influences  of  the  USA  would  soon  become  the  focal  point  of  German  anti-
Americanism.  Particularly  Fordism  and  Taylorism  with  their  standardization  and 
rationalization processes were perceived as levelling society and destroying creative 
individual  spirit.  Moreover,  mass  production  was  perceived  as  only  focalising 
quantity  which  would  destroy  the  quality  of  the  German  handicraft  tradition.  In 
addition,  industrialization  was  generally  perceived  negatively  due  to  over-
specification and over-specialisation of the workforce, which destroyed innovation. 
The  main  medium  in  implementing  these  new  economic  processes  was  the 
reinvention  of  advertising  which  was  aimed  at  the  masses.  Anti-Americans 
consequently strongly condemned these publicity campaigns and discredited them as 
an attempt to condition the individual taste of people.535 
The cultural dimension of American influences was just as prominent and vocal 
during the interwar years as political and economic forms. Key idea and foundation 
of all cultural criticism was that the USA was a planned society and had no form of 
cultural tradition. In opposition to Europe it was not a naturally grown society and 
could not be characterized as inheriting a culture in the European sense. The values 
the  USA would  choose  as  its  own  form  of  culture  were  money,  success  and 
materialism.  Particularly American materialism was heavily discarded by German 
anti-Americans and remained their most fundamental critique. Materialism was seen 
as  dominating  all  parts  of  American  society,  which  was  symptomatic  for  the 
destructive character of the American model. In Germany, American cultural imports 
such  as  American  movies  or  Jazz  music  had  become  visual  artefacts  and 
representations of American influences and were condemned sharply. Furthermore, 
the supposedly dominant position of women in American society, was perceived as a 
threat to the German value system. Overall, the anti-American discussion regarding 
cultural influences thus centred on the idea that the USA had no high culture and 
would morally corrupt the individual.536





and the conservative political right. Anti-American ideas were transmitted and spread 
through  various  publications.  Especially  the  journal  Die  Tat  (The  Deed)  was  an 
important forum for right-conservative authors. These authors formed a very vocal 
anti-American circle during the interwar years. The most prominent figure of this 
circle was Adolf Halfeld, who formulated his perception of the USA in a travelogue 
entitled  America and Americanism.  Halfeld formulated Americanism as a lifestyle 
that was morally corrupted on all fronts. Other authors, such as Alfred E. Günther 
took a more nationalistic stance. Günther argued that  the most important struggle 
would  be  the  fight  between  nationalism  and  its  enemy  Americanism.  Another 
important  author,  Hermann  Fackler,  particularly  elucidated  what  he  perceived  as 
American  cultural  barbarism.  Paul  Wengraf  debated  the  opposition  of  European 
culture and American civilization and Hermann George Scheffauer,  an American, 
dismissed the mass-culture of the United States. German anti-Americans however 
generally  tended  to  raise  similar  argumentations  which  rested  on  the  lack  of 
American culture, materialism and a loss of individualism.537 These ideas were part 
of a bigger, European anti-Americanism. What was a German peculiarity was the fact 
that, unlike its anti-American neighbours, it had lost the First World War. 
6.1.2. Adolf Halfeld
The German journalist  and writer  Adolf  Halfeld  is  today considered as  the  most 
representative  author  of  the  German  anti-Americanism  of  the  1920s.  The  most 
complete collection on Halfeld's life and work is provided by the German National 
Archives in Hamburg.538 Other biographical information can be retraced through a 
short  autobiography  in  Halfeld's  dissertation539 and  an  entry  in  the  German 
Biographical Archive from 1935540. In addition, there exists a CV in his NSDAP file 
in  the  National  Archive  in  Berlin541,  and  an  obituary  notice  in  the  newspaper 
537  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, 269–314 with further references.
538  ‘Staatsarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg; Shelf Mark 731-8_A 758 Halfeld, Adolf.’
539  Adolf Halfeld, Das Imkergewerbe im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert in den älteren Hannoverschen Landesteilen, unter  
besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Sonderstellung als geldwerbende Marktproduktion im Bauernhaushalt. Eine  
Untersuchung zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Niedersachsens. Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der  
staatswissenschaftlichen Doktorwürde der rechts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Hamburgischen  
Universität, 1921, p. 5.
540  Hermann A.L. Degener, Degeners Wer Ist’s? Unsere Zeitgenossen (Berlin, 1935).
541  See: Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, p. 111, footnote 40 and 41.
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Hamburger  Anzeiger  from 1955542.  Together  with  secondary  sources  the  archival 
materials provide a rather complete overview of his life.543 
Adolf Halfeld was born on 14 September 1898 in Hannover, northern Germany, 
to  August  Halfeld and Friderike née  Schuetze of  protestant  confession.544 Halfeld 
graduated from the Leibniz-School in May 1917.545 After having been in the military 
service since 1916 a hand injury from his youth years hindered his deployment at the 
front in the First World War. In the fall of 1918 he began the study of what we would 
today  call  political  science  (incorporating  law,  economics,  history,  public 
administration, politics and sociology) in Berlin. Halfeld studied three semesters in 
Hamburg, two in Heidelberg and one in Berlin. He received his Ph.D. in December 
1921 in political science at the University of Hamburg. Subject of his dissertation 
was  the  beekeeper  industry  in  the  17th and  18th century  in  Hannover.  His  Ph.D. 
supervisor  was  the  German  national  economist  Friedrich  von  Gottl-Ottlilienfeld 
(1868–1958),  who  was  an  enthusiast  regarding  the  developments  Fordism  had 
initiated  in  the  German  economy,  an  enthusiasm Halfeld  in  no  way  shared  and 
dismissed in his publication of 1927. After completing his studies, Halfeld at first 
became a bank employee in 1922, but quickly changed his career path and became a 
journalist. From 1924 onwards he became foreign correspondent for the newspapers 
Hamburger Fremdenblatt and Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten from New York and 
between 1929 and 1932 from London. His publication America and Americanism is a 
product of his experiences and travels in the USA during this period (1924-1929).546 
 The main newspaper Halfeld worked for was initially, when it was founded in 
1928, a  list  of all  the foreigners that arrived in Hamburg. From 1864 onwards it 
appeared as a real newspaper under the name Hamburger Fremdenblatt.547 In 1932 
Halfeld took over the editorship of the Hamburger Fremdenblatt in Berlin which he 
542  ‘Adolf Halfeld Gestorben’, Hamburger Anzeiger, 1955.
543  Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld Und Georges  
Duhamel’, Peter Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes unter  
Ribbentrop (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1987), p. 314ff; Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, p. 111.
544  Halfeld, Das Imkergewerbe Im 17. Und 18. Jahrhundert in den älteren Hannoverschen Landesteilen, unter  
besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Sonderstellung als geldwerbende Marktproduktion im Bauernhaushalt. Eine  
Untersuchung zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Niedersachsens. Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der  
staatswissenschaftlichen Doktorwürde der rechts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Hamburgischen  
Universität, p. 5.
545  Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel.”
546  Idem., p. 2f.
547  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 276f.
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would keep until 1945.548 In 1943, or possibly earlier, he became the chief editor of 
the newspaper. On 1 May 1933 Halfeld joined the NSDAP. He became a member of 
the  “Mittwochsrunde”  (English: Wednesday-Circle), a  political  round-table  of  the 
ministry  of  foreign  affairs  that  consisted  of  only  members  of  the  press.  It  was 
designed to give journalists more information regarding the Nazi-German position on 
foreign affairs.549 The inherent aim was of course to create a certain synchronization 
of the broadcasts on German international relations. From 1940 onwards Halfeld thus 
had close contacts with the press department of the ministry of foreign affairs.550 
After the Nazis had declared war on the USA in 1941 there was a need for anti-
American propaganda and Halfeld's early writings were rediscovered. He published a 
pamphlet named The USA engages in the world (ger.: Die USA greift in die Welt) in 
1941 and was  co-author  of  another  anti-American  writing  that  was published by 
Friedrich Schönemann (1886-1956). After the Second World War Halfeld translated 
the books Our threatened values by Viktor Gollancz and Plato's American Republic 
by Douglas Woodruf from English into German. These were his last publications as a 
writer and journalist. Until the 1940s he however was part of the editorship of the 
publication  house  Eugen-Diederichs  in  Jena,  Eastern  Germany.  Through  this 
position,  he  took  part  in  the  formation  of  the  ideas  of  the  German-right  in  the 
interwar  period.  Especially  the  journal  Die  Tat became  popular  with  the  young 
conservatives at the end of the 1920s and took a nationalist as well as anti-capitalist 
stand.551 Adolf  Halfeld  died  on  23  November  1955  in  Hannover.552 The  period 
between 1945 and 1955 cannot be accounted for.
Halfeld's work America and Americanism of 1927 was his biggest success as a 
writer  and drew the  attention of  the  America-discourse of  the  time on him even 
though he was no conspicuous or prominent figure of the Anti-American circle.553 
Soon  after  the  first  edition  had  been  published  by  the  publishing  house  Eugen-
Diederichs, a second edition appeared on the market in 1928 in response to the great 
548  For an account of Halfeld's positions in the Hamburger Fremdenblatt see: Jürgen Fromme, Zwischen Anpassung 
und Bewahrung: das ‘Hamburger Fremdenblatt’ im Übergang von der Weimarer Republik zum ‘Dritten Reich’ :  
eine politisch-historische Analyse (Hamburg: H. Christians, 1981), especially 95f, 105f.
549  Peter Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes unter Ribbentrop 
(München: R. Oldenbourg, 1987), 314–316.
550  Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges 
Duhamel,”, p. 3.
551  Ibid.
552  ‘Adolf Halfeld Gestorben’, Hamburger Anzeiger, 1955.
553  Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel,”, p. 2.
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demand.554 Halfeld's main thesis throughout the book was that American society had 
become increasingly mechanised and people had lost their individual freedom. He 
contrasted European culture sharply with the planned mass-civilization of the USA 
and  dismissed  American  influences  and  developments.  According  to  Halfeld  the 
American citizen idealised material success as the only goal in life and saw money 
making  as  the  main  value.  Halfeld  consequently  tried  to  defend  individualistic 
European values against the American mechanisation of life. 
But in what relation does this work stand to his life-experiences? How did his 
lifelong  personal  experiences  influence  his  book  and  ideas?  An  important 
precondition is that  America and Americanism is a travelogue, and thus reproduces 
the actual experiences Halfeld had in the USA during his work as a correspondent for 
the Hamburger Fremdenblatt. Initially it was thus his job that was the reason for him 
to go to the USA. It is also possible that Halfeld wanted to see the USA for himself  
after  his  Ph.D.  supervisor Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld had been vocally pro-
American.  The  decision  to  become an  international  correspondent  highlights  that 
Halfeld had an  interest  in  international  developments.  It  furthermore implies  that 
what  Halfeld  wrote  in  his  publication  cannot  be  assessed  as  “wrong”.  Halfeld 
described his experiences in the USA and what at least for him was an objective 
analysis  of  American  society.  Nevertheless,  what  Halfeld  wrote  in  his  book was 
intended to portray a negative image of the USA. His selection of anecdotes and facts 
was aimed at creating a specific America-image. In this sense, the contemplations by 
Halfeld cannot be seen as being objective or “true” in an absolute sense. They were 
the basis for a conscious selection of facts and developments aimed at fuelling anti-
American sentiments. Halfeld, as he states himself, felt compelled to educate German 
society on American developments and particularly wanted to aim this publication at 
all the Americanization-enthusiasts in Germany.555 
His biography and previous experiences might have influenced this reflection in 
multiple ways. An important personal contact Halfeld had with people in favour of 
the Americanization of German society was during his time as a Ph.D. student in 
Hamburg, considering that his thesis supervisor was an admirer of Fordism and the 
Americanization  of  the  German  economy.  Interestingly,  in  the  blurb of  the  first 
554  Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, in Welche Modernität?, p. 3f.
555  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, 4.
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edition Halfeld declared that his book was an answer to the autobiography of Henry 
Ford, which had appeared in 1922.556 Here one might be able to draw a connection to 
his relationship with his Ph.D. supervisor, who admired Henry Ford. It was people 
like Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld that Halfeld wanted to show what living in an 
American society “really” meant. People who only monitored the USA from across 
the Atlantic did not see the bigger picture. He in this sense took part in the formation 
of political opinion. 
As Egbert Klautke has formulated, the main reason for the success of Halfeld's 
work was probably its timing.557 It was published at the highpoint of people's interest 
in the USA in the 1920s. Multiple publications on the USA including travelogues, 
documentations  and  historical  writings  were  circulating  on  the  German  market. 
Halfeld's book hence hit the nerve of the time.558 It was read by a relatively broad 
public, newspapers published commentaries on his work and people began citing his 
book in their publications.559 One can therefore argue that it became a benchmark and 
standard thesis on the characteristics of Americanism. What is however interesting is 
that the book never got translated into other languages. A possible reason could be 
that as Halfeld's main aim was the education of German society it was enough to 
guarantee the availability of the book in German. Nevertheless, the German language 
was of  course  besides French and English  one  of  the  most  spoken languages  in 
Europe.  In  any case,  the influence of the book in Germany cannot be neglected. 
Maybe it only directly influenced German anti-American intellectuals, but it became 
part of the general America-discourse. It was probably this position in the general 
America-debate  that  made it  possible  for  him to  become selected as  part  of  the 
“Wednesday-Circle”. In 1941, the “Wednesday-Circle” was made up of 18 German 
journalists from different newspapers.560 One can therefore conclude that Halfeld was 
amongst the most influential  journalists of the time regarding the publication and 
broadcasting of Nazi-German international affairs. The explicit anti-Americanism in 
America and Americanism fit into the anti-American propaganda of the Nazis.561 
556  Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, My life and work, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922).
557  Klautke, “Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel,” p. 4.
558  Ibid.
559  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 276.
560  Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg, 314–316.
561  Ibid.
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This touches upon a very interesting development in Halfeld's life, the fact that 
he  became  a  member  of  the  NSDAP562.  The  relation  between  his  NSDAP 
membership and his proclaimed anti-Americanism raises some interesting questions. 
As  we  have  seen,  Halfeld's  main  thesis  was  the  comparison  between  the 
individualistic  European  society  and the  mass-society  of  the  USA.  Clearly  when 
writing his book in 1927, any loss of individual freedom and becoming part of the 
state's  mass-civilization were Halfeld's  deepest  fears.  Six years  later,  however,  he 
entered the NSDAP, a party that promoted the culmination and perversion of the 
mass effect. The complete homogenization and submission of the individual under 
the state were central characteristics of Nazi ideals. What could be possible reasons 
that Halfeld became part of what he had so rigorously dismissed only a couple of 
years earlier? It is most likely that Halfeld saw the Nazi-ideology as a protector of the  
“real German values”. In his book, he explicitly states that the USA had succumbed 
to a certain culture-feminism, an effeminacy, and was in no way a “Volk”, an ethnic 
nation, as Germany was. The Nazi-ideology was particularly based on the idea that 
Germany was a unique and superior ethnicity and the male had a dominant role over 
the  female.  In  this  sense,  the  Nazis  offered  the  institutionalization  of  the  values 
Halfeld  adhered  to,  which  is  a  possible  explanation  for  his  membership  in  the 
NSDAP. His conviction was possibly also rooted even deeper,  such as the racial 
structure the Nazis propagated or he was just fascinated by the new possibilities and 
prospects the party offered.  There is not enough evidence to answer this question 
definitively; however,  bearing in mind the position Halfeld takes in his book, the 
Nazis probably offered the protection of the German cultural  values he felt  were 
endangered through Americanization.  
Another factor of Halfeld's life which has a direct impact on his book is the fact 
that  it  was  published  through  Eugen-Diederichs,  the  publishing  house  for  which 
Halfeld would later become a regular and important  writer. The publishing house 
itself leaned towards the conservative-right of the Weimar Republic. The publishing 
house was for Halfeld, therefore, a channel to highlight a specific political stand. In 
addition, Eugen-Diederichs was a mediator to create public awareness for his book in 
a circle that would be receptive to his ideas.  As Halfeld stated in his book, it was 
aimed  at  those  who  seemed  to  have  a  wrong  understanding  of  the  USA.  He 
562  Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
170
consequently  intended to  reposition  the  understandings  of  particularly  those  who 
welcomed American developments such as standardization-processes of Taylorism 
and the mass-production of Fordism in the German economy. Nevertheless, the book 
was  of  course  also  aimed  at  society  as  a  whole;  Halfeld  inherently  stressed  the 
educative and enlightening purpose in his writing. The ideological proximity to the 
publishing house Eugen-Diederichs however suggests that Halfeld was also aiming 
his publication at like-minded anti-Americans. 
Generally, the success of Halfeld's book can be largely explained through the 
fact  that  it  touched  upon  a  prevalent  sentiment  in  the  German  society.  Halfeld 
consciously played with the political dismissal of the USA which essentially had its 
foundation in the First World War. The legacy of Versailles was part of the public 
discourse and had the potential  to evoke a  very negative image of the USA (see 
section 4.3.). Halfeld seemed to have been successful in resuscitating those emotions. 
The nostalgic  tendencies and the romantic  reflex that  the “good old times” were 
fading was in  addition a strong narrative in German society throughout  time and 
space.563 This inherent nostalgia was combined with progress-pessimism and jointly 
formed the fertile soil on which the anti-American tree grew, whose seeds Halfeld 
had carefully sown.
The  anti-American  sentiment  Halfeld  touched  upon  was  rooted  deep  in  the 
German collective subconscious. It went back to much larger, German and American 
international  relations  and  their  developments  for  over  two  decades.  Halfeld’s 
forecasts  were to  be later  fulfilled  in  the  sense that  the  economic  crisis  of  1929 
rocked the German economy hard. The close economic and financial  connections 
between  the  USA and  Europe  plunged  Western  Europe  into  a  deep  depression. 
Halfeld must have seen all his predictions come true as Wall Street's Black Thursday 
triggered the global depression, despite its origins reaching further back in time. In 
light of the economic depression, the Nazis gained support as they seemed to offer an 
answer to the German problems. Conscription gave people work and rearmament 
stimulated the economy. Halfeld in this sense might have seen the program of the 
NSDAP as a general solution to the American problem. 
Whatever the case, it  is apparent that the ideas in  America and Americanism 
cannot be contemplated without bearing in mind the bigger picture. Halfeld's life-
563  Van Elteren, Americanism and Americanization, p. 17.
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experiences shaped what he wrote in the book and the publication of the book in turn 
shaped his further life. In the academic debate the book is nearly entirely investigated 
with regard to German anti-Americanism. Of course, the book played a major part in 
this circle, but was aimed at a larger audience, influenced a larger public and related 
to much wider issues than just the anti-American debate. One could even say that the 
book reflects the entire relationship between Germany and the United States in the 
1920s. Halfeld combined economic, cultural and historical notions that seem to be 
valuable  for  the  entire  German  society  and  compared  them  with  the  American 
society. The book has to be therefore seen in a greater context than it currently is in 
the academic debate. It can be viewed as reflecting the discourse on the United States 
as a political system from a German point of view. 
6.1.3. “America and Americanism”
The  title  and  subtitle  of  Halfeld's  travelogue  suggest  a  very  interesting  point  of 
departure:  America  and  Americanism.  Critical  contemplations  of  a  German  and  
European (Amerika  und  der  Amerikanismus.  Kritische  Betrachtungen  eines  
Deutschen und Europäers)564.  As the subtitle states, Halfeld considers himself to be 
German  and  European.  This  suggests  that  he  contrasts  the  USA not  only  with 
Germany but with Europe in general. He therefore hides behind a European facade, 
supposedly uniform and contrasting with the USA. This European approach was a 
common tool of the anti-American writers of the time to generalize their ideas.565 
Therefore, pretending that the book symbolised a European viewpoint can be seen as 
amplifying the anti-American approach. 
The book itself is divided into six parts. Some preliminary comments that figure 
as  an  introduction,  four  separate  chapters  with  three  subchapters  each  and  an 
epilogue.  The first  chapter  entitled ʻPlanned and developed culturesʼ exploits  the 
different  cultural  history  of  the  United  States  and  Europe  (mainly  focused  on 
Germany) and its impact. The second chapter, ʻForm and landscapeʼ, focuses on the 
American  society's  relationship  to  nature  and  God.  The  third  chapter,  ʻThe 
564  This translation was made by myself as no official translation of the book exists. Furthermore all chapter- and 
subchapter names will also be translated by myself.
565  “Klaus Schwabe: Archäologie des Anti-Amerikanismus.” [accessed 29 September 2015]
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omnipotence of successʼ, elucidates the American values and ideology. The fourth 
and last chapter, ʻIntellectual framesʼ, concludes the publication with a description of 
the role of women and role models in American society.
The constructivist analysis of this source will not judge the statements made by 
the author or investigate their historical accuracy. The main aim will be solely on 
retracing the creation of an America-image and analysing it  from a constructivist 
point of view. The focus will thus be on how the author creates certain structures and 
how those structures impose identities on the individual. Furthermore, the notion of 
how the individual accepts or dismisses these identities will be elucidated and what 
his/her possibilities are to create structural identity. Thereby the source will not be 
investigated  chronologically,  we  will  look  at  certain  dominant  narratives  that 
reappear throughout the book and use examples from different parts of the source to 
illustrate  the  author's  argumentation.  The  focus  thus  mainly  on  three  dominant 
narratives  of  the  author  which  are  the  key  fundamentals  of  his  anti-American 
argumentation. The first narrative is that the USA is a planned society and how it 
contrasts  with  the  idea  of  Germany  as  one  ethnic  nation,  a  “Volk”.  The  second 
narrative is the idea that the materialism of the Unites States is compared to the more 
cultural values of Germany. The third and last dominant narrative is the comparison 
between  the  characteristics  of  American  mass-society,  opposed  to  German 
individualism. These three dominant narratives encompass the entire argumentation 
by the author and will in the following be investigated from a constructivist point of 
view.   
The American planned society
One of Adolf Halfeld's most persistent and reoccurring arguments is that America has 
no history and does not possess any real culture.566 The USA as a nation-state has no 
tradition on which it could base its societal norms. Halfeld perceives the main reason 
for this lack in culture in the fact that the USA is a planned society. It can only exist 
through  rational  planning  as  it  has  no  historical  experiences  it  may  base  its 
orientation  on.567 This  society's  only  goal  is  development  and  development 
566  Halfeld, Amerika und der Amerikanismus, p. 6.
567  Idem., p. 10.
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fundamentally  contradicts  the  idea  of  “Volk”,  a  nation  which  is  based  upon 
traditions.568 Halfeld thus constructs a vision of the United States through the use of 
American characteristics that are not inherently negative. Development and progress 
for example have, by pro-Americans, been classified as very positive for any society. 
Halfeld however roots those notions in a much larger framework and creates the idea 
that  those  characteristics  are  a  representation  of  the  absence  of  culture.  The real 
America culture, as it may have been developed through the colonisers, only remains 
in  fragments.569 These  fragments  came  from  a  Europe  that  had  a  long  cultural 
tradition  and  was  therefore,  as  such,  more  than  only  a  continent.570 From  a 
constructivist point of view, Halfeld here figures as an agent who acts based upon his 
particular assessment and perception of the USA. He, on the one hand, creates the 
structure  of  Americanism  which  is  lacking  real  culture  and  on  the  other  hand 
“Europeanism”571 which  has  a  long  cultural  tradition.  This  European  structure  is 
attributed a strongly positive moral value. Halfeld implies that European culture is 
congenitally better than the American one. This not only gives European culture a 
special  standing  but  also  devalues  American  culture  and  thus  the  structure  of 
Americanism.  This  structural  opposition  of  Americanism  and  Europeanism  is 
connected  through  the  constructivist  conception  of  collective  identities.  Halfeld 
argues that if German society were to let itself be Americanised, it would not serve its 
motherland.572 His assessment highlights how a rejection of American influences is 
actually required in order to strengthen a feeling of national identity. Conceptually 
outside influences from another structure bear the potential of endangering national 
identities and breaking up this uniqueness. Halfeld suggests his readership that the 
European or German national identity can only be fostered through a rejection of 
everything American. To support this approach the author further claims that Europe 
is losing its own cultural spirit.  Inherently, he thus tries to protect this seemingly 
original  identity  of  Europe  through  writing  this  book.  Again,  a  parallel  to  the 
constructivist  identity  concept  can  be  drawn.  As  developed  in  the  part  on 
constructivist  methodology  the  individual,  in  this  case  Halfeld,  sees  his/her  own 
identity constantly threatened by a new dominant structure. A natural reflex is thus a 
568  Idem., p. 8.
569  Idem., p. 10.
570  Idem., XI.
571  This term is my own creation and not formulated by Halfeld.
572  Halfeld, Amerika und der Amerikanismus, XII.
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defence against this new identity, in this case by the rejection of Americanization as a 
new representation-structure. 
For  Halfeld,  American life  meant  a  step  backward compared to  the  German 
lifestyle. To prove this, he especially draws on non-material values. The idea of the 
German people  belonging to  one “Volk” (ethnicity),  as  opposed to  the  American 
people  who  have  nothing  comparable,  is  developed  throughout  the  book.  The 
American  citizen  has  no  personality  and  can  therefore  have  no  such  thing  as 
ethnicity. The idea of ethnicity, which was of course in its perversion the cornerstone 
of the Nazi ideology, has a historical foundation. This can thus not only be attributed 
to Halfeld but relates to much more general societal narratives. The idea of “Volk” is 
rooted in the German romanticism of the 19th century. German Romanticism, which 
is of course inherently tied to nationalist feelings, was a first foundation of German 
anti-Americanism.573 Halfeld thus again refers to a sentiment in the population that 
goes much further back than his book. He contrasts the irrational idea of “Volk” with 
the American rationality of a planned and uniform society. Moreover, he concludes 
that German culture is fundamentally based on these non-material values.574 It is the 
creative spirit that is constitutive of European culture.575 Education, language and a 
humanist tradition jointly form the European identity. Halfeld hence judges the two 
societies and devalues the American society through the revaluation of the German 
one. 
This  contrast  of  the  American  and  European  society  is  taken  even  further 
through a comparison of the cultural and geographical unity of the two continents. 
According to Halfeld the USA as homogenous society was clearly inferior to Europe, 
as Europe, although fragmented, would symbolise union in its diversity, as opposed 
to the USA which symbolised emptiness in its unity.576 Germany is for Halfeld the 
centre  of  Europe  and  thus  the  most  important  fragment.  It  is  the  creative  spirit, 
irrationality opposed to logic,  which is  preferable to the standardization of life.577 
Notice again that Halfeld draws on subconscious and irrational concepts to create a 
sense  of  European  identity.  This  common  identity  is  however  only  constituted 
through the dismissal of American values. Therefore, automatically whatever is bad 
573  Van Elteren, Americanism and Americanization, p. 17; Diner, America in the eyes of the Germans, pp. 31–51.
574  Halfeld, Amerika und der Amerikanismus, p. 32.
575  Idem., p. 33.
576  Idem., p. 48f.
577  Ibid.
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in the United States is the exact opposite of what happens in Europe, which is in turn 
automatically  good,  because  different  from  the  USA.  The  structure  of 
Americanization is therefore also constructed as inherently bad, because it is different 
from Europe. This European identity could from a constructivist perspective function 
as the counter-structure to Americanization, which even though possibly endangered 
has  the  possibility  to  overcome  Americanization.  Through  uniting  the  European 
population under one structure, Halfeld uses the second constructivist paradigm of 
identity creation: agency constituting structure. The autonomous individual values 
European  peculiarities  over  American  ones  and  creates  the  structure  of 
“Europeanism”. What this would suggest is that the only possibility the European 
individual  has  to  withstand  Americanization  is  through  the  collective  of 
Europeanism. This is highlighted through the concluding words of the first chapter. 
Halfeld states that the norms of Americanization are incompatible  with European 
society.578 The two structures he creates in his work are thus mutually exclusive .  A 
natural conclusion is that the individual has to choose the structure he/she wants as 
dominant  identity  representation.  Halfeld himself  suggests the absolute  merger in 
Europeanism which fundamentally symbolises the rejection of all American values.  
Another important example Halfeld uses to elaborate the planned culture of the 
USA is the relationship between its ideology and societal reality. Especially regarding 
the  constructivist  concept  of  identity,  some interesting  conclusions  can be  drawn 
from this. According to the author Germans are capable of combining reality and 
ideology, whereas Americans make their ideology the basis of reality.579 Halfeld here 
performs image-creation of the United States through comparison with Germany. He 
creates identity through structural rejection, another key constructivist concept based 
on  the  we-vs.-them  dichotomy.  As  individuals  value  certain  characteristics  over 
others they adhere to a certain identity. Identity, in turn, can thus not exist without its 
counterpart.  Identity  cannot  constitute  itself  without  the  other.  The  criticism  of 
Americanization is hence not only a dismissal of American norms and values but it 
also figures as a tool to define and formulate what exactly the specific European and 
German identity is. Through demarcation with the USA Halfeld formulates what for 
him the actual German identity is he feels endangered. In this sense, we have another 
example of structure constituting agency, but this time from another dimension. It is 
578  Idem., p. 50.
579  Idem., p. 116.
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not  the structure of Americanism that imposes an identity on the individual,  it  is 
through fencing off this structure that individual identity is created. And those new 
individual characteristics are then linked and attributed to the counter-structure of 
“Europeanism”. In this sense, agency in return reconstitutes structural identity.
American materialism
The second fundamental narrative of Halfeld's publication is the opposition of the 
materialism of the United States and the immaterial values of Germany. As already 
elaborated, Halfeld argues that money and making money are the only benchmark in 
the professional life of the American citizen. In Europe and Germany, work itself and 
its contribution to society are perceived as most important.580 Halfeld again uses an 
American development that as such is not negative and contrasts it with Germany in 
such a way that it  attains a negative spin. The materialism of the United States is 
firmly entrenched not only in the American economy but also in the societal world 
view.  This  can  be  viewed  as  part  of  the  general  narrative  that  the  structure  of 
Americanization and the individual become inseparable through the picture Halfeld 
paints of the USA. He even calls the American economy a new form of feudalism.581 
Here the negative notion becomes very apparent. The people are in a dependency 
relationship to the structure. According to Halfeld, the USA had the possibility to 
develop  this  society  through  the  clean  start  it  had  since  the  formulation  of  its 
constitution.582 It  did  not  undergo  different  stages  of  economic  development  but 
began industrialising. Business without moral values was thus the road it took.583 
It is however not only industry which influenced the American economy. Also, 
the  financial  market  and  the  dominant  position  of  Wall  Street  are,  according  to 
Halfeld,  characteristics  of  the  American  economy.584 The  result  is  that  only  few 
people are very rich.585 Interestingly, this actually contradicts Halfeld's idea that the 
American society is completely homogenous and uniform. But this interpretation fits 
580  Idem., p. 25.
581  Idem., p. 37.
582  Idem., p. 38.
583  Ibid.
584  Idem., p. 39.
585  Idem., p. 41.
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in  with  his  argument  that  everyone  has  the  minimum  subsistence to  keep  the 
machinery  of  consumption  going.586 More  importantly,  intellectual  work  is  of  no 
value  in  the  American  society.587 An  enlightenment  that  has  its  foundation  in 
intellectual reflection is hence not possible in the USA.588 The youth will grow into 
the society without questioning its basic premises. The “Homo Americanus”589, as 
Halfeld calls it, is not capable of reflection. The creation of this term is another way 
Halfeld constructs an overpowering conception of Americanization which influences 
the individual. 
An interesting connection is drawn by Halfeld between the importance of money 
and its relation to politics. As money is so important, the influence and effect it has 
are also crucial.590 In the USA, politicians buy votes and money becomes the only 
determinant for social status.591 The author hence implies that money makes people 
corrupt which seems to be the main reason Halfeld keeps coming back to this main 
narrative of money being the only American value. As he ties money to corruption, 
thus moral reprehensibility,  he shows that the key value of Americanization is bad. 
The whole structure is therefore inherently bad as well. The method Halfeld uses to 
create this negative idea of Americanization is through tying every characteristic of 
the structure congenitally to ethics. He uses whatever is morally reprehensible in all 
different  parts  of  everyday  life  and  isolates  it.  These  different  parts  are  then 
interconnected  to  a  para-structure  which  therefore  as  such  has  to  be  morally 
reprehensible. The only identification pattern this structure offers can therefore only 
be  negative.  It  is  the  dark  side  of  the  United  States,  the  systemic  influence  of 
Americanism. 
It is also significant how Halfeld combines the idea of materialism and religion. 
According to the author, religion provides the moral foundation for the American 
paradigm of success.592 What religion and its puritan interpretation suggest is that, 
whenever someone is successful, his/her path must have been righteous. In Europe, 
however, everyone has their own responsibility that allows them to judge whether 
586  Idem., p. 42.
587  Idem., p. 41.
588  Idem., p. 42.
589  Ibid.
590  Idem., p. 72.
591  Idem., p. 72f.
592  Idem., p. 87.
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what they do is good or bad.593 Halfeld here clearly implies that the Europeans, by 
nature,  have  a  sense  of  moral  judgement  whereas  the  religion  in  the  USA only 
legitimises  and  reinforces  the  dominant  narrative.  The  ethics  of  Americanization 
form  an  ideology  that  combines  business  and  God  into  one  all-encompassing 
structure.594 Halfeld claims that even the Church is part of this mass-effect. Because 
of their publicity and propaganda, religion tries to sell its teachings just like the rest 
of the American industry.595 The author hence suggests to the reader that religion, 
again  something  that  as  such should  be  objectively  good  and  right,  has  become 
corrupted through the structure of Americanism. 
The author furthermore makes a more general theoretical comparison of the role 
of  money  in  the  USA,  which  is  opposed  to  the  role  of  money  in  Germany. 
Particularly the strive for material success is perceived very critically and morally 
corrupt.  According  to  Halfeld  all  material  things  lose  their  non-material  value 
through putting a price on them.596 Wealthy American citizens legitimise striving for 
success  through  setting  up  charity  foundations. Money  in  this  sense  buys  moral 
legitimacy.597 Again Halfeld uses positive features such as the setting up of charity 
foundations and attributes them a negative value through tying them to the moral 
benchmark of money corrupting the individual. This can be especially seen through 
his argument that in Europe money is just a tool, whereas in the USA money is the 
ultimate  goal.598 Life,  according  to  Halfeld,  becomes  a  business  for  itself.599 All 
values  are  tied  to  the  central  value  of  success.  It  becomes  determinant  for  self-
realization.600 Here Halfeld again touches upon the dominant narrative of individual 
autonomy. As soon as self-realization is tied to a certain value that is dictated through 
society,  the  free will  and autonomy of  the  subject  are  restricted. Halfeld thereby 
reinforced his construction of Americanism as the dominant representation structure 
that influences all parts of the individual life. 
Another  good example  for  Halfeld's  analysis  of  materialism is  the  American 
education system. Halfeld begins this analysis by stating that education is not an 
593  Ibid.
594  Idem., p. 88.
595  Idem., p. 91.
596  Idem., p. 144.
597  Idem., p. 145.
598  Ibid.
599  Idem., p. 146.
600  Ibid.
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American but a European tradition that came with the first settlers.601 A key idea, 
developed by Halfeld, is that intelligent creativity is incompatible with the ideal of 
success.602 The slowly emerging intellectual layer of writers has no concurrence and 
has  therefore  only  negligible  claims.603 They  are  writers  who  use  literature  as  a 
medium to fight the machine of Americanism and despite showing some tendencies 
of the enlightenment, they do not intend to liberate the mind but rather formulate 
their ideas out of opportunism not systemic criticism.604 Halfeld in addition argues 
that  the  mass-individual  is  the  educational  ideal  of  the  American  society.605 
Furthermore, the educational system is comparable to a machine that focuses more 
on quantity than on quality.  Halfeld moreover makes an explicit comparison with 
Germany and declares that the American academic education is far worse than the 
German one.606 Again through the demarcation of the “other” the German identity is 
constructed and upgraded. Halfeld also again draws on the concept of using positive 
aspects of American society and attributing them with the negative mass-civilization. 
He for example states that the only reason everyone has the right to be educated in 
the USA is to form homogeneity and the uniformity of the coming generations.607  
Halfeld's  cultural  anti-Americanism  culminates  in  his  argument  that  the 
American  society  destroys  all  free  spirit  as  children  are  conditioned through  the 
system.608 Since their birth, children are indoctrinated with the American values of 
infallibility. What the author is trying to suggest through this account is related to the 
constructivist agency debate: whether the individual has the possibility for autonomy 
regarding  the  structure.  Normally,  the  educative  system is  supposed  to  form the 
autonomous and free will of the individual. If his educational system however fails it 
is impossible for the individual to attain a degree of self-determination that will allow 
him/her to question existing structures. Through the educational system, the structure 
of  Americanism  is  thus  constantly  reinforced  as  all  possible  discontent  and 
disagreement are eroded and conditioned through education. 
601  Idem., p. 176.
602  Ibid.
603  Idem., p. 177.
604  Idem., pp. 177–180.
605  Idem., p. 181.
606  Idem., p. 182.
607  Ibid.
608  Idem., p. 185.
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The American mass-society
The third fundamental  narrative relates to the American mass-society which is  in 
opposition to German individualism. Similar to materialism, which can be found in 
all  parts  of  the  American  society,  the  mass-society  with  consumerism,  mass-
production and mass-culture is an equally overarching characteristic. A very good 
example  of  how  Halfeld  describes  this  mass-society  is  his  account  of  how 
immigrants have to undergo a process of naturalization. According to Halfeld, the 
foreigners  undergo  a  rigid  transformation  which  constitutes  the  backbone  of  the 
American  success.609 The  most  important  idea  is  that  through  the  process  of 
naturalization,  the  individual  becomes a  completely assimilated part  of the mass-
civilization. This relates to the question of whether the individual, when confronted 
with a dominant structure, is able to retain his/her autonomy or if a new identity is 
forced upon him/her  through the dominant  representation structure.  What  Halfeld 
suggests is that Americanization is such a strong structure that the individual has no 
chance at all to retain his/her autonomy and individuality. The “old” identity and the 
“new” identity do not overlap; the new American identity is completely imposed on 
the new arrival. In order to become part of society he/she has to give up his/her old 
identity. He/she constitutes his/her new “me” though the structure. This reflects back 
on Halfeld himself. From a constructivist perspective, he thus seems to imply that a 
structure like Americanization leaves the individual no choice for individual freedom.  
Here  the  intrinsic  fear  of  the  individual,  where  his/her  identity  is  constantly 
endangered,  shows  itself.  Halfeld  himself  seems  to  be  threatened  by  the  new 
American values in Germany and feels that his real identity is fading. The natural 
reaction is the attempt to defend the own identity and this is what the author does 
through writing this book. The underlying reasons for the publication hence seem to 
go much deeper than only educational purposes. It is the subconscious fear that the 
autonomy  of  the  individual  is  lost.  The  constitution  of  the  subject  as  a  self-
determining creature is endangered through the structure. And Halfeld sees no way to 
avoid this. The structure in this sense constitutes agency entirely. This is probably 
also the reason why he constructs Americanization as such a strong negative and all-
609  Idem., p. 18.
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encompassing structure. He argues that Americanization completely transforms the 
individual and levels it with the mass-culture.610 Halfeld thus portrays the structure 
exactly as he subjectively perceives it in relation to his personal identity. As he sees 
no possibility for the individual to retaining certain traces of his/her original identity, 
the importance of agency is neglected. Identity-formation is a one-way process that 
makes the individual a product of the structure. 
Halfeld's further remarks on the societal structure of the United States portray his 
idea  of  a  mass-society  that  destroys  individual  identity.  Halfeld  states  that  even 
though the wealthy dominate the poor, the poor are afraid to reform the system as 
they have no self-responsibility and fail to take any initiatives.611 Public opinion is 
formed through the  state.  The collective is  forced  upon the  people.612 This  again 
relates to the idea that structure constitutes agency. This is underlined by Halfeld's 
final  remarks  on  prosperity  as  key  concept  of  American  domestic  politics.613 
Prosperity  and  wealth  do  not  produce  happiness,  so  Halfeld.614 Again,  positive 
characteristics of the American society are  turned around through suggesting that 
non-material values are worth more than material ones. Halfeld explicitly states that 
this  mechanised  American  society  has  mechanised  man,  which  again  underlines 
Halfeld's fear that the individual could lose his/her autonomy and individuality.615 
As we have already seen, Halfeld's account on the link between Americanism 
and religion is very important as it helps to create a mass-society. Halfeld argues that 
religion plays a very strong role in American society. He even argues that the USA is 
counter-secular  as  it  tries  to  develop  a  state  religion.616 Political  functions,  for 
example, require a commitment to religion.617 This argumentation implies that people 
that   hold political  functions  did not  attain them through intellectual  capabilities. 
Halfeld is painting a picture throughout the book where all political representatives 
of the American society are a bad choice to guide society. This of course gives the 
reader the impression that what the American model stands for can only be negative. 
How can a state represent positive values if its representatives do not? Moreover, 
610  Idem., p. 19.
611  Idem., p. 74f.
612  Idem., p. 76.
613  Idem., p. 77.
614  Ibid.
615  Ibid.
616  Idem., p. 80.
617  Idem., p. 81.
182
Halfeld  proclaims  that  there  is  a  strong  religious  fundamentalism.618 This 
fundamentalism denies the principles of the Enlightenment such as the Darwinian 
theory  of  evolution.619 Through  this  account  the  author  constructs  an  image  of 
American society that even denies objective scientific principles such as evolution. It 
is the slave of its own mass-civilization. 
This leads us to what Halfeld calls the “psychology of Americanism”620. Halfeld 
argues  that  people's  physical  and  psychological  features  can  be  regulated  like  a 
machine.621 He in this sense again entirely links structure and individual and denies 
the individual all autonomy. Halfeld shows that rules and values become subject to 
imposition in the American society. Furthermore, from a constructivist perspective 
the influence of the Church could be interpreted as an identification structure that 
overlaps with the structure of Americanism. Religion to a certain extent influences 
the structure of Americanism. What Halfeld once again does, is to extract certain 
characteristics of the American society which, as such, are attributed a positive value 
and turns them around. In this specific case, he combines those characteristics with 
the idea that the individual has no personal freedom and is not self-determinant. 
The  economic  dimension  of  the  mass-society  and  its  implications  for  the 
individual  are  another  good  example  to  investigate  Halfeld's  vision  of 
Americanization. Halfeld argues that everyone's life becomes standardised through 
American values.622 This uniformity of people and goods is responsible that people 
can only live and exist in the collective of society. Looking at those statements from a 
constructivist  perspective,  these  passages  show  how  structure  and  agency  are 
mutually constituted and reinforced. The unification of society under the same values 
is the breeding ground for consumption. And what the American economy offers is 
the mass production that feeds and needs this demand from the mass-society. The 
cultural  and  economic  dimensions  of  Americanization  are  mutually  reinforcing. 
Halfeld's  work  underlines  this  connection.  He claims that  personal  taste  is  being 
conditioned and the whole market is being unified.623 Uniformity becomes a utopia 
through the conditioning and reconstitution of the subject.  
618  Idem., p. 82.
619  Ibid.
620  Idem., p. 83.
621  Ibid.
622  Idem., p. 99.
623  Idem., p. 101f.
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The cultural  sphere is also part of the process Halfeld characterises as mass-
society  and  adds  to  the  concept  that  the  American  collective  principle  is  firmly 
opposed to European individualism.624 Whereas Europe lives a tradition from the past 
into the future, the United States only sees the now. There are no all-encompassing 
contemplations,  only  the  present  counts,  and  this  present  has  to  consist  of 
entertainment to make it liveable.625 As the exceptional is so rare in the American 
lifestyle, people seek the exceptional in entertainment.626 The mass-idols are hyped 
up  through  publicity  and  there  is  a  longing  for  superlatives.627 Through  those 
accounts,  the  author  suggests  how the  individual  has  completely  lost  all  his/her 
preferences  and characteristics.628 The only  entertainment  that  remains  is  what  is 
offered from the structure of Americanism. The boundary between individual and 
collective  has  become  entirely  eroded.629 The  question  the  author  consequently 
implies  is  whether  or  not  Europe  really  wants  to  develop  in  the  same  way.630 
Naturally he states that Europe is individualistic and it is only this individuality that 
allows a  creative  spirit  which advances  society.631 It  is  strongly opposed to  what 
Halfeld calls the “selling, success, service”632 of the United States, where the mass-
effect  has  become the  state  sovereign.633 Especially  the  press and its  propaganda 
reinforce this Americanism. The press is thus misused from the structure to influence 
mass-society, where morality is contrived.634 According to the author it is the Puritan 
spirit  that  is  at  least  partly  responsible  for  these  developments.635 As  there  is  no 
balance between work and leisure, the individual has become void. Pseudo-cultural 
developments  such as  Jazz  music  portray a  spirit  of  life that  is  non-existent  and 
symptomatic of this society.636 According to the author, Jazz symbolises the mass-
mentality- it is no music but simply entertainment.637 The tabloid culture in addition 
represents the levelling of knowledge on the lowest possible plane.  They create a 
624  Idem., p. 228.
625  Idem., p. 229.
626  Idem., p. 230.
627  Idem., p. 231f.




632  Idem., p. 234.
633  Idem., p. 234f.
634  Idem., pp. 236–238.
635  Idem., p. 238.
636  Idem., p. 239.
637  Idem., p. 240.
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dream world for the masses where the quantity of the broadcasts is more important 
than its quality, the optimistic sphere of replacement the mass-society needs.638 The 
author sees no possibility that future generations could be capable of changing this.639 
The American mass-civilization, according to Halfeld, additionally results in a 
mass-citizen that is made part of a homogenous collective, loses all individuality and 
is stunned through entertainment to ignore its mental and emotional emptiness. All 
areas of society are painted black; Americanism is  constructed as a  machine that 
destroys subject autonomy. Whenever Halfeld however refers to the press or Jazz 
music as characteristics of this society he never really goes into detail or analyses the 
different areas. He simply links everything and anything to the idea of mass-society 
and how the individualistic spirit is lost. It is all about creating a feeling, an image of 
Americanism that is per definition negative for society,  therefore Americanization 
has to be a priori a bad development as well. These American developments thus 
oppose  European  individualism.  The  author  himself  states  that  showing  the 
difference between the  USA and Germany through an  objective analysis  was his 
main aim.640 He argues that it is a crucial task to preserve one's own kind rather than 
being taken over by alien components.641 The only thing Europe might learn from the 
USA is its quality of economic adaptability.642 For the rest “Amerika ist Amerika, 
Europa ist Europa”- the USA is the antithesis to Europe.643 
6.1.4. Discussion and Implication of the research
The  analysis  of  the  source  has  rested  on  the  investigation  of  three  dominant 
narratives.  The  opposition  of  American  planned  society  and German  (as  well  as 
European) culture, American materialism as opposed to German immaterial values 
and  American  mass-society  contrasting  with  German  individualism.  Overall,  the 
constructivist  investigation has shown that  the author raises Americanization to  a 
structure which imposes itself on the German identity and endangers the German 
638  Idem., pp. 241–243.
639  Idem., p. 244.
640  Idem., pp. 247, 249.
641  Idem., p. 250.
642  Idem., p. 251.
643  Idem., p. 252.
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cultural  characteristics.  The analysis  has  demonstrated multiple  approaches  where 
one  could  contemplate  the  structure/agency debate.  The  most  dominant  idea  one 
could interpret from the source was that the author perceives the American lifestyle 
as  a  negative  structure  that  influences  individual  identity  and  hence  destroys 
individuality.  American  values  are  imposed  through  dominant  representation 
mediators such as the movie industry and consequently entirely constitute agency. 
The individual becomes a product of the structure.  He/she is not only constituted 
through the structure but in the structure as this structure has become his/her only 
reference  point.  The  negative  structure  of  Americanism  exploits  the  population, 
denies autonomy and is based on a morally corrupt foundation. The materialism of 
mass-civilization  is  reinforced  through  consumer-culture.  And  it  was  in  the 
consumer-culture of the United States that the absolute perversion of lifestyle and 
complete mutual constitution of structure and agency became visible. The structure 
offered mass production and demanded a society that was prepared to consume. The 
society  on  the  other  hand  treasured  consumption  and  craved  material  mass-
production. 
The structure of  Americanism represented an entirely negative perspective  in 
constructivist terms. It had such an impact on the individual that whenever he/she 
would behave negatively it was not him/her personally but rather related to the para-
structure  of  Americanism that  had  conditioned the  individual.  What  Halfeld  thus 
created  was  a  counter-structure.  A  structure  that  was  imminently  opposed  to 
Americanism  and  hence  only  provided  positive  characteristics.  Halfeld  valued 
German characteristics over American ones and saw them in opposition to each other.  
The result was that he created a structure of “Europeanism” or “Germanism” which 
were the positive counterexample to  Americanism. Of course,  one has to bear in 
mind that both structures were created as  absolutes.  Americanism was created as 
entirely bad and with it all its characteristics. The counter-structure of “Europeanism”  
or  “Germanism” was  created  as  all-encompassing  good.  In  reality,  the  American 
society wasn't as Halfeld portrayed it, nor was the German one. Nevertheless, the 
importance here is the reason why Halfeld saw the German identity endangered and 
rejected  American  influences  so  radically.  This  is  something  that  relates 
fundamentally to the historical background of the time. 
As  we  have  seen  in  the  chapter  4.1.  on  the  historical  background,  the  US-
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German  relationship  throughout  the  1920s  was  shaped  by  increasing  American 
involvement in Germany. Be it  through political  negotiations such as the London 
Conference or increasing economic influences through American investments,  the 
USA unmistakably exerted increasing influences in Germany. Together with cultural 
changes, the Americanization of Germany was the subject of public debate. Halfeld's 
work consequently fits in very well with the general Americanization-discourse of 
the time as he debates cultural and economic forms of American influences. Through 
discarding  these  American  characteristics,  he  however  reinforces  the  meaning  of 
Americanization as a concept in the popular discourse. Through formulating what he 
perceives as negative about Americanization, he implicitly defines the concept. Most 
of  his  arguments  were  in  this  sense  neither  new  nor  original.  The  notion  that 
American influences would alter  German society was a dominant narrative in the 
German Americanization-discourse. Criticism of the USA and Americanization was 
equally  prevalent.  Negative  America-images  during  the  1920s  were  politically 
shaped by the legacy of  the First  World War.  Particularly for  anti-Americans  the 
wartime defeat as well as the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference influenced 
negative  America  perceptions.  Revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  became  a 
cornerstone  of  political  anti-Americanism as  much as  it  became a  foreign-policy 
objective  throughout  the  1920s.  Economic  influence  of  the  United  States,  be  it 
through private investments of the Dawes-Plan and reparations-negotiations added to 
the anti-American narrative.  The USA as a new powerful force was perceived as 
endangering Germany's position and identity. Halfeld's publication therefore not only 
reflects the general America-debate and historical circumstances it also mirrors the 
overarching German anti-Americanism. A negative view of the USA combined with 
anti-modernization  tendencies  make  it  apparent  why  his  work  is  perceived  as 
representative of the anti-Americanism of the time. 
One final concluding notion is that the publication by Halfeld not only relates to 
the  historical  background  and  the  debate  on  American  influences,  it  is  actually 
representative of the Americanization-discourse of the 1920s. It cannot only be seen 
as a key work on German anti-Americanism of the 1920s. Even though the book 
paints a very negative view of American influences it nevertheless touches upon all 
notions that were generally connected to Americanization. Through stating that his 
publication is aimed at educating those people that have a wrong understanding of 
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the  United  States  and  its  influences,  he  implies  that  many  people  do  have  a 
wrongfully positive view of Americanization. In this sense, the work represents the 
absolute  ambivalence  regarding  American  influences  in  the  1920s.  Some  people 
perceived American economic influences positively, others, like Halfeld, condemned 
all American influences radically. As Halfeld touches upon all those different notions 
of  Americanization,  he  reinforces  its  understanding  and  reflects  the  entire 
Americanization-discourse of the time. Ironically, it might be exactly his dismissal of 
American influences that drew increased attention on the concept of Americanization 
and reinforced its spread and the Americanization of Germany in return. 
6.2. Case Study: French anti-Americanism 1918-1933
6.2.1. General perspective
Anti-Americanism in the 1920s and 1930s was just as much a French phenomenon as 
it was European or German. In all countries with a high economic output American 
influences  were  perceived  as  very  significant  and  widely  discussed.  Whereas 
England had already felt an increasing Americanization before the First World War, 
France  and  Germany  witnessed  American  influences  in  the  interwar-period  and 
similar anti-American tendencies emerged. French anti-Americanism of the interwar-
period  was  a  combination  of  cultural-criticism  and  a  negative  perception  of 
increasing American-style economic rationalization. Culturally, mass-production and 
standardization were perceived as the main risks of Americanization. Authors such as 
Duhamel  criticised  the  American cultural  imports  and the  exclusively technically 
industrially developed American society whilst lacking moral values. 644 This criticism 
was shared by Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, who published a book in which 
they referred to Americanization as a cancerous disease.645 They were the core of the 
intellectual  circle  called  “Ordre  Nouveau”  (New  Order)  which  would  publish  a 
journal  under  the  same  name.  The  Americanization-discourse  as  well  as  anti-
Americanism  would  thus  mainly  be  proclaimed  through  publications.  The  anti-
644  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, 279–281.
645  Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, Le cancer américain. (Paris: Rieder, 1931). For further information see: Seth D. 
Armus, French Anti-Americanism (1930-1948): Critical Moments in a Complex History (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2007), p. 19ff.
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Americanists of the “Ordre Nouveau” saw Americanization as the main reason for a 
societal  crisis  and  took  an  anti-capitalist,  anti-materialist  and  even  anti-
parliamentarian  stand.  Interestingly  they  had  close  contacts  to  the  German  anti-
Americans publishing their right-conservative ideas in the magazine Die Tat. Both 
circles  shared  the  idea  of  a  European  cultural  heritage  that  opposed  American 
values.646 The highpoint of French anti-American publications was reached when the 
newspaper  Le  Figaro launched  an  investigation  at  the  end  of  the  1920s  if 
Americanization  would  actually  represent  a  danger  for  the  French  culture.  Sixty 
writers, academics and politicians contributed to the anthology which was published 
between November 1930 and February 1931. There certainly existed strong anti-
American voices (18) and fewer pro-American voices (11), the large majority of 34 
contributors however took a neutral position.647 
An  important  characteristic  of  French  anti-Americanism  as  formulated  by 
authors such as Kadmi-Cohen, Octave Homberg or Pierre Laurrent, was the idea that 
France was threatened by U.S. imperialism.648 This imperialism would reveal itself 
through the Young Plan649 and the financial domination of the United States. Indeed, 
France still had a massive wartime debt it owed the United States. The idea that the 
United States was implementing a specific form of imperialism through its financial 
dominance  was  in  this  sense  a  particular  French  anti-American  argument.  Other 
arguments would be very comparable to the German discourse. Octave Homberg, for 
example,  dismissed the increasing share of American movies in France which he 
characterised  as  uniform and  low-level.  Kadmi-Cohen  formulated  a  critique  that 
centred on the idea that the USA would put  quantity  before quality  in  economic 
production.650 
Even though Georges Duhamel had taken a rather radical negative stand towards 
Americanization, authors like Aron and Dandieu still found this criticism too weak. 
They wanted a radical break with the bourgeois tradition and formulated a political 
646  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 281ff, with further references.
647  Idem., p. 283f.
648  Idem., p. 282.
649  The Young-Plan formulated the German reparations-payment obligations on the background of the Treaty of 
Versailles. It had been developed from an international financial committee, chaired by the American Owen D.  
Young, in 1929 and was formally adopted on the 17 May 1930. It stated that Germany had to pay 2 billion 
Reichsmark of reparations annually, was however deferred through the Hoover Moratorium in June 1931 and 
cancelled at the Lausanne Conference of 1932. Whereas the Young-Plan was generally perceived positively, some  
parts of the political right-wing disliked the treaty as the Rhineland had to be cleared of French troops was perceived 
as an economic and military threat. For more information see chapter 4 and footnotes 355 and 386.
650  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, 282f.
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rather than economic or cultural  criticism of Americanization.  Nevertheless,  more 
general  criticisms  prevailed.  French  anti-Americans  proclaimed  the  idea  that  the 
USA had  no  culture  and  would  only  pursue  material  values.  Furthermore,  the 
dominance of the industrial and financial sectors was rejected. The notion that the 
USA had  no  cultural  values  was  very  prominent  and  absolutely  comparable  to 
German anti-Americanism. Whereas Germans argued that the USA had no culture, 
the  French  anti-Americans  would  proclaim  that  the  USA  had  no  civilization. 
Civilization in this sense encompassed all values of the nation as well as the idea of a 
French esprit. Octave Homberg for example contrasted American mass civilization 
with the elitist civilization of France. Henri Ghéon would go even further and claim 
that  the  USA  had  no  civilization  at  all.651 The  standardised  and  automated 
organization of the United States could not be called civilization. 
Overall,  this  criticism  of  American  civilization  would  proclaim  that  people 
would lose their individuality and the individual would become mechanized through 
Americanization. What went hand in hand with those statements was the idea that 
Americanization had led from an emancipation of women to a domination of women 
in  society.  As  we have  seen,  parallel  arguments  were  also  part  of  German  anti-
Americanism. What the contemplation of the French anti-Americanism of the 1920s 
thus  shows is  that  it  was  rather  similar  to  Germany.  Possibly  the critique  of  US 
financial imperialism was stronger in France as well as an occasional combination of 
anti-Americanism  and  anti-republicanism.  Nevertheless,  similarities  rather  than 
differences prevailed between both countries.652 
6.2.2. Georges Duhamel
Similar  to  the German anti-Americanism of the interwar period,  the  French anti-
Americanism  would  also  produce  very  prominent  and  vocal  representatives. 
Particularly  the  French  writer  Georges  Duhamel  published  a  travelogue  in  1930 
entitled Scènes de la vie future653 which became a big success and contained the main 
criticisms  which  French  anti-Americanists  had  raised  in  the  previous  decade.654 
651  Idem., p. 296.
652  Idem., p. 286f.
653  The reprint from 1948 contains a large introduction on the author and his works.
654  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 279f.
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Duhamel's  work summarized the French anti-Americanism of the 1920s and was 
hence for France what  Amerika und der Amerikanismus  had been for Germany, a 
representative manifesto which reflected the spirit of the time. Duhamel's biography 
has  been  well  researched  and  can  be  investigated  through  different  sources.  His 
memoires Lumières sur ma vie655 thereby provide a detailed account of his life. The 
manuscript department of the French National Archives in Paris additionally hold a 
collection of  preliminary versions  of  his  publications  and notebooks.  Information 
about  the  circumstances  of  his  America-voyage  can  be  found  in  Kornel  Huvo's 
publication  Cinq Mirages Américains656.  Among the literature on Duhamel and his 
anti-Americanism  the  article  Kronzeugen  des  anti-Amerikanismus657 by  Egbert 
Klautke stands out. 
Georges Duhamel was born on 30 June 1884 in Paris as the son of a medical 
doctor and former journalist. Even though his parents would change their residence at  
least twice a year Georges Duhamel would soon love particularly the Rive Gauche in 
Paris, the area south of the Seine which was home to an artistic crowd. Duhamel 
received  bis  Baccalaureat  in  1902  and  went  on  to  study  science  and  medicine 
between 1903 and 1909 in Paris. During his studies, he began his first attempts as a 
writer and poet, nevertheless finished his studies as a doctor in medicine in 1909. His 
time at university was accompanied by strive for art and discovery. Duhamel would 
take  part  in  multiple  travels  with  his  friends  through  France,  Switzerland,  Italy, 
Austria and Germany658. He was also a founding member of the “Abbaye de Créteil”, 
a  local  artistic  project  which  would  allow  artists  a  life  free  of  bourgeois 
responsibilities and solely dedicated to their artistic creations.659 He had cofounded 
this commune alongside Charles Vildrac, René Arcos, Alexandre Mercerau and the 
painter Albert Gleizes in 1906 in Créteil, southern Paris. It was here where Duhamel 
picked up the craft of printing which resulted in his first poetic publications in 1907 
and 1908.660 
655  Georges Duhamel, Lumières sur ma vie (Paris; Paris: Hartmann ; Mercure de France, 1944).
656  Kornel Huvos, Cinq mirages américains; les États-Unis dans l’œuvre de Georges Duhamel, Jules Romains, André  
Maurois, Jacques Maritain et Simone de Beauvoir. (Paris: Didier, 1972).
657  Egbert Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, in Welche Modernität? Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich im Spannungsfeld  
nationaler und europäischer Identitätsbilder, ed. by Wolfgang Essbach (Berlin, 2000), pp. 173–91.
658  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future. 2 éd. rev. et améliorée avec introd., analyse,  
notes, jugements et citations par Armand Bottequin. (Audenarde: Sanderus, 1952), pt. Introduction, p. 13.
659  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 8.
660  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 13.
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After literary and literary-critic works in the following years, Duhamel would 
become  “critique  littéraire”,  literary  critic  at  the  Mercure  de  France,  a  literary 
magazine and publishing house that dated back to 1672. In 1912, he would take over 
the editorship of the Mercure where he remained permanently employed until the 
First  World  War.  Next  to  his  literary  ambitions  he  would  nevertheless  work 
accordingly to his education as a doctor in a laboratory. With the outbreak of the First 
World War Georges Duhamel volunteered to be a military doctor at the front. His 
wartime experiences at the front marked Duhamel and he would gain a deeper-rooted 
understanding of human brotherhood. He would process his powerful experiences in 
two publications, namely the Vie des martyrs (1917) and Civilisation (1918). These 
publications marked his literary breakthrough and allowed him to give up his work as 
a doctor and from here onwards only focus on his work as a writer.661 
During the 1920s Duhamel became one of the most popular French writers. He 
would  publish  poetry,  novels  and  travelogues.  The  latter  were  a  product  of  his 
frequent travels, in fact Duhamel travelled several months every year.662 The works 
Le  voyage  de  Moscou663,  Scènes  de  la  vie  future and  Géographie  cordiale  de  
l'Europe664 are all results of this time. His literary oeuvre would increase his public 
acknowledgement  and fame and would  lead  to  his  affiliation and admission into 
several  French literary  academies.  Between 1935 and 1938 he  became executive 
editor of the Mercure de France, after the death of former editor Alfred Vallette. His 
editorship ended in 1938 and he was replaced by Jacques Bernard, because he had 
taken an anti-war stand. After the Second World War Duhamel, as major shareholder 
of the Mercure would appoint Paul Hartman as new executive editor, as Bernard had 
been arrested and tried in 1945 for collaborating with the Nazis. Meanwhile Duhamel 
would resume his work as military doctor in 1940. Subsequent to the liberation of 
France, Duhamel quickly published a series of diverse publications and novels since 
he had not been publishing during the occupation of France. In addition, he continued 
his extensive travels. Nevertheless, his post-war works did not match the success of 
his oeuvre of the 1920s and 1930s. Georges Duhamel died on 13 April 1966 in his 
661  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 8f.
662  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 15.
663  Georges Duhamel, Le voyage de Moscou. (Paris: Mercure de France, 1927).
664  Georges Duhamel, Géographie cordiale de l’Europe. (Paris: Mercvre de France, 1931).
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house in Valmondois as famous contemporary French writer.665
During his creative period, Georges Duhamel published several notable works. 
As already mentioned, Duhamel had his breakthrough as a writer with his works Vie 
des martyrs666 in 1917 and Civilisation667 in 1918. The novels are a clear work-up of 
his experiences as hospital doctor at the front and are to a certain extent an account of  
four  painful  years.  Vie  des  martyrs  (Life  of  martyrs)  reproduces  Duhamel's 
encounters  with  wounded  soldiers,  their  pain  and  their  courage.  He  wanted  to 
demonstrate  the  greatness  and  divinity  of  the  simple  man  in  his  most  severe 
moments.668 Civilisation  follows up his first novel  Vie des martyrs  and depicts the 
fictive story of a mathematics professor at the front and his acquaintances. It is an 
account  of  the  medical  and  technical  advancements  and  developments  at  the 
beginning of the 20th century,  the terrifying butchery of the war and foremost  an 
ironic  criticism  of  the  path  a  mechanised  European  civilisation  had  taken: 
mechanisation  in  combination  with  modernity  were  the  gravediggers  of  Europe's 
potential for progress.669 
Duhamel  was awarded the Prix Goncourt  for  his  novel  Civilisation,  France's 
oldest  and  considered  most  prestigious  literary  award.  In  both  works  Duhamel 
developed one of his key opinions: any mechanic and material society was doomed 
to  fail  and  was  opposed  to  his  ideal  –  a  moral  and  true  society.670 The  idealist 
Duhamel  was  deeply  convinced  that  there  was  a  necessity  for  a  spiritual  and 
humanistic  civilisation,  striving for  the ideals  of  love,  brotherhood and beauty,  a 
“règne du coeur”671 (rule of the heart). In particular, the last words of  Civilisation  
symbolise  Duhamel's  mantra:  “La civilisation  n'est  pas  dans  toute  cette  pacotille 
terrible; et si elle n'est pas dans le coeur de l'homme, eh bien ! elle n'est nelle part.”672 
(There is no civilisation in all this terrible rubbish; and if it is not in the human heart, 
then it  is nowhere.) It  seems like Duhamel was a true idealist  who believed in a 
transcendental human goodness, a pure nature of man, which had been failed by a 
665  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 9.
666  Georges Duhamel, Vie des martyrs, 1914-1916. (Paris: Mercure de France, 1950).
667  Georges Duhamel, Civilisation, 1914-1917 (Paris: Mercure de France, 1918).
668  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 20.
669  Ibid.
670  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 10.
671  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, 21.
672  Idem., p. 20f.
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mechanised system but did inherently and unmistakeably carry the natural potential 
for benevolence, a divine spark. 
This idealism could also be found in his  La possession du Monde673 where he 
argued that happiness was based on profound and all-encompassing knowledge of 
things. The means to achieve this enlightenment was to focus on one's surrounding, 
nature, animals and first and foremost brotherhood.674 Duhamel hence recognized a 
moral  value  grid  that  was  cast  like  a  fishing  net  over  our  very  existence  and 
interactions. The idealism merged with romanticism in his multivolume novels  Le 
cycle de Salavin675 and  La Chronique de Pasquier676. The apparent humanism and 
moralism  of  Georges  Duhamel  in  his  novels  probably  relates  back  to  his  war 
experience.677 As already mentioned the wartime experiences as a military doctor had 
a strong impact on Duhamel and reassured his beliefs of the importance of moral 
values and human charity.  It seems that this humanitarian conviction was already 
existing in his adolescence, hence his choice to study medicine – a subject based on 
helping and curing other people – on “doing good”. In addition, the field represents 
what  seemed  to  have  been  crucial  for  Duhamel:  personal  enhancement  through 
education  on  the  one  hand  (as  seen  with  La  Chronique  de  Pasquier)  and 
humanitarian brotherhood on the other (as seen in Vie des martyrs and Civilisation). 
The moralism and philosophy of Duhamel is not only carried by humanitarian, but 
also metaphysical beliefs. Even though Duhamel was no believer in the church, he 
contemplated metaphysical paradigms such as the purpose of being. The result was 
his moralism and the “règne du coeur”, a love for society resting upon the native 
goodness of people.678 
A work which combined Duhamel's ideals of morality and goodness with his 
anti-mechanization beliefs in his early works is his travelogue Scènes de la vie future. 
The book is the result of Duhamel's travels through the USA in the autumn of 1928 
with the intention of studying the American way of life which was in Duhamel's eyes 
the future for the European society.679 In the Scènes de la vie future Duhamel strongly 
673  Georges Duhamel, La possession du monde. (Paris: Mercvre de France, 1919).
674  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 21.
675  Georges Duhamel, Vie et aventures de Salavin. (Paris: Mercvre de France, 1958).
676  Georges Duhamel, Chronique des Pasquiers. (Paris: Gallimard, 1974).
677  For further information of Duhamel's moralism and philosphy see: Arlette Lafay, La sagesse de Georges Duhamel 
(Paris: Minard, 1984).
678  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 20f.
679  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 9.
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dismissed the developments he  saw in the USA. He thereby did not  criticise the 
American  people  as  such,  but  rather  radically  criticised  ʻAmericanismʼ  as  social 
model.680 His  main  points  of  criticism  were  the  supposedly  mechanised  society, 
particularly the machine- and mass-culture,  its materialism and the lack of moral 
values.  Duhamel as moralist  and humanist  sharply contrasted the American mass 
culture  with  European  individualism.  In  the  USA,  the  actual  improvement  and 
education  of  the  self  were  disprized  for  the  intoxication  of  society  by  mass 
entertainment, such as the American movie industry and the commercialization of 
recreational activities like sports. 
Naturally  the  personal  experiences  of  Duhamel  influenced  his  opinions  and 
beliefs and by that also his literary work. As we have already touched upon Duhamel 
must have always felt a strong altruism, hence his decision to study medicine, which 
particularly demonstrates itself when he decided to volunteer as a military doctor in 
the First World War. It seemed to have been this wartime trauma that had a crucial 
impact  on  Duhamel's  convictions  and  consequently  the  literary  processing  in  his 
books. Particularly the works La vie des martyrs and Civilisation touched upon some 
important fundamentals which would later also form the canon of the  Scènes de la 
vie future: on the one hand that systemic mechanisation would destroy society and on 
the other that everyone needed moral ideals in life. This idealism, moralism as well 
as  anti-modernisation and -mechanisation was then taken up in  Scènes  de  la  vie  
future and projected onto the USA. 
The Scènes de la vie future however relate to larger narratives than the personal 
experiences  by  Geoerges  Duhamel.  One  of  Duhamel's  main  ideas  is  that  the 
American citizens would lose their personal freedom through Americanism which 
signified the uniformity and lack of individualism of the human being. This very 
particular idea and importance of “personal freedom” is a dominant structure in the 
French cultural canon. The birthplace of modern day France, the French Revolution 
in 1789 was a strive for personal freedom against the tyranny of a given political 
system. This very French contestation of an oppressive system that takes away the 
personal freedom can also be retrieved from the  Scènes de la vie future.  Here an 
oppressive American way of life leads to a levelling of the individual and loss of 
autonomy. This importance of personal freedom and uniqueness of the individual for 
680  Idem., 10.
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Duhamel  also  relates  to  his  various  travels.  These  travels  were  a  mediator  for 
Duhamel to explore the world and consequently enhance the individual personality; 
most of all they were a sign of freedom. Travelling meant “libération” to Duhamel, 
liberation and emancipation. 
As already considered in the case of Adolf Halfeld, the observations by Duhamel 
are neither true nor false in an absolute sense. Duhamel deliberately picks anecdotes 
and encounters  in order to convey a negative picture of the USA. Duhamel wanted 
to convey a negative picture of the USA because it opposed his ideologies. The book 
had an educative purpose and intended to warn the French public about the dangers 
of  Americanization  and  to  a  certain  extent  even  modernisation.  These  anti-
modernisation tendencies were thereby partly rooted in an early romanticism.
Duhamel's ideas in Scènes de la vie future were taken up very positively and the 
book became a bestseller in France. Some of the positive reactions included Edmond 
Jaloux (1878-1949) who saw Americanism as the total destruction of French moral 
and social existence.681 Gaston Picard built on Duhamel's criticism and argued that he 
was tired of all those who perceived American influences as something positive. 682 As 
already mentioned Duhamel's criticism was taken up and reproduced by authors such 
as Kadmi-Cohen, Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu who perceived Americanism as a 
cancerous disease which had to be eroded. They took a strong anti-material and anti-
capitalist stand and combined it with anti-parliamentarian thought.683 Nevertheless, 
there also existed some criticism of Duhamel. Jean E. Erhard for example stated that 
Duhamel failed to understand the American society and was lacking sensibility by 
condemning everything American,  from slaughterhouses  to  American  football,  as 
forms of entertainment. He had completely enclosed himself and was thus unable to 
judge the USA.684 Jacques de Lacretelle added that the American way of life was not 
the future for Europe, it represented a parallel societal evolution. It was particularly 
impressive because the American pioneers had levelled the European developments 
of 500 years in only 150. Lacretelle also developed that it was important to partly 
disregard the own cultural prejudices whenever travelling and openly discover the 
new culture.685 
681  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 31f.
682  Idem., p. 32.
683  Klautke, Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten, p. 281f.
684  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, 30.
685  Idem., 30f.
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Generally, however, the Scènes de la vie future were taken up very positively and 
became a success. This can partly be explained by the timing of the book, published 
at  a highpoint of French interests  in  the USA.686 The book was thereby not only 
aimed at like-minded anti-Americans, but at the French society as a whole, which 
Duhamel intended to educate.687 Nevertheless, Scènes de la vie future touched upon a 
certain anti-American sentiment the French society shared at the end of the 1920s. 
The America-picture which was conveyed in the French literature and press of the 
1920s was shaped by books and travelogues about the USA. One of the main subjects 
was the American economy. Here the financial power of the USA, particularly the 
tough stance against the wartime creditor France, was debated negatively on the one 
hand,  while,  on the other the standardisation and rationalization of businesses by 
Fordism and Taylorism were assessed rather positive by the entire society.688 
American developments were thus very apparent in France. Particularly mass-
cultural imports such as American movies were often seen as potentially endangering 
the European identity. There was a high interest and awareness of Americanism and 
Americanization which was the premise and prerequisite for the success of Scènes de  
la vie future; it met the French literary demand. In addition to the timing of the book 
and  a  receptivity  of  society  for  anti-American  thoughts,  Duhamel's  degree  of 
popularity certainly also contributed to the sales numbers of his work. The fame of 
Duhamel preceded him, especially as winner of the Prix Goncourt. It was this fame 
that contributed to Duhamel becoming chief editor of the Mercure de France, the 
publishing house which published most of his works, including the Scènes de la vie  
future.  As chief editor,  he was able to  control the output  of an important  French 
publishing house and was able to spread his ideas, as well as his Americanization-
criticism.  The  Mercure  de  France  was  consequently  a  platform  for  Duhamel  to 
propagate anti-Americanism.     
The reflections on Duhamel's life and work have shown that there is  a  clear 
connection between his personal experiences, his ideology and the way he processes 
these through his literature. The First World War had destroyed the idea that universal 
686  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 10.
687  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 26ff.
688  Thomas Raithel, ‘“Amerika” als Herausforderung in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1920er Jahren’, in  
Deutschland - Frankreich - Nordamerika: Transfers, Imaginationen, Beziehungen, ed. by Chantal Metzger and 
Harmut Kaelble (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), pp. 82–97 (p. 90).
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progress and mechanical developments could go hand in hand with intellectual and 
moral principles.689 The result  was that Duhamel despised systemic mechanisation 
and began to adhere to a strong moralism and humanism which manifests itself in his 
publications.690 
6.2.3. “Scènes de la vie future”
The Scènes de la vie future was originally published in 1930 by the publishing house 
Mercure de France. The book is divided into fifteen chapters including Duhamel's 
arrival  to  the  USA,  his  experiences  in  and  his  views  on  American  cinemas,  the 
American car-culture, segregation and the commercialisation of mass-entertainment. 
The title of the book:  Scènes de la vie future  (English:  Scenes of  our future life) 
suggests that Duhamel perceives his observations and experiences during his stay in 
the USA as the future for Europe and France. He picks up a dominant narrative, often 
touched upon in the literature, which states that the USA was a pioneer of modernity 
and  that  the  American  developments  would  reach  Europe  chronologically 
staggered.691 American  society  was  not  seen  as  developing  parallel  to  European 
society,  but  it  was  an  incubator  of  Europe’s  future.  Duhamel  must  have  been 
convinced that what he saw in the USA was also the direction French society would 
head towards sooner or later, as if he had seen a glimpse of France's future, as if he 
had seen scenes of his future life. His quest to dismiss American developments was 
thus fuelled by his objective to protect France from its own possible future.
In order to investigate the America picture Duhamel conveys in Scènes de la vie  
future  we will  investigate  three dominant  narratives  of  the author  throughout  the 
book.  The first dominant narrative is the mechanised machine-culture of the USA. 
The second narrative is  the American  mass-culture  and finally  the  lack  of  moral 
values in combination with materialism. These three narratives will in the following 
be analysed with constructivist methodology focusing on how structures are created, 
689  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, pt. Introduction, p. 20f.
690  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 10.
691  Dieter Heimböckel, ‘Zivilisation Auf Dem Treibriemen: Die USA im Urteil der deutschen Literatur um und nach 
1900’, in Mythos USA : ‘Amerikanisierung’ in Deutschland seit 1900, ed. by Frank Becker and Elke Reinhardt-
Becker (Frankfurt/Main; New York: Campus, 2006), pp. 49–69 (50f).
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how they impose identities on the individual, how the individual accepts or opposes 
the  structure  and  finally  how  individuals  rest  autonomous  and  create  structural 
identity, in short, the interplay between structure, agency and identity. 
“Civilisation méchanique” 
Georges Duhamel begins his travelogue by describing his journey to the USA. This 
account plunges the reader into a separation of the “old world” and the “new world” 
right from the start.692 As we have already seen, separation is the most important tool 
for identity forging. The author here separates two opposing sides, the US one the 
one  end and France or  Europe on the other.  This separation is  supported by the 
author's account of one of his conversations with the captain of the ship. He quotes 
the captain who claims that the USA is superior to Europe.693 Duhamel here on the 
one  hand  draws  on  a  nationalistic  European  feeling  that  rejects  the  USA  by 
suggesting that Europe is in no way inferior to it. On the other hand, he uses other 
people to express ideas he wants to convey, a method he uses throughout the book. 
By  re-enforcing  narratives  through  personifications,  the  author  highlights  that 
Americanism has  already  brainwashed  the  American  citizens  which  are  now the 
vocal defenders of its ludicrous policies.
According to  Duhamel  these policies include the  questionnaire  every foreign 
citizen has to fill  out regarding possible illnesses,  which for Duhamel is strongly 
breeching personal  privacy.694 As  we have  seen  in  the  previous  section,  personal 
privacy, freedom and independence were all key pillars supporting Duhamel's world 
view.  These  standardised  questionnaires  are  the  messenger  of  a  mechanised  and 
standardised  society  that  is  emotionally  as  sterile  as  it  tries  to  be  clinically.  The 
questionnaires the medical doctor conducts are just as automatized and mechanized 
as the customs procedures, which are another intervention in the private sphere.695 
Civil Servants are puppets of a system that disregards personal freedom. Already in 
Duhamel's first experiences in the USA he thus portrays this American system as 
constricting and adverse. This negative account of the USA is thereby fundamentally 
692  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, p. 48f.
693  Idem., p. 50.
694  Idem., p. 52.
695  Idem., p. 57.
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influenced by his personal perception of the American system.     
From a constructivist perspective, this American system i.e. Americanism figures as 
structure which influences Duhamel as agent. Duhamel constructs the structure of 
Americanism as systemic influence that hangs over the USA like a shadow and that 
is  constantly  re-enforced  by  its  main  actors.  Americanism thereby  figures  as   a 
dominant negative representation structure with seemingly contaminates society. 
Duhamel's account of his arrival in the USA adds a layer of differentiation to this 
systemic influence of Americanism. When Duhamel disembarks, he is told he is no 
longer in the “old world”, a time “before the First World War”696. He consequently 
arrives  in  a  “new  world”  which  is  geographically  distinct  from  Europe  and  a 
representation of modernity.  This is interesting in multiple regards: first  Duhamel 
proposes that  he has now not  only entered a new world geographically,  but  also 
temporally: he travels into the future.697 The structure of Americanism thus seems a 
possible if not most likely future for Europe. Thereby Duhamel concretises the notion 
that  American  developments  have  a  direct  impact  on  Europe,  they  have  to  be 
monitored and either be accepted or rejected. With the statement “before the First 
World War” there is a reference to shifting international power relations. Had the so 
called old world been the dominant international force pre-WWI, the USA came out 
of the First World War as a main geopolitical  player,  if  not hegemon. One could 
interpret that this is all the more reason for Duhamel to raise questions about the 
socio-cultural environment of the USA and its possible impact on Europe. From a 
constructivist angle one can argue that the structure of Americanism seems to clearly 
influence not only personal but also national identities by its superordinate nature. Its 
overarching constitution transcends territorial and temporal boundaries. This implies 
that Duhamel perceives the structure of Americanism as very dangerous and plays 
with, as well as relies on, a protectionist or even nationalistic fear of his readership. 
He conveys the image that the USA is administrating a cultural imperialism through 
its  overly  modernistic  and  culturally  progressive  “civilisation  méchanique” 
(mechanical  civilisation)  one  is  already  confronted  with  upon  entering  the  “new 
world”.698
What  takes  a  particular  role  in  the  machine-culture  of  the  USA and  is  a 




stereotype  of  mechanisation  is  the  automobile.699 In  Duhamel's  account  of  the 
automobile  he  elaborates  various  interesting  notions.  For  one  he  mentions  that 
women drive cars,  which re-enforces the more emancipated role  of the American 
women.700 To the author, this dominant position of women goes hand in hand with the 
loss of values.701 This is symbolised by her steering the car which can be interpreted 
as being in charge of the entire machinery, the entire society. One can generally view 
the  automobile  as  a  metaphor  for  the  American  society:  a  mechanized  and 
automatized machine, constantly moving forward, having only speed as a measure of 
progress, regardless of all accidents and pollution, with a woman in the driver’s seat 
and the man in the back seat, “doing his numbers”702 as Duhamel calls it, placing 
material wealth over decision-making, placing money over power and culture. 
The  chapter  on  the  automobile  describes  how  little  Duhamel  values 
mechanisation and modernisation. He argues that the automobile has introduced a 
material hierarchy into a society that was equal before the automobile-era.703 Now 
material  consumer goods in different models and prices have introduced different 
social classes. It is no more a “règne du coeur” it is a “règne de l'argent” (rule of the 
heart vs. rule of money).704 Money has become the determinant for social status. The 
car has literally and figuratively become a medium to overtake other people. The 
description of the automobile in this sense again symbolises the system. Duhamel 
combines  progress-pessimism with  systematic  criticism of  the  American  societal 
structure.705 Again,  Americanism  becomes  a  constructivist  structure  which  is 
inherently  bad  and  can  be  retrieved  in  different  parts  of  the  societal  structure. 
Americanism is a multi-layered structure which impacts all parts of American life 
and is particularly characterized by its mechanisation. This mechanisation symbolises 
the planned and automated structure of Americanism. On top of that mechanization, 
however, also symbolises autonomy. This again relates to the danger of Americanism. 
If a structure is autonomous and exists detached from individual influences, it is even 
stronger and more influential. The structure of Americanism has hence developed a 
699  Idem., p. 74.
700  Idem., p. 76.
701  Idem., p. 77.
702  Idem., p. 79.
703  Idem., p. 80.
704  Idem., p. 80.
705  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 17f.
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life of its own like a virus which has become uncontrollable.
Duhamel  clearly  paints  a  very  negative  picture  of  Americanism  and  its 
mechanisation and plays with the fear of his readership. His method is a mixture of 
differentiation, comparisons and irrational notions which he references back to an 
underlying nostalgia and culture-pessimism. He takes different parts of Americanism 
which are positive as such and turns them around, such as technological advancement 
and  social  mobility.  The  concepts  themselves  would  generally  be  perceived  as 
something very positive, Duhamel nevertheless gives these ideas a negative spin by 
connecting them to the ideas of indoctrination and the loss of personal freedom and 
culture.  It  is  thus  a  cultural  nostalgia  that  culminates  in  a  structural  anti-
Americanism. This structure turns positive attributes around by drawing on irrational 
sentiments. All parts of society are connected to an overarching American structure 
which is inescapable and thereby only provides negative influences. 
From a constructivist point of view, all the different features of Americanism as 
representation structure are reprehensible. There remain no positive attributes as the 
structure has an entirely negative connotation. The identity the structure provides is 
constantly re-enforced through multi-layered Americanism. The constitution of the 
self in and through the structure is an automatic and unconscious process. Thereby 
the ongoing reconstruction of the self in relation to the structure leads to a loss of 
individuality. As the main reference point for personal identity, the structure offers a 
structural  identity  that  undermines  individuality  through  mechanisation  and 
uniformity. The new identity the individual is offered is hence less personal and in an 
even stronger relation to the structure. The structure consequently superordinates and 
constantly  grows  in  domination  through  its  interplay  with  the  individuals.  The 
negative  side  of  Americanization  is  a  vicious  circle  for  the  agency/structure 
combination.  Agency  here  has  become a  tool  to  diminish  its  own importance  in 
favour of a structure that provides the individual with an identity that subordinates 
personal freedom entirely under the mechanised structure of Americanism. 
Duhamel's  final  account  of  the  mechanised  nature  of  Americanism  is  his 
description of visiting the slaughterhouses of Chicago which he calls the “royaume 
de la mort scientifique”706 (kingdom of scientific killing). His argumentation implies 
that there exists a scientific and mechanised backbone to killing animals. According 
706  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, p. 84.
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to  the  author,  the  entire  meat  industry  is  standardised  and mechanised,  it  is  one 
gigantic  planned  “culture”.707 The  slaughterhouses  are  the  culmination  of 
mechanisation. The value of life becomes devalued to the point where it has become 
a minor determinant in the grander picture of the meat industry. 
This  again  has  a  clear  connection  to  the  agency/structure  relationship. 
Americanism as a mechanized structure is exaggerated and presented as autonomous 
and self-sustaining, regardless of all values. Thereby the structure not only opposes 
the European or French cultural values, which we will call “Europeanism”, it also 
opposes the  human being itself,  an idea we will  come back to  in  the section on 
morals and materialism. What is clear here is that the structure has influenced the 
individual  to  an  extent  that  he/she  has  surrendered  his/her  personal  reasoning in 
favour of structural identity. Individuals have become gearwheels in the machine-
culture of Americanism. Agency has been entirely deferred into structure. The impact 
of the structure on personal identity has been so great that individuality has been 
sacrificed for the religion of Americanism. Duhamel hereby renders Americanism 
absolute and its dismissal, anti-Americanism, becomes the absolute counter structure. 
Thereby a rejection of American influences becomes inevitable and a necessity for 
the individual in order to guard his/her personal freedom. 
According  to  Duhamel,  the  slaughterhouses  symbolise  the  uniformity  and 
mechanisation  of  Americanism.708 One  can  again  view  the  slaughterhouses  as  a 
metaphor for the American society which figures as combination of productivity and 
the  absurdity  of  the  system.  This  is  further  conveyed  through  Duhamel's  use  of 
language:  he  uses  multiple  adjectives  such  as  “immense”  (enormous),  “désert” 
(empty) and “mortelle” (deadly) to describe the abattoirs.709 In addition he compares 
the meat-industry in Chicago to his local butcher in France.710 Duhamel here creates 
the  cultural  counter  structure  of  the  Occident  which  is  the  prototype  of  his  key 
antithesis:  machine-culture versus  humanistic  culture.  Through his  account  of  the 
butcher he combines the “real” humanistic culture to nostalgia. 
His final paragraph of the chapter on the slaughterhouses compares the squealing 
of the pigs to the shrieking of the wheels of the automobile.711 One can thus conclude 
707  Idem., p. 85.
708  Idem., p. 85ff.
709  Idem., p. 92f.
710  Idem., p. 93.
711  Idem., p. 97.
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that the mechanised structure is part of all layers of society and inescapable. The 
individual and his/her identity are determined by the structure which is multi-layered 
and culturally reinforced. The “civilisation méchanique”, structurally opposed to the 
“civilisation  veritable”  (true  civilisation),  transcends  the  public,  professional  and 
private life.
Mass-Entertainment 
For  the  first  dominant  narrative  of  Scènes  de  la  vie  future,  the  mechanized 
civilisation, we  have  focused  a  lot  on  structure  and  how  the  structure  destroys 
individuality  and  personal  identity.  The  narrative  of  mass-entertainment  however 
does  allow  very  interesting  contemplations  about  Duhamel's  relationship  to  the 
agency. In the chapter on his cinematographic experiences he continues his negative 
account of Americanism. He states that “cinéma n'est pas encore un art”712, movies 
and cinema are not yet an artform as they are not an expression and result of personal 
creativity.  Personal  creativity  and  the  possibility  for  the  individual  to  actually 
“create”  (identities  and  structures)  are  however  the  very  foundation  of  agency. 
According to Duhamel the movie industry is trying to numb the masses, to stun the 
crowd  with  unilateral  mass-entertainment.713 There  is  no  intention  of  stimulating 
cultural desires by creativity. In this sense agency and the possibility of the individual 
to  be  creative  are  non-existent.  This  leaves  two  very  interesting  layers  of 
interpretation. First Duhamel implies, that one has to be European in order to possess 
the  ability  of  free  will  and  self-determination.  One  can  thus  abstractly  say  that 
Americanism  has  destroyed  the  possibility  of  self-determination  and  with  it  the 
possibility of the individual to oppose or create identities. Only the background of the  
Occident  therefore  allows  any  form of  agency  and  is  the  counterpart  to  an  all-
encompassing American structure. On a second level Duhamel and his work himself 
are an example of agency. With his book, he participates in the formation of opinion 
and thus in the endpoint also identities. Through writing this book he thus personifies 
the very premise for agency. He is the incarnation of the Occident's potential for 
structural opposition and identity formation. 
712  Idem., p. 69.
713  Idem., p. 61ff.
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The  cinema  therefore  takes  up  an  important  position  for  Duhamel.  It  is  the 
stereotype of a structure that indoctrinates a mass-culture through mass-entertainment  
rather than a real humanistic culture.  It  is produced “by a soulless machine for a 
soulless  mass-society”714.  The  result  is  that  the  individual  loses  his/her  identity 
through mass-entertainment. According to Duhamel, everything is an illusion cast by 
consumer entertainment rather than intellectual stimulation.715 
An  important  notion  of  the  mass-entertainment  narrative  is  the  role  of  art, 
including  both  music  and  visuals.  Duhamel  refers  to  these  as  the  “robinet  de 
musique” and “robinet des images”716. They are consequently a standardised product 
that loses its uniqueness and beauty through reproduction. This idea has been touched 
upon by Walter Benjamin only a few years later in 1936 in his essay The work of art  
in the age of mechanical reproduction717. Benjamin argues that art loses its “aura”, its 
authenticity  and its nature of being special  through mechanical  reproductions.  As 
Duhamel states, the beauty of imperfection is lost just as much as the imperfection of 
beauty. 
According to  Duhamel  mass-entertainment  destroys this humanistic  quest  for 
self-determination of the arts. Whereas art provides the opportunity to surpass oneself 
proactively, entertainment is a passive irrigation of the senses.718 Mass-culture and 
conditioning lead to the dissolution of the possibility that the human nature entails 
the potential for creativity. This can again be related back to the erosion of agency, an 
incapability of invention and creation. This importance of creationism touches upon a 
very romantic notion. In the German literary period of the Sturm und Drang (Storm 
and Stress) particularly this creative spirit of the so called “Originalgenie”, a creative 
genius inside every human being, was a central paradigm.719 Through literary periods 
such as the Sturm und Drang in the second half of the 18 th century, there existed a 
strong humanistic tradition in Europe. The idea of a creative spirit, which directly 
relates to the constructivist paradigm of creating structural identity through agency, 
seems to be crucial in Duhamel's description. In addition, this quest also relates to the 
national Romanticism of the beginning of the 19th century.  Main political  goal of 
714  Idem., p. 61. “Un luxe industriel, fabriqué par les machines sans âme pour une foule que l'âme semble déserter  
aussi.”
715  Idem., p. 62f.
716  Idem., p. 65.
717  Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (London: Penguin, 2008).
718  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, p. 70.
719  Herbert A. Frenzel, Daten deutscher Dichtung 1.  (München: Dt. Taschenbuch-Verl., 2001), p. 201.
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Romanticism was the grasp of a clear cut national identity for the nation state as 
social construction.720 Duhamel thus joins literary traditions and arguments that have 
been present for over a century.  
Duhamel tries to educate the French population regarding the dangers of mass-
entertainment as he fears that the loss of culture and the “new religion” have already 
reached  Europe.  He  thereby  implies  that  the  structure  of  Americanism  is 
contaminating  other  parts  of  the world.  The structure is  “brute”,  which  could be 
translated  as  goring  and  low,  it  does  not  comprise  a  high  culture.  The 
commercialisation of sports for example does not contain something “beautiful” it is 
simply an animalistic mass-phenomenon.721 Standardisation and mechanisation have 
thus taken the form of mass-entertainment and commercialised the private sphere. 
Not only have the economy and industry become standardised but also the human 
being itself which flourishes in its uniformity and thereby loses its personality, its 
soul.
Morals & Materialism 
The third and final narrative which is developed throughout the  Scènes de la vie  
future relates to morals and materialism. As we have previously discussed, the author 
can be characterized as a strong moralist and conveyed this moralism in his other 
works as well. In the Scènes de la vie future this moralism can be strongly retraced in 
Duhamel's account of the slaughterhouses of Chicago. According to Duhamel it is an 
industry of killing, where the value of life has been lost entirely.722 The dominant 
structure  of  Americanism is  hence free of  all  moral  judgement.  It  represents  the 
absolute absurdity where the human being has become only an executing force of the 
structure  that  has  mechanised  and  industrialised  the  process  of  “killing”.  Even 
irrational  and immaterial  values  such as  life  itself  have  become standardized.  As 
Duhamel states, it takes exactly 22 minutes to take the life of a beef.723
This  has  a  very  interesting  relation  to  the  combination  of  structure,  agency, 
identity and morality. Duhamel implies that a person has to be moral and just in order 
720  Idem., p. 296f.
721  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, p. 110f.
722  Idem., p. 88.
723  Idem., p. 94.
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to be able to oppose the structure.  When these personal  traces are eroded by the 
structure, the individual loses his/her only tools to judge whether to oppose or accept 
the structure. The only result is the total assimilation of the individual in the identity 
offered by the structure. Morality itself comes from the “good soul” of the individual. 
This idea conveys the idea that there is something greater and metaphysically divine 
inside everyone which functions as moral compass. When this moral compass is lost 
through a negative representation structure that constantly reinforces this structural 
identity through mediators such as mass-entertainment, the individual loses his/her 
ability  to  “be”.  The human being henceforth  loses its  ability to  choose  from the 
offered representation structures, assimilate some identity traits and oppose others. Its  
very nature and personal identity are lost, alienating its constituting characteristics.  
On  top  of  that  the  agential  possibility  to  create  structural  identity  is  destroyed 
because  the  tools  for  creating  structures  have  been  eroded  by  the  dominant 
representation structure. Agential identity creation becomes impossible without moral  
values and guidelines as one can no longer identify with something if the criteria for 
the  assessment  of  right  and  wrong  are  lost.  This  is  why  Duhamel's  moral 
underpinning  is  so  crucial  from  a  constructivist  standpoint:  if  morality  actually 
figures as determinant for identity then an amoral structure such as Americanism is 
the highest form of reprehensibility. Any potential for self-determination is destroyed 
and with it the role of agency. The complete constitution in or through the structure 
has  destroyed  all  autonomy  and  self-determination  of  the  individual  and  hence 
eliminates  agency  from  the  equation  of  identity-formation  through  the  mutually 
constitutive structure/agency paradigm. And it is this absolute heteronomy which is 
mirrored  in  Duhamel's  final  statement  reflecting  upon  his  Chicago  experiences  - 
“Nous devons vivre, mais à quel prix?”724 (We have to live, but at which cost?).
Duhamel  finalises  these  contemplations  about  morality  in  his  chapter  on 
segregation where he argues that American standardisation and classification are not 
only a phenomenon of industry, they are also applied on the human races.725 They 
represent the human perversion of a system that has indoctrinated its citizens with an 
ideology  of  classifying  goods  and  people  according  to  their  characteristics. 
Duhamel's account of his experiences however also implies that he dismisses this 
segregation of American society and opposes it by treating coloured people as his 
724  Idem., p. 98.
725  Idem., p. 99f.
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equal.726 He thereby shows how he is still in possession of a moral compass. Whereas 
the  automobile  introduced  a  separation  of  social  status  through  material  wealth, 
segregation symbolises a partition of people according to their “value”.  It is here 
where morality and materialism fundamentally intertwine. The core foundation of 
morality has been replaced by materialism. One could even argue that this perverted 
form  of  materialism,  the  result  of  Americanism  as  structure,  demonstrates  the 
culmination of the dangers of Americanization. The influence of Americanization in 
Europe and the loss of morality might even lead to the individual turning on other 
people's  personal  freedom,  which  figures  as  highest  good.  This  corrupt  structure 
actually  transcends  the  metaphysical  component  of  death  as  white  and  coloured 
people have to be buried in different cemeteries.727 
A crucial idea of Duhamel is that African Americans do not have the possibility 
of  identifying  themselves  with  the  American  nation  because  Americanism  has 
downgraded  them.728 The  elementary  feeling  of  national  identity,  of  “patrie”729 
(fatherland)  as  Duhamel calls  it,  can thus not  develop.  This is  a  very interesting 
concern by the author because it highlights the importance he attributes to national 
identity.  As the structure of Americanism denies the individual to inherit  national 
identity, another main personal identification structure is disregarded. A system that 
denies a part of its population the possibility of feeling national identity can thus only 
be illegitimate. 
   One  of  the  final  parts  of  Scènes  de  la  vie  future  describes  the  authors 
conversation with a railroad insurance agent. This agent confirms that it is actually 
cheaper for the railway companies to buy insurance for possible accidents rather than 
to make railroad repairs.730 This argument inclines that money seems to be of more 
value than people. Duhamel deliberately uses this anecdote to convey the negativity 
and  absurdity  of  Americanism.  He  again  combines  morals  and  materialism  by 
supposing  that  the  latter  has  replaced  the  former.  The  heart  of  the  structure  is 
comprised of material values, the “règne du coeur” is no longer possible. Here both 
structures clash, the “civilisation morale ou véritable” and the “civilisation matérielle 
726  Idem., p. 99.
727  Idem., p. 103f.
728  Idem., p. 105.
729  Idem., p. 105.
730  Idem., p. 119.
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ou  mécanique”.731 Human  life  has  been  attributed  a  monetary  value  through life 
insurances and represents the ultimate merger of morals and materialism, something 
immaterial has been replaced with something material. 
The insurance agent is to Duhamel a representative of the structure, while being 
controlled and indoctrinated by it. Structure and agent literally and figuratively merge 
from a constructivist standpoint. As Duhamel states “ʻtoutʼ vaut ʻtantʼ”732 (everything 
is worth so much). He contrasts a “valeur humaine”733 and a “valeur marchande”734 
and what one could call a “valeur divine”, human values, material values and divine 
values. Duhamel here creates three structures- “Americanism” as negative structure 
and two opposing counter-structures: humanistic “Europeanism” and “morality”. We 
have  already  touched  upon the  use  of  morality  by  Duhamel  nevertheless  in  this 
particular case morality is used as a structure that directly opposes Americanism and 
reinforces European national identity.
The insurance here is a metaphor for the human being that has willingly sold its 
soul. For Duhamel, this seems to be more than metaphorical: his belief in something 
similar to Plato's “idea of the good”735, a natural goodness of people linked to their 
soul, has been lost. The aim of insurances, to protect people, in reality makes them 
free of all morality as the human life has obtained a monetary value. Betterment leads  
to  demoralisation,  “améloriation”  to  “démoralisation”.736 The  final  argument 
regarding morals and materialism is the idea that “amélioration”, the improvement of 
people's lives, is fundamentally linked to the improvement of the standard of living 
by Americanism.737 Duhamel however strongly argues in favour of what one would 
call the standard of being and what he himself calls “valeurs non réversibles”738. This 
concludes the constructivist paradigms of structure, agency and identity. There exist 
two opposing structures, the standard of living, hence Americanism, and the standard 
731  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 10.
732  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, p. 122.
733  Ibid.
734  Ibid.
735  Plato’s theory of forms states that non-material abstract forms, the “ideas” of things, exist and that the material  
world is modifiable and only a reproduction of these ideas. These overarching ontological entities are the highest  
and purest form of metaphysical reality. Thereby the highest idea, from which all other ideas derive and are  
subordinated to, is the idea of the good. The idea of the good is the highest principle and the reason for the goodness 
of everything, it transcends the existing, and superordinates all forms. See: Otfried Höffe, Kleine Geschichte der  
Philosophie (München: C.H. Beck, 2001), 42ff.
736  Georges Duhamel and Armand Bottequin, Scènes de la vie future, p. 123.
737  Idem., p. 124.
738  Ibid.
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of  being,  hence  true  morality.  Americanism  as  dominant  identity  structure  has 
destroyed the  possibility  for  the  individual  to  act  upon self-determination,  it  has 
eroded  moral  judgement  and has  as  a  result  destroyed the  possibility  of  identity 
formation through agency. 
6.2.4. Discussion and implication of the research 
The constructivist analysis of Scènes de la vie future has focused on three dominant 
narratives which reoccur throughout the work by the French writer and philosopher 
Georges Duhamel. These narratives not only symbolise the convictions and beliefs of 
the writer, they also contrast Americanism as socio-cultural structure on the one hand 
and  the  European  counterpart  on  the  other.  The  first  narrative,  the  “civilisation 
méchanique”  contains  Duhamel's  dismissal  of  American  mechanization  and 
standardization  processes.  Americanism  is  raised  to  a  negative  structure,  which 
imposes  a  uniform,  “mechanised”  identity  on  the  individual  and  thus  erodes 
individual  personality.  A counter-structure  is  created,  individualistic  and  full  of 
personal  freedom,  a  “Europeanism”  with  entirely  positive  connotations.  Both 
structures  are  created  as  absolutes  and  thereby  exaggerate  all  features  and 
characteristics of the respective structure. The individual is hereafter supposed to feel 
endangered by the new American structure which restricts personal freedom and self-
determination and as consequence Americanization has to be opposed. 
The second narrative, mass-entertainment, is portrayed as the cultural means of 
re-enforcing systemic Americanism and is contrasted with the true humanistic culture 
of the Occident. Mass-entertainment, in contrast to real art, contains no potential to 
surpass oneself and live up to the creative nature of the human being. Multi-layered 
Americanism erodes the individual's potential to create structural identity and ability 
to  oppose  a  dominant  representation  structure.  The  third  narrative  relates  to 
Duhamel's idea of morality and materialism, draws upon the other two narratives, 
and goes even further. The uniform structure of Americanism is not only contrasted 
with  the  cultural  structure  of  Europeanism,  Duhamel  creates  a  third  structure: 
moralism. For Duhamel, the core of the human existence is based on moral values 
and Americanism has replaced these with material ones. Americanism thus opposes 
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the very nature of the human being and is not only an evil counter structure to the 
humanistic  and  individualistic  European  identity,  but  also  to  an  independent 
moralism. This is particularly important because it suggests an objective measure that 
American influences need to be rejected in order to preserve the very nature of being 
human.
The enhancement of the purely materialistic standard of living is in contrast with 
the standard of being, which is moral and individualistic. Identity thus seems to have 
its foundation in a moral and just representation structure. Therefore, agency can only 
function via moralism. The danger of Americanism is that as it destroys agency, the 
individual can no longer oppose the dominant representation structure and the self is 
constituted  through  the  structure.  What  Duhamel  however  does  is  agency.  He 
opposes a dominant representation structure and values specific characteristics over 
others thereby creating structural identity.
The publication by Georges Duhamel thereby on an argumentative level relates 
to the prevailing French Americanization-debate of the 1920s. Financial imperialism, 
as well as economic and cultural Americanization were cornerstones of the interwar 
debate.  The  Americanization-discourse  indeed  portrayed  extreme  positions  and 
manifested itself in a praise of American influences on the one hand, and a dismissal 
on the other. In this sense Duhamel, definitely was a representative figure of the 
French anti-Americanism as his argumentations took up the general criticisms of the 
anti-Americanists of the 1920s. His prominence as a writer here helped to target a 
larger public which was generally receptive to America related literature. Through 
reaching this larger public Duhamel actually unwillingly spread and reinforced the 
idea that there in fact existed an ongoing Americanization of France. 
6.3. Comparison 
The work Amerika und der Amerikanismus and Scènes de la vie future pursue very 
similar  lines  of  argumentation.  Both  authors  base  a  fundamental  rejection  of 
Americanization  and  Americanism  on  a  criticism  of  mechanisation  and 
standardisation of the American society which supposedly goes hand in hand with a 
loss of culture. Both authors in this sense contrast European culture and individuality 
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with American mass-phenomena and uniformity.  What represents the antithesis of 
“Kultur” and “Zivilisation” to Halfeld, the confrontation of the “civilisation morale et 
veritable” and the “civilisation méchanique et materielle” were to Duhamel.739 Both 
authors stress that material values as well as mass-culture and -entertainment of a 
planned  society  oppose  the  cultural  values  of  Europe.  Standardization  of  the 
industries, but also of consumer goods, have destroyed individual peculiarities and 
are  contrasted  with  a  European  culture,  being  humanistic,  individualistic  and 
immaterial.
This is highlighted through the similarities of the dominant narratives in both 
works. Halfeld and Duhamel both stress materialism, mass-culture and the planned or 
mechanised society as the three main pillars of Americanism. Their main goal was to 
defend the Occident against the influences of Americanization in order to preserve 
the European cultural heritage and character. They intended to educate the European 
population with the observations they made during their travels to the USA, which to 
them were a likely and dangerous future for Europe. They criticised Americanism 
and Americanization through the example of the USA.740
The argumentation of both authors is thereby in line with older criticisms of the 
USA and  anti-modernisation  tendencies.  As  discussed,  anti-Americanism was  no 
phenomenon limited to the 1920s, the dominant narratives have been prominent at 
least since the mid-19th century.  In addition, a combination of anti-modernization, 
nostalgia  and  romanticism  have  historically  been  constitutive  of  cultural  anti-
Americanism. The anti-Americanism of the 1920s by Georges Duhamel and Adolf 
Halfeld is hence a specific variation of older critiques of civilisation.741 This criticism 
was projected onto the USA,742 but was not exclusive to Americanism. Both authors 
have a fundamental attitude and ideology that is very humanistic, protects personal 
freedom and self-determination. This attitude is projected onto the USA, but could 
however  be  applied  to  any  other  country.  Georges  Duhamel  for  example  does 
criticise similar developments in his USSR-related work Le voyage de Moscou. What 
both authors thus proclaim is more of a pro-individualism, than an anti-Americanism. 
Nevertheless, the USA is a perfect target for their criticisms. Americanization was a 
739  Klautke, ‘Kronzeugen des Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland und Frankreich. Adolf Halfeld und Georges  
Duhamel’, p. 16.
740  Idem., p. 17.
741  Ibid.
742  Idem., p. 18.
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present  and ongoing feature of  both  Germany and France  during the  1920s.  The 
Americanization-debate hence allowed the authors to advocated their deeper-rooted 
concerns and relate them to a contemporary phenomenon.
This new public debate about American influences became bundled with the end 
of the First World War. There seemed to have existed a feeling that the USA had 
surpassed the “old world”, particularly in technology. The predominance of European 
culture and its approach to modernity had fallen second to the USA. Germany and 
the  USA were  both  important  economic  powers  with  a  colonial  strive  but  their 
standing had been undermined through the First  World War.  Feelings of  national 
pride and national identity had consequently become increasingly eroded. Germany 
had to bow to the American military supremacy and France had to rely on the USA 
for eventual liberation. The national identity of both nations was threatened by a new 
structure that exhibited military, economic and cultural supremacy. What the authors 
thus tried was to fence off against American predominance and partly fled back into 
narratives  of  national  romanticism.  This  was  combined  with  nostalgic  anti-
modernization tendencies through which they tried to hold off Americanization. It 
was an attempt to dismiss Americanism whilst Americanising. 
Nevertheless, the USA did offer a broad contact surface. The First World War 
had shown that the values of the “old world” were seemingly subordinate to the “new 
world”,  that  the  European  nations  could  not  be  self-sustaining.  Moreover,  the 
unprecedented  military  and  civil  casualties  indicated  that  the  values  of  the  “old 
world” about coexistence and human dignity were no longer shared. Functionally 
both authors would thus dismiss American developments in order to reinforce the 
pride  and  national  identity  of  their  nations.  At  the  same  time,  however,  an 
Americanization of the European economy was ongoing, which was at least partly 
responsible for the recovery of the German and French industries after the war. The 
authors  thus  contested  a  perceived  anti-intellectualism  and  anti-individualism 
regardless of other “objectively” positive American influences. Anti-Americanism as 
formulated by Duhamel and Halfeld was a rephrased culture and civilisation criticism 
resting on five different pillars: anti-modernisation, the legacy of the First World War,  
the  humanistic  background  of  the  Occident,  a  transatlantic  shift  in  international 
politics and finally  the actual  economic and cultural  Americanization as imported 
through different-minded values of the USA. They reinforced national identity in the 
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deep post-war identity crisis in Europe that would also be partly responsible for the 
political crisis which were to come.743
On an argumentative level, there are however not only similarities between the 
works of Georges Duhamel and Adolf Halfeld. First of all, both authors differ in the 
style  of  writing.  Adolf  Halfeld  as  journalist  gives  a  rather  neutral  and  factual 
description of the American society. The writer Georges Duhamel on the other hand 
uses a more literary-artistic style.744 Moreover, both works did not reach the same 
degree  of  popularity.  Whereas  both  works  were  commercial  successes,  George 
Duhamel as famous writer reached a much larger readership and  Scènes de la vie  
future therefore had a much larger diffusion.745 
When one compares  both descriptions of  Americanism there also exist  some 
differences on a hermeneutic level. Adolf Halfeld delegitimizes Americanism through 
pragmatic and historical reasons, whereas Georges Duhamel bases his ideas more on 
a moral, idealistic and romantic framework. Halfeld strongly contrasts the USA and 
Germany as two totally opposing systems and keeps comparing the two throughout 
his work. Duhamel by contrast draws less on comparisons on a national level and 
more  on  universal  morals.  He  compares  Americanism rather  to  universal  values 
which are a paragon for France. Even though the ultimate dismissal of Americanism 
as sociocultural system is similar, both authors take different paths to reach it. For 
Halfeld  Americanism  is  inherently  negative  as  it  signifies  the  exact  opposite  of 
German  and  European  traditions.  For  Duhamel  Americanism  is  reprehensible 
because it opposes universal moral values. In both cases, Americanism thus opposes 
what the authors perceive as the absolute and righteous system. Whilst Halfeld argues 
more from a pragmatic side, Duhamel uses an idealistic angle. This is also reflected 
in what is emphasised through the main narratives of the works. Halfeld particularly 
develops the idea of Germany being one “Volk”, one ethnic nation, which opposes 
the planned culture of Americanism. Duhamel on the other hand develops his main 
narrative  through  the  idea  that  moralism has  been  replaced  by  materialism.  The 
stronger focus of Halfeld on the nation-state and its ethnic dimension, i.e. being a 
“Volk”,  suggests  that  the  German  national  identity  was  more  disordered  and 
dysfunctional than the French one. This certainly again relates to the legacy of the 
743  Idem., p. 19.
744  Idem., p. 16.
745  Ibid.
214
First  World  War  and  the  German  defeat,  opposed  to  France  which  was  at  least 
formally  a  wartime  victor.  The  First  World  War  in  addition  explains  Duhamel's 
emphasis  on moral  values  which  is  rooted in  his  experiences  at  the front.  These 
experiences seemed to have been one of the main reasons for Duhamel's moralism 
and idealism which is equally reflected in his other works. 
On a constructivist level one can again see various similarities and differences 
between  the  works  of  both  authors.  When  we  look  at  the  constructivist 
agency/structure dichotomy it is apparent that Halfeld as well as Duhamel both create 
Americanism as constructivist structure. It is the dominant representation structure 
that emits specific traits of identity which can then be either accepted or denied by 
the individual.  This structure is  in both cases  painted very dark.  All  parts  of  the 
American  society  and  lifestyle  are  taken  up  and  spun  around  negatively.  Even 
developments with a generally positive connotation were exaggerated, attributed a 
negative  value  and  then  connected  to  the  structure  of  Americanism.  From  a 
constructivist standpoint both authors would describe Americanism as a structure that 
had a direct impact on the individual and changed its personal identity radically. The 
overarching structure of Americanism did not only offer a certain identity, it forced a 
new identity onto the individual by changing one's very personal identity. The multi-
layered structure of Americanism would be constantly reinforced on different levels. 
Not  only  would  certain  narratives  and goals  be  depicted  as  desirable,  they were 
reinforced  on  a  cultural  level  by  mass-culture  and  mass-entertainment.  As  a 
consequence, the individual could not escape the structural imposition and had barely 
any chance to oppose this representation structure: the structure was forced upon the 
individual.  Moreover,  the  identity  that  was  imposed  would  however  inherently 
contain the central aspects of uniformity and standardisation. The individual would 
hence over the long run, by incorporating the new identity,  render himself/herself 
more and more uniform and loose his/her personality completely. The identity which 
was offered by the structure reinforced itself constantly through the individual. The 
individual  would  lose  all  tools  to  actually  oppose  the  dominant  representation 
structure or even be able to create structural identity. Agency was hence completely 
eroded. 
In  order  to  oppose  this  dangerous  structure  of  Americanism  and  preserve 
individuality,  Halfeld  and  Duhamel  created  a  counter  structure.  Whereas 
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Americanism was the absolute of negativity, Europeanism as counter-structure had to 
be entirely positive. Thereby the own (national) identity was sharpened, enhanced 
and  desirable  as  the  structure  of  Americanism  was  endangering  the  actual 
constitution  of  the  self.  The  “self”  was  constituted  through  the  existence  of  the 
“other”.  It  was  image-making  and  identity  creation  by  comparison,  the  central 
mediator for identity formation. In addition to the structural approach, where both 
authors argued that the possibility for identity formation through agency was eroded, 
they  are  both  prime  examples  of  personified  agency.  They  not  only  oppose  the 
dominant  representation  structure  they  actually  construct  structures  and  reinforce 
identities through their arguments. Their hierarchical assessment of the American and 
European antagonism created structural identity through shared meaning. Through 
writing  the  books  they  advocated  their  ideas  and  took  part  in  creating  and 
constructing identity.  They consequently represent  the possibility  and potential  of 
agency and identities in the structure/agency paradigm. 
Nevertheless,  some differences  between the  works of  both  authors also exist 
from  a  constructivist  standpoint.  The  main  difference  is  thereby  that  Halfeld  is 
particularly working on creating a counter structure in order to constitute national 
identity.  Duhamel  on  the  other  hand  is  particularly  focused  on  how  agency's 
possibility  to  create  identity  is  destroyed.  While  Halfeld  argues  more  from  a 
structural  perspective,  Duhamel  argues  more  from  an  agential  perspective. 
Nevertheless, the similarities overweigh: the main structure created by Duhamel is 
the counter structure of morality. In this sense, Duhamel reinforces and uplifts French 
national  identity  from a  moral  standpoint  while  Halfeld  creates  national  identity 
through  fencing  off  against  all  characteristics  of  Americanism.  Duhamel  creates 
structural  national  identity  though  placing  it  on  a  moral  foundation,  he  creates 
legitimacy through morality. 
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7. Conclusion
7.1. Answering the Research Questions
The study on hand has addressed the German and French Americanization-debate 
between 1918 and 1933. It has thereby contemplated the works of significant authors 
who  contributed  to  the  interwar-debate  about  the  USA and  its  influences  across 
Europe.  The  focal  point  of  the  research  has  rested  on  the  relationship  between 
advocated pro- or anti-American images and national identity. The central research 
questions of the present study were subsequently how the said relationship between 
the Americanization-debate and national identity was constituted, what figured as the 
main differences and similarities between the pro- and anti-American authors and 
how these could be explained. The following section will answer each of these three 
research questions separately and elucidate the findings of this research. 
What  is  the  relation  between  the  Americanization-debate  (i.e.  pro-  and  anti-
Americanism) and national identity in Germany and France in the 1920s?
In order to answer the main research question, the empirical chapters of this study 
have focused on the life and work of Julius Hirsch, Lucien Romier, Adolf Halfeld 
and Georges Duhamel. The America-related writings of these authors contain distinct 
assessments of the USA, of the American socio-economic model and of its influences 
on  Germany  and  France.  Whilst  the  former  two  authors  demonstrated  positive 
assessments of the USA and pro-American images, the latter reject everything related 
to the USA and represented a firm anti-American standpoint. The writings therefore 
provided  a  practical  case  study  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  the 
propounded  Americanization-discourse  and  national  identity.  The  hermeneutic 
investigation of the sources was conducted through the application of constructivist 
methodology.  Constructivism  as  International  Relations  Theory  included  a 
conceptual  approach to  national  identity  and  simultaneously  provided a  research 
methodology  that  allowed  to  analyse  the  sources  under  their  subjective  and 
constructed aspect. The research has consequently shown that there indeed exists a 
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noteworthy  relationship  between  the  Americanization-debate  and  the  concept  of 
national identity. This relationship was, however, distinct for each of the four authors.
The  German  economist  Julius  Hirsch  advocated  a  very  economic  pro-
Americanism in his publication  Das Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder.  Throughout 
his work, Hirsch constructed the USA as incubator of Germany's and Europe's future. 
He perceived the adaptation of American influences as a necessity for the progress of 
Germany. Functionally Hirsch created  the opposing structures  of  progression and 
stagnation and asserted that only through Americanization Germany could in fact 
progress.  Progress  as  constructivist  structure  thereby  allowed  the  value-free 
incorporation of American developments into the German national identity without 
losing  what  it  meant  to  be  German.  Discussing  America  gave  the  debate  about 
progress  and  modernization  more  liberty,  focus,  relevance  and  immediacy.  Pro-
Americanism was thus a mediator for a debate about progress and the modernization 
of  Germany.  The  American-model  was  constructed  as  a  utopian  structure  which 
provided the building blocks  for  a  new conceptual  design  of  the German future. 
Endorsing  America  was  a  platform for  the  economic  advancement  of  Germany. 
Despite  this  prevailing  pro-Americanism,  Hirsch  differentiated  Germany  and  the 
USA on a cultural level and argued that German culture was superior to its American 
pendant.  The  cultural  references  in  Das  Amerikanische  Wirtschaftswunder thus 
intended to strengthen the German national identity. This highlights the functional 
dimension  of  Hirsch's  pro-Americanism  which  was,  in  essence,  a  tool  for  the 
selective incorporation of the American economic-model into the German national 
reality and identity.
A similar relationship could be observed in the works of Lucien Romier who 
figured as a representative of French pro-Americanism. Here, significant references 
to  the  USA and  its  importance  for  France  could  be  observed  in  two  different 
publications,  namely  Qui  sera  le  Maître,  Europe  ou  Amérique?  and  Idées  très  
simples pour les français. Both works fundamentally discussed the emergence of the 
economic masses  as main challenge for the modern nation state.  For Romier the 
USA  was,  in  this  regard,  a  case  study  on  how  France  could  cope  with  the 
omnipresent  mass-phenomenon.  In  light  of  French  economic  and  technological 
backwardness,  Romier  argued that  the progress of  France  actually  demanded the 
application of American rationalization methods. The USA, as a functioning mass-
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society,  figured as an economic role-model  while  simultaneously highlighting the 
potential  risks  of  the  mass-society  for  France.  Romier's  guidebook  therefore 
demonstrated a clear connection to national identity: structurally the French national 
identity  could  be  reinforced  through  the  selective  incorporation  of  American 
developments  without  adapting  its  cultural  peculiarities.  Instead  of  a  complete 
rejection,  parts  of  the  American  structure  could  be  incorporated  into  the  French 
identity.  Similarly to  its  German counterpart,  pro-Americanism was  used  here  to 
refine French national identity through the incorporation of American rationalization 
methods without a complete reinvention of the national identity and what it meant to 
be French.
The  relationship  between  national  identity  and  the  America-debates  is  even 
clearer in the writings of the anti-American authors. For the German debate, this is 
visible  in  Adolf  Halfeld's  Amerika  und  der  Amerikanismus.  Halfeld  completely 
rejected all American influences and criticised the American model on an irrational 
level.  For Halfeld,  the features of the American society,  such as materialism and 
mass-society, radically opposed German culture, individualism and ethnic character. 
He thereby functionally opposed the negative structure of Americanism which was 
created as a counterexample and a counter-structure to Germany. Halfeld actually 
defined and reconstructed the German national identity through the existence of clear 
cut negative counterpart, i.e. Americanism. For Halfeld, German anti-Americanism 
was hence a tool to recreate and reinforce national identity. The unstable political 
environment of Germany seemed to demand a clear national representation-structure 
which Halfeld offered through the rejection of the USA. The relationship between 
national  identity  and  anti-Americanism  was  thus,  in  essence,  a  reflection  of  the 
conceptual  properties  of  collective  identities:  a  constitution  of  “self”  through the 
existence of an “other”.
Equal observations could be made for the French anti-Americanism in Georges 
Duhamel's work Scènes de la vie future. Duhamel showed a strong demarcation from 
particularly  cultural  American  developments.  He  thereby  argued  from  a  moral 
humanist  perspective which created Americanism as amoral and negative counter 
structure to the French national identity, i.e. Frenchness. The creation of Frenchness 
as a positive structure was combined with structural moralism which opposed and 
delegitimized  American  materialism  as  a  socio-economic  model.  For  Duhamel, 
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French  ethnicity  was,  in  essence,  founded  on  creative  individualism.  Duhamel's 
account highlighted how national identity as representation structure was based on 
hierarchy and superiority. To Duhamel anti-Americanism served as other to refine 
French national identity and most importantly to reinforce the moral superiority of 
France. 
The empirical chapters have thus shown that the America-debates in the different  
sources clearly entail a dimension of national identity. While anti-American authors 
rejected  Americanization  to  reinforce  national  identity,  the  pro-American  authors 
refined it by incorporating the American economic-model. It seems as though the 
pro-American authors thus actually saw the possibility of economic Americanization 
without cultural consequences, anti-Americans evidently did not. Nevertheless, both 
parties  debated  the  exact  same  developments  and  assessed  them  in  complete 
opposition. It is thus clear that the works do not illustrate an objective analysis of the 
American model but rather a construction of either a positive or negative image of 
the USA. The debate was hence functionally just as much a repositioning of the own 
nation state and its identity as it  was an actual investigation of the USA. For the 
relevant  case  studies  and  sources  under  investigation  this  allows  the  following 
conclusion:  pro-  and anti-Americanism in France and Germany during the 1920s 
were a catalyst for the creation, definition and refinement of national identity. The 
relationship  between  the  Americanization-debate  and  national  identity  was 
consequently a functional one with the goal of reinforcing the national identity in 
France and Germany.
What  are  the  main  differences  and  similarities  between  the  pro-  and  anti-
American authors in France and Germany? 
The investigation of the four representative authors has, on the one hand, revealed 
the  national  identity  dimension,  but  on  the  other,  also  shown  how  nuanced  the 
Americanization-debate  of  the  time  actually  was.  The  authors  are  thence 
representative particularly in the sense that they display the diverse components of 
the discourse on America. These include the economic and cultural perspective but 
also perspectives related to personal experiences and historical circumstances. It is 
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therefore  not  surprising  that  the  arguments  of  the  different  authors  showed 
transnational  similarities  and  differences.  As  chapters  5.3  and  6.3.  have 
demonstrated,  there  generally  existed  more  similarities  than  differences  in  the 
transnational  canon.  The  pro-Americanism  of  Hirsch  and  Romier,  for  example, 
related  primarily  to  economic  and  industrial  developments.  Both  authors  were 
equally  convinced  that  this  approach  could  lastingly  generate  economic  wealth. 
Thereby,  the  concepts  of  prosperity  and  rationalisation  were  at  the  heart  of  the 
argumentative framework. While Julius Hirsch geared his argumentation towards the 
creation of “Reichtum” (prosperity), Lucien Romier intended to create the “peuple 
riche”, a wealthy social structure. The main narratives of both writings are thus very 
much in line with each other. In addition, Hirsch and Romier shared the opinion that 
even though the USA provided a vital  economic role-model,  it  was secondary to 
France and Germany on a cultural level. For Hirsch, the German culture was superior 
to  American  imports  and Romier  argued that  the  actual  culture  of  the  USA was 
destroying the mores. Argumentative differences between both works mainly related 
to the specific lines of reasoning. While Hirsch elaborated on the American economy 
and its advantages, Romier rather investigated the current socio-economic situation 
of  France  which  could  be  improved  by  American-style  rationalization.  As  a 
consequence, Romier's work provided a guidebook for political implementation and 
thereby demonstrated a concrete political agenda. The creation of a “union nationale” 
was for Romier the solution to the ongoing problems of the French society. Julius 
Hirsch on the other hand showed an analytical rather than political  approach and 
highlighted the effective advantages of standardisation and assembly line production 
in the USA itself. The Ford Motor Company and the Chicago slaughterhouses were 
to him a paragon for production and consumption.  
For  the  anti-American  writers  Halfeld and Duhamel  the  actual  focus  on  the 
American society was even stronger. In contrast to the pro-American authors, Halfeld 
and Duhamel  argued from a cultural  perspective and debated  the  features  of  the 
American society.  Their  writings thereby related to the USA itself  as much as to 
American influences in Europe. On an argumentative level the works of both authors 
thus  portrayed  very  similar  narratives.  Their  criticism  centred  on  American 
materialism,  anti-individualism  and  mass-entertainment.  While  for  Halfeld  the 
German  “Kultur”  opposed  the  American  “Zivilisation”,  Duhamel  contrasted  the 
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French  “civilisation  morale  et  veritable”  with  the  “civilisation  méchanique  et 
materielle”. Both authors thus contrasted an ethnic and grown European society with 
a planned mass society of the USA. Main objective of both authors was thence an 
education of the German and French society about the dangers of Americanization. 
They  explicitly  stated  that  they  intended  to  protect  the  cultural  heritage  of  the 
Occident against American influences. Here, the criticism was not confined to the 
cultural  array:  economic  and  political  developments  were  also  connected  to  an 
overbearing  negative  American  system.  Even though  this  systemic  criticism was 
generally  similar,  it  does  entail  some  argumentative  differences.  Duhamel 
particularly  developed  a  moral  and  idealistic  framework  and  argued  that  the 
American model would oppose a shared canon of humanistic universal values. This 
was reflected in his main narratives where the mechanisation of society became a 
synonym for a loss of individuality and creative spirit.  Halfeld of the other hand 
especially propelled the ethnic dimension in his writings, arguing that the German 
“Volk” was incompatible with the planned society of the USA. 
How can we explain these differences and similarities?
The differences and similarities between the examined authors primarily relate to the 
subjective  dimension of  their  American-perception.  As  we have  discussed  in  the 
historiographical section this research has intended to contribute particularly to this 
subjective component of the debate. The empirical chapters have shown that different  
assessments  of  the  USA and the  American-model mainly relate  to  the subjective 
rudiments  of  the  authors  rather  than  objective  characterisations.  This  subjective 
perception was heavily shaped by the personal experiences of the authors and it has 
therefore been necessary to investigate their biographies in detail. As a result, there 
indeed existed an undeniable relationship between the lives of the authors and the 
ideas they conveyed in their America specific writing. This was particularly evident 
in the works of Georges Duhamel. Duhamel's focus on morality and humanism was 
not confined to the  Scènes de la vie future  it  also played an important role in his 
belletristic works such as Vie des martyrs, Civilisation and La possession du monde. 
Duhamel's experiences as a military doctor during the First World War had convinced 
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him that there was a necessity for brotherhood and morality in light of the wartime 
devastation.  The  mechanical  and  technological  innovations  of  the  war  were  for 
Duhamel  some  of  the  main  reasons  behind  the  many  casualties.  A rejection  of 
mechanisation together with a calling for morality hence also became cornerstones of 
his  America-criticism.  For  Adolf  Halfeld  there  exists  less  information  about  his 
biography,  therefore  a  connection  to  his  America-perception  is  more  difficult. 
Probably the only clear relation relates to Halfeld's focus on the German “Volk” and 
how he perceived his rejection of Americanization as a defence of the Occident. His 
later membership in the NSDAP can in this sense be interpreted as though the Nazis 
offered  a  defence  of  the  German  culture  against  outside  influences  and 
Americanization.
The subjective dimension of the pro-American argumentation is by contrast very 
clear.  Particularly  the  political  agenda  in  Romier's  Idées  très  simples  pour  les  
français can be explained through his affiliation with the Redressement Français. His 
call for a “union nationale” and American-style rationalization were not only part of 
his writings but actually mirrored the political demands of the Redressement. His 
America-image  was  therefore  clearly  influenced  by  the  political  precepts  of  the 
Redressement  which  intended  to  implement  technocratic  corporatism.  Similar 
assertions can be made for the writings of Julius Hirsch. Particularly Hirsch's focus 
on  standardisation and assembly line production  show a  clear  relationship to  his 
professional activities. As economist and member of diverse corporate directorships 
he witnessed the implementation of assembly line production first hand. By the time 
he  published  Das  Amerikanische  Wirtschaftswunder  in  1926,  assembly  line 
production was already part of the production process of the companies he chaired. A 
specific focus on the advantages of assembly line production and standardisation in 
his writings can hence be explained by the fact that Hirsch dealt with them on a 
regular basis. One can thus overall record that the arguments of the pro- and anti-
American authors under investigated were influenced by their personal experiences. 
In this sense, the Americanization-debate certainly contains a subjective component 
that  shouldn't  be  underestimated  and  accounts  for  many  of  the  argumentative 
differences. 
Further peculiarities in the America-perception of the authors were however also 
influenced by the historical circumstances and contemporary international relations. 
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This  was  equally  the  case  for  pro-  and  anti-Americanism.  Nevertheless,  the 
relationship was clearer for the pro-Americans due to their focus on the economic 
realities. Julius Hirsch, for example, debated the benefits of economic prosperity on 
the entire society and thereby showed a direct relation with the German realities. His 
prosperity calling here needs to be seen in relation to the instability of the German 
economy in the first half of the 1920s. The years prior to the publication of  Das 
Amerikanische Wirtschaftswunder had been characterised by economic depression 
and hyperinflation. It was only through the Dawes Plan and a currency reform that 
the  economic  situation  could  actually  be  stabilised.  The  historical  circumstances 
consequently  demonstrated  how  economic  stability  and  prosperity  would  spawn 
social well-being and an increase in living-standards. Similar assertions can be made 
for  the  writings  of  Lucien  Romier  who  argues  in  favour  of  French  economic 
independence  and  protectionism.  His  demand  for  economic  protectionism  was 
thereby  partly  a  reaction  to  the  increasing  American  investments  in  the  French 
industry. The growing financial involvement of American firms across all areas on 
the one hand certainly encouraged economic recovery but on the other hand also 
impaired self-determination. More importantly, however, the demand for economic 
independence  relates  to  the  reparations  and  debt  topicality.  While  Germany  was 
reluctant to pay reparations to France, the USA insisted on a repayment of the French 
wartime loans. France was therefore in a dependent relationship of two different sorts  
which put increasing pressure on the monetary system and the French economy in 
general. The request for more economic independence and self-determination thus 
clearly relates to this difficult political and economic situation. 
Explaining  the  similarities  and  differences  in  the  case  studies  through  the 
historical circumstances proves a lot more difficult for the anti-American authors. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to relate cultural criticism such as the rejection 
of mass-entertainment to undeniable American influences in Germany and France. 
Particularly  on  a  cultural  level  the  emergence  of  Jazz  music,  Tiller  Girls  and 
American  movies  became  part  of  the  cultural  realities  in  both  countries 
simultaneously. Specific criticism of technisation and mechanisation however in the 
works of Georges Duhamel not only relate to American culture but also to the history 
of the First World War.   After all  he connected mechanisation to the diminishing 
value of the individual and thereby held it accountable for the devastations of the 
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war. For Duhamel's counterpart Adolf Halfeld the First World War seemed to be a 
more  indirect  reason  for  his  America-criticism.  As  the  American  war-entry  was 
perceived as one of the main reasons for the German defeat his rejection of the USA 
can be seen as reaction to said defeat. Moreover, the role of the USA at the Paris 
Peace  Conference  as  author  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  added  to  anti-American 
images and were a possible further reason for Halfeld's anti-Americanism. 
Ultimately, the similarities and differences in the America-images of the authors 
are however also a reflection of the overarching pro- and anti-American discourse. 
What the influence of the debate on the authors actually was and to what extend they 
followed the debate is very difficult to assess. What can be said for certain is that  
there undeniably existed an ideological exchange between the national camps. While 
an ideological proximity could be observed between the Tat-circle and the Ordre 
Nouveau,  German  rationalization-supporters  were  cherished  guests  of  the 
Redressement Français as the speech by Julius Hirsch in Paris has shown. In this 
sense,  transnational  similarities  are  not  surprising  and  a  reflection  of  ideological 
interconnection.
7.2. Conclusion and Outlook
Aside  from the  similarities  and  differences  we  have  elucidated  above,  the  most 
important  finding  of  the  research  on  hand  was  the  affirmation  of  a  functional 
relationship  between  the  Americanization-discourse  and  national  identity. 
Particularly with regard to national identity these findings allow some conceptual 
conclusions. The general importance of identity reinforcement across all camps is an 
indicator for the perceived instability of the national identity in Germany and France 
for  the  given timeframe.  What  could be  possible  explanations  for  this  weakened 
identity during the 1920s? The most likely reason is an identity-crisis that is based on 
the First World War. Germany for one had lost the war and was thereafter confronted 
with the political instability of the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic was on 
the  one  hand  challenged  from  the  political  right,  which  wanted  to  return  to  a 
monarchy,  whist  the  political  left  pursued  a  Marxist  revolution.  In  France,  the 
military inferiority to the early German aggressions and later reliance on American 
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aid equally rocked the national identity. There hence in both cases existed a need for 
the reinforcement of a strong national representation-structure. A reconstruction and 
reinforcement  of  national  identity  in  this  sense  seems  to  be  triggered  by  an 
exogenous  shock.  The  Americanization  debate  hence  helped  to  foster  a  strong 
national identity in times of identity insecurity after the First World War. One could 
even argue that there exists a correlation between the perceived instability of the 
political  system and national identity as a representation structure. In any case,  it 
seems apparent that there certainly exists the need of a clear counter-structure after 
an external identity shock. The USA thence figured as representation structure, as 
functional “other” to reposition the own national identity. 
That the USA was in fact chosen as a functional model can thereby mainly be 
explained by the circumstances. The USA was simply the only western country that 
provided the right  characteristics for potential  adaptation or rejection.  France and 
Germany  would  not  turn  to  each  other  as  social  models  due  to  their  historical 
hostility.  Great-Britain  had  lost  its  imperial  and  economic  predominance  by  the 
1920s and the USSR had a political system that was not comparable to France and 
Germany. These countries therefore did not offer socio-economic models that could 
serve as representation structure for the creation of national identity. For the 1920s 
the  American  model  was consequently  the only  viable  model  to  function as  this 
representation grid. While Americanization itself had already existed before 1914, 
the functional dimension of the America-debate only became acute after the First 
World War.  One can therefore  conclude  that  this  specific  Americanization-debate 
demonstrates  a  new  approach  to  conceptualise  the  German  and  French  national 
identity during the interwar-period. 
Evidently these main findings in principle only relate to the case studies, i.e. the 
writings of the authors we have investigated. The case study methodology runs the 
risk of exaggerating the actual findings by generalising them to the universe of cases. 
Therefore, asserting that the Americanization-debate was generally and primarily for 
every author a catalyst for the reinforcement of national identity during the 1920s is 
impossible.  The  conclusions  in  this  section  consequently  can  only  and  are  only 
related to the four investigated authors. Nevertheless, based on my reading of the 
secondary literature it is possible to assume that the writings of the four authors do 
mirror  the  prevailing  arguments  of  the  respective  and  overarching  German  and 
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French Americanization debate. Assuming that they were in fact representative one 
can  consequently  argue  that  at  least  on  a  secondary  level  a  relation  to  national 
identity was a pillar of the discourse. Adding more authors to the research would in 
this sense not make the findings more reliable, it would simply add different nuances 
to the subjective dimension of the debate. 
In order to concretely investigate the connection between the Americanization-
debate  and  national  identity  the  constructivist  methodology  was  of  fundamental 
importance.  It  incorporated  a  conceptual  approach  to  collective  identities  and 
parameters which exceeded the socio-historical circumstances. A focus on agents and 
their relationship with structures has particularly helped to develop the subjective 
component of the Americanization-debate. The theory thus offered a methodological 
starting point that allowed to investigate how the authors constructed an image of the 
USA. Their America-assessment was certainly, from an argumentative perspective, 
not  innovative  and  picked  up  older  narratives.  But  by  looking  at  it  from  a 
constructivist  perspective  it  was  possible  to  observe  how  the  authors  (agents) 
deliberately created an image of the USA that was used to either argue for national 
changes  or  against  them and  thereby  ultimately  contributed  to  strengthening  the 
respective national identities. For future research the theory of Constructivism and its 
focus  on  structures,  agents  and  identities  thus  offers  a  very  useful  methodology 
particularly to investigate subjective and constructed concepts and images.
In  conclusion,  the  research  on  hand  has  thus  intended  to  contribute  to  this 
subjective  dimension  of  images  and  discourses.  It  has  revealed  an  additional 
approach for the conceptualisation of national identity in Germany and France during 
the 1920s. Pro- and anti-Americanism proved to be a catalyst for the reinforcement 
of national identity in both countries. In this sense, the debate about America was as 
much a discussion about the national reality and future of Germany and France as it 
was of the USA. To phrase this in constructivist terms: there is no “self” without an 
“other”. For the interwar-period the only viable “other” was thus an American-model 
that served as chisel to deliberately sculpt and polish what it meant to be German and 
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Summary in Dutch 
Samenvatting in het Nederlands
De constructie van Amerika
Een constructivistische reflectie op de relatie tussen het Frans-Duitse amerikaniseringsdebat 
en de nationale identiteit, 1918-1933
Sebastian Jacqué
Deze studie onderzoekt het Franse en Duitse amerikaniseringsdebat tussen 1918 en 1933. Zij 
reflecteert op de werken van auteurs die een significante bijdrage hebben geleverd aan het 
debat tijdens het interbellum over de Verenigde Staten en hun invloed op Europa. De focus 
van het  onderzoek ligt  op de relatie  tussen pro- en anti-Amerikaanse afbeeldingen en het 
concept  van  de  nationale  identiteit.  Als  leidraad  bij  het  onderzoek  gebruikt  de  studie  het 
Constructivisme als Theorie der Internationale Betrekkingen, en de methodologie rust op het 
vergelijkend onderzoek van casussen. Het empirische deel van deze studie behandelt het leven 
en  het  Amerika-gerelateerde  werk  van  Julius  Hirsch,  Lucien  Romier,  Adolf  Halfeld  en 
Georges Duhamel. Op basis daarvan komt deze studie tot de conclusie dat het pro- en anti-
Amerikanisme in Duitsland en Frankrijk in de jaren twintig een katalysator was voor het 
creëren, definiëren en verfijnen van de nationale identiteit. Daarmee bevestigt de studie niet 
alleen de functionele relatie tussen het amerikaniseringsdebat en de nationale identiteit, maar 
illustreert zij ook de meerlagige nuances van het discours, dat zowel subjectieve dimensies als 
historische en ideologische dimensies bevat.  
249
Curriculum Vitae
Sebastian Jacqué was born on 2 September 1990 in Bad Schwalbach, Germany. He studied 
European Cultures with a specialization in History at the University of Luxembourg. During 
this period, he partook in the Erasmus Program which allowed him to study one semester at 
the Friedrich-Meinecke-Institute at the Free University, Berlin.  He rounded off his studies 
with a Master of Arts in History from the Erasmus University Rotterdam with a specialization 
in  Global  History  and International  Relations.  Since  November  2012 he  has  studied  as  a 
Ph.D.-candidate  at  the  Erasmus  School  of  History,  Culture  and  Communication  of  the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam under the supervision of Prof. Hein Klemann and Dr. Ferry de 
Goey.  His  research  focuses  on  the  Americanization  of  Germany  and  France  during  the 
interwar-period, Constructivism as International Relations Theory and the concept of national 
identity.  During  his  studies,  he  inter  alia  worked  as  Freelance  Journalist  for  the 
Luxembourgish newspaper Luxemburger Wort and as Research Assistant at the professorship 
of  Prof.  Michael-Sebastian  Honig  at  the  University  of  Luxembourg  (research  axis  Early 
Childhood: Education and Care). 
250
